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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE IN HONG KONG
Summary
What would happen in Hong Kong after the 1997 transfer of its political sovereignty from 
the United Kingdom to the People's Republic o f China? For organizational leaders in 
Hong Kong, this was more than an academic issue. As the handover approached, they 
faced an impending discontinuity in their environment
Although the Chinese are renowned for their business success amidst environmental 
uncertainty, little is known about information management in Chinese organisations. 
Given that the ethnic Chinese constituted a vast majority o f both the general population 
and organisational leaders in pre-handover Hong Kong, it was an attractive context for 
strategic intelligence research
The study considered how Hong Kong Chinese chief executive officers (CEOs) perceived 
the pre-handover business environment, and how they acquired and used information 
about that environment A multiple method design was employed to extend an existing 
body of management literature on environmental scanning. Eight case studies across four 
industries complemented a survey of 53 CEOs in the printing and securities industries.
The questionnaire was designed to determine 1) the levels o f perceived uncertainty in six 
distinct sectors of the business environment, and 2) the environmental scanning conducted 
in response to the perceived uncertainty. Quantitative analysis revealed many similarities 
but also several significant differences from both previous studies in the West and between 
the two industries in Hong Kong
The case studies examined how CEOs acquired and used information about the external 
environment as they attended to specific strategic issues. The cases provided empirical 
grounding for an explanatory theory of information management and indicated that the 
handover was not a uniform or even universal source o f  environmental uncertainty. 
Specific cultural, institutional, and competitive factors were found to influence the 
environmental perceptions, scanning behaviours and information management activities 
of Hong Kong Chinese chief executives.
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CHAPTER 1
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AMD INTELLIGENCE
This dissertation presents an empirical study of how Chinese 
chief executives in pre-handover Hong Kong managed information 
about their external business environments. The focus of the 
study was on the environmental uncertainties perceived by these 
CEOs, and their acquisition and use of information in responding 
to those uncertainties and dealing with strategic issues.
The first chapter frames the topic of the study, by introducing 
the focal phenomenon, which is termed strategic intelligence, and 
outlining its role in strategic management and the decision 
making that is associated with its practice. The opening chapter 
also explores the current and potential role of information 
technology (IT) within this focus. The second chapter considers 
strategic intelligence in depth, by identifying the major 
concepts associated with this phenomenon, and reviewing and 
integrating the relevant literature. Chapter 3 discusses the 
context for the study - the neo-Confucian society and the open 
market economy of Hong Kong in the period leading up to its 
transfer of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to the People's 
Republic of China (PRC).
The framework for the research is presented in Chapter 4. First, 
the objectives, expected contribution, and key research questions 
are identified. Next, the research methods used to address the 
key questions and test specific hypotheses are outlined and 
justified. Finally, this chapter identifies and discusses the 
limitations of the study design.
The study employed multiple methods and consisted of two parts - 
a survey and case studies. The results from each part are 
presented in a separate chapter. Chapter 5 reports on the survey 
of 53 chief executive officers (CEOs) from the printing and 
securities industries. The results of the hypothesis testing 
revealed both similarities and differences compared to previous
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studies and between the two industries. Chapter 6 reports on 
case studies of eight CEOs in four different industries. A 
critical incident technique was employed to examine how 
information about the external environment was acquired and used 
to identify and interpret strategic issues.
Chapter 7 integrates the two phases of the study and discusses 
the results. The findings from pre-handover Hong Kong are 
compared to those from previous investigations conducted 
elsewhere in order to highlight key issues and to reinform the 
literature. Chapter 8 draws conclusions from the results of the 
study, considers the implications for management theory and 
practice, and recommends specific areas for further research.
1.1 Introduction
The political sovereignty of Hong Kong was transferred from the 
United Kingdom to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the 1st 
of July 1997. This was an unprecedented event, whereby an icon 
of capitalism was handed over to the world's last remaining major 
Communist regime. Since the Sino-British Joint Declaration was 
made public in 1984, the world knew that Hong Kong would have a 
new government in the middle of 1997. A Chinese government based 
in Beijing would replace a colonial administration ultimately 
responsible to the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland.
"What would happen to Hong Kong after 1997?" was a natural 
question to ask. And it was asked by many people within the 
territory and outside of it. The impending handover of Hong Kong 
prompted heated discussion and assorted speculation all around 
the world. It also represented a unique and attractive research 
opportunity. For those managing organisations in Hong Kong, the 
political change in 1997 was expected to be a serious issue 
rather than merely a topic for academic debate. In the period 
before the handover, those heading up both private and public 
sector organisations in Hong Kong faced an impending 
discontinuity in their external environment. This study
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addressed two key questions: What uncertainties did Hong Kong 
Chinese chief executives perceive to exist in the pre-handover 
environment? and What information did they acquire and use in 
response to the perceived uncertainties?
Significantly, about 97 percent of the population in pre-handover 
Hong Kong was ethnic Chinese. Nearly all of the business 
establishments there were owned and operated by this ethnic 
group. Although Hong Kong was under British administration prior 
to July 1997, a growing majority of the public agencies there 
were also led by ethnic Chinese.
Chinese businesses are renowned for their success amidst 
environmental uncertainty, turbulence and even chaos (Engardio, 
1991; Redding, 1990; Wang, 1991). Superior information about the 
business environment may help to explain this success. By 
sensing and understanding the implications of external changes 
on a timely basis, Chinese businesses may be able to thrive in 
a dynamic environment. However, little is known about how top 
managers in Chinese organisations manage information, or the role 
that information management plays in Chinese business success.
Pre-handover Hong Kong provided an attractive context for 
building upon an emerging body of Chinese management literature 
(see Fukuda, 1983; Ko, 1995; Martinsons & Hempel, 1995; Tricker, 
1988; Redding, 1990; Westwood, 1997). This study examined the 
environmental perceptions and information sourcing patterns of 
Chinese chief executives at a time when an elevated level of 
external uncertainty was to be expected. More specifically, the 
focus was on the environmental uncertainty perceived by these top 
managers, and their acquisition and use of information about the 
external business environment in response to that uncertainty.
This dissertation extends a rich body of Western literature 
related to the area of environmental scanning (see Aguilar, 1967; 
Auster & Choo, 1993; Daft et al., 1988; Duncan, 1972; Hambrick, 
1979) by studying this phenomenon in an important new context.
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It is also linked to a tradition of military and business 
intelligence that goes back to the writings of Chinese military 
leader Sun Zil some 25 centuries ago (see Griffith, 1963).
This opening chapter briefly reviews the evolution of strategy 
and intelligence^, contrasts different types of intelligence, and 
defines strategic intelligence. Then, the role of information 
in management is considered, while the nature of the decision 
making processes that are part of strategic management are 
examined. Finally, the degree of formalisation and systemisation 
of these processes as well as the application of IT are outlined.
1.2 The origins of strategy and intelligence
The concepts of strategy and intelligence both have military 
origins. The English word strategy is derived from the Greek 
strategos. Strategos first referred to the role of a general 
commanding an army, but later evolved to the art of the general, 
including the skills needed by a military leader (Evered, 1983). 
In recent times, strategy has referred to the art and science of 
conducting a military campaign on a broad scale (Dupuy & Dupuy, 
1970). As societies developed over time, their leaders 
progressively studied and codified the essence of strategy. This 
led to the emergence of some coherent strategic principles.
One of the key principles related a sound strategy to good 
information about the opposing army and the environment. The 
gathering and use of intelligence would promote an awareness and 
understanding of the issues as well as the dangers and the 
opportunities that lay ahead. Military strategists could make 
use of timely and reliable intelligence to take evasive or 
aggressive actions, and raise their prospects of winning wars.
1 also Sun Tzu from the transliteration of the Cantonese 
dialect
the term refers to the act of collecting key information 
as well as the collected information. Intelligence, in this 
context, does not refer to a measure of mental ability or the 
faculty of perceiving and comprehending meaning
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One of the first known efforts to record a theory of strategy is 
found in a reflective series of essays called The Art of War. 
These essays were written by Sun Zi, a noted Chinese military 
strategist who lived in the 4th century B.C. Significantly, the 
value of good intelligence was a central theme in The Art of War.
"The enlightened sovereign and the wise 
general can conquer their enemies, and 
achieve things that are beyond the reach of 
ordinary men because of their foreknowledge 
. . . know the enemy and know yourself, and in 
a hundred battles you will never be in 
peril" - Sun Zi, The Art of War (as 
translated in Sammon et al. , 1984)
The concept of intelligence has dominated strategic thoughts and 
actions ever since Sun Zi. For example, a remarkably coordinated 
system of intelligence was critical to the devastating style of 
warfare practised by the 12th century Mongols that foreshadowed 
the blitzkreig strategies of 700 years later (Ransom, 1970). 
Meanwhile, in the latter part of 16th century. Sir Francis 
Walsingham, the Secretary of State for Queen Elisabeth, designed 
an extensive intelligence system that enabled England to defeat 
the Spanish Armada, and increase its stature as a major maritime 
power (see Deacon, 1969).
Prussia's militant king, Frederick the Great (1712-86) also 
stressed the necessity of military intelligence, and backed up 
his words with actions. He was willing to excuse and pardon 
those who were defeated in battle, but not those who were 
surprised in the effort. Frederick was also among the first 
leaders to see the need for special staff to collect and analyse 
intelligence (Dulles, 1965). Their dedicated efforts and 
accumulated expertise would ensure a thorough familiarity with 
the prospective battlefield, including its topographic details, 
and also enable an accurate and comparative assessment of not 
only the current opponent, but also the prospects of either side
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receiving assistance from other parties.
Shortly after Frederick the Great cultivated this form of 
information gathering, Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), a 
Prussian general, noted the difficulties of interpreting external 
data in a timely fashion. In his military treatise. On War, Von 
Clausewitz noted that unforeseen obstacles, which he termed the 
'friction of war', could complicate the execution of strategy 
(Collins, 1962) . However, he added that these obstacles could 
be overcome by coupling good intuition, based on experience, with 
a strong personal will to win (Dulles, 1965). This implied that 
military commanders needed to rely on their own judgment when 
interpreting reported intelligence that may be contradictory, 
false or of dubious quality.
Intelligence gathering intensified dramatically in the 1800s. 
By the start of the 20th century, Europe was covered by a complex 
network of espionage and counterintelligence networks (Ransom, 
1965) . Although these efforts had a military emphasis, political 
concerns related to economic growth, social developments, and 
diplomatic relations were being monitored with increasing 
frequency. In Great Britain, the creation of the Intelligence 
Branch at the War Office in 1873 was a crucial first step toward 
the development of a modern intelligence organisation (Deacon, 
1969). In the aftermath of the South African War, the 
redesignation of the Intelligence Department as the Directorate 
of Military Operations facilitated a closer relationship between 
intelligence and strategic planning.
1.2.1 The emergence of business intelligence
Even as military and political intelligence systems became 
progressively more sophisticated, the emergence of mercantilism 
and its offspring, capitalism, had "transformed European commerce 
into a powerful international force" (Sammon, 1984, p. 28). As 
international trading houses in the 16th and 17th centuries moved 
to exploit the wealth of the New World, Asia and Africa, they 
sought out accurate information about distant places, persons,
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and institutions. This gave rise to non-political forms of 
intelligence. An early example was the timely knowledge about 
the results of key battles that enabled the Rothschild family to 
profit in the financial markets (see Sammon, 1984, pp. 29-30) .
The government intelligence services of the major Western powers 
in the first half of the 20th century may be seen as role models 
for the powerful intelligence-driven corporations that now exist.
"Although both the Allies and the Axis experienced 
significant intelligence failures during World War 
II, the highly-sophisticated, broad-based 
intelligence agencies that served the military and 
political leaders of both sides were relatively 
efficient, large-scale bureaucracies capable of 
collecting and integrating a wide-range of 
technical, scientific, military, economic, cultural 
and political data" (Sammon, 1984, p. 35).
With industrial and commercial competition becoming more intense 
and international during the 20th century, it was only natural 
that growing numbers of business leaders would embrace the 
concepts of strategy and intelligence. Strategic planning became 
"inextricably interwoven in the fabric of modern management" 
(Steiner, 1989). Strategic plans were needed to guide the 
complex logistics and sophisticated administrative structures of 
modern high-technology corporations over an extended time 
horizon. The development of these plans has almost invariably 
required the collection and processing of tremendous amounts of 
information about the external environment.
Multinational corporations now typically devote substantial 
resources to intelligence gathering and processing (see McGonagle 
& Vella, 1996; Sammon et al., 1984; Stanat, 1990 for examples). 
In Japan, economic intelligence gathering has been an official 
part of the national industrial policy since the late 1800s while 
the large Japanese trading firms (sogo shosha) have had business
7
intelligence systems since shortly after the Second World War 
(Kahaner, 1996) . Perhaps significantly, the Japanese word joho 
means both information and intelligence. This is consistent with 
the high intrinsic value placed on information in Japan (Meyer,
1988) .
Governments and corporations throughout Europe have also moved 
to enhance their intelligence capabilities while the Central 
Intelligence Agency in the United States has stepped in to become 
an information provider for American business (Herring, 1992; 
Kahaner, 1996) . The analysis of political risk in foreign 
countries has been of particular interest to Western 
multinationals. For example, McGonagle and Vella (1996, p.51) 
suggest that banks and oil companies concerned about the possible 
nationalization of their assets are highly motivated to ensure 
that they receive reliable early warning signals.
These types of initiatives imply that businesses around the world 
now compete on multiple dimensions, not just for the best 
customers, the best workers, and the best raw materials, but also 
for the best information. Intelligence may have the most value 
in high-technology industries, such as biotechnology, computers, 
pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications. These industries have 
large research budgets, short product development cycles, and 
small profit margins. Knowledge is the key resource while good 
information can make the difference between success and failure.
Despite the recent critiques of both the form and function of 
strategic plans (see Knights & Morgan, 1991; Mintzberg, 1994), 
there remains a general consensus that business performance can 
be improved by thinking ahead and planning for the future. 
Intelligence is now widely viewed as a critical input to this 
planning process. The collection and analysis of information 
about the external business environment is now a common activity 
in the modern business world. Many firms have even created 
formal intelligence systems (Huff, 1979; Gilad & Gilad, 1988; 
Kahaner, 1996) .
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Sammon (1984, p. 35) suggests that "intelligence that had been 
synonymous with ... the espionage agent ... is now an 
unparalleled information resource, produced by legions of 
analysts". These intelligence bureaucracies may not be able to 
guarantee superior performance, but they do promote a well- 
informed approach to strategic decision making. To paraphrase 
Frederick the Great, firms may still lose on the business 
battlefield, but they have no excuse if they are surprised 
during the battle.
1.3 Defining different types of intelligence
Intelligence can be conceptualised as information about the 
external environment that is relevant to decision making. In 
fact, it is the first of three stages in a decision making model 
proposed by Herbert Simon (1960). This model is detailed later 
in this chapter. Many dictionaries, including the Oxford 
Dictionary of Current English, also use the word "intelligence" 
to represent the collection and filtering process associated of 
this information. Assorted books and journal articles have 
considered this topic and employed different adjectives or 
related terms to denote sub-sets of intelligence.
As a result, it is useful to build upon Choo (1994) in order to 
compare some of the most commonly-used terms: competitor 
intelligence, competitive intelligence, business intelligence, 
strategic issues management, and social intelligence.
The most specific of these, competitor intelligence, seeks
"to develop a profile of the nature and success of 
the likely strategy changes each competitor might 
make, each competitor's probable response to the 
range of feasible strategic moves other firms could 
initiate, and each competitor's probable reaction 
to the array of industry changes and broader 
environmental shifts that might occur" (Porter,
1980, p. 47) .
9
Competitor intelligence is thus confined to the actions, 
behaviours and options of existing or potential competitors.
Competitive intelligence is a slightly broader concept. It 
refers to the analysis of competitors as well as the competitive 
conditions in particular industries and/or geographic markets. 
Michael Porter's seminal book on Competitive Strategy (1980) 
devotes eight of its sixteen chapters to competitive analysis 
techniques. More recently, Bernhardt (1994, p. 13) offers the 
following working definition for competitive intelligence: "an 
analytic process that transforms disaggregated competitor, 
industry and market data into actionable strategic knowledge".
Business intelligence has a considerably larger scope than either 
competitor or competitive intelligence. Market research, 
political risk assessment as well as competitive intelligence are 
among its many sub-areas. It is the function whose end product 
is processed information about the present and future business 
environment that is of interest to management (Greene, 1966, p.
2) . In contrast to corporate espionage or industrial spying, 
business intelligence efforts seek public or semi-public 
information using legal and ethical means. Gilad and Gilad 
(1988, p. 6) have defined business intelligence as "the activity 
of monitoring the environment external to the firm for 
information that is relevant for the decision-making process in 
the company." This is very similar to the concept of 
environmental scanning.
Environmental scanning has been defined to include the 
acquisition and analysis of information about every sector of the 
environment that is relevant to the future of the organisation 
(Aguilar, 1967; Auster & Choo, 1994). Both business intelligence 
and environmental scanning not only cover competitors, suppliers 
and customers, but also political and regulatory factors,- 
economic factors; social, demographic and cultural factors,- and 
technological factors that may affect the organisation.
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Strategic issues management differs from the previous process- 
based concepts primarily in terms of its issues-based 
perspective. It evolved from the field of public affairs with 
the aim of helping to ensure the "future viability and well-being 
of the organisation" (Ewing, 1990, p. 19). Stanley (1985) 
emphasised the need for systematic scanning so as to anticipate 
five types of possible strategic issues: economic, social (public 
attitudes), political (government policy changes) , technological 
(inventions or new techniques), and other (such as environmental, 
health and safety) issues. In the business context, Jane Dutton 
and her colleagues have considered how managers recognise and 
develop an understanding of strategic issues (see Dutton, Fahey 
& Narayan, 1983 ; Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Dutton, 1993) .
Finally, social intelligence is the broadest in scope and 
approach. Rather than being relating to a single organisation, 
it is concerned with the capability of society and societal 
institutions to identify problems, collect relevant information 
about these problems, and ultimately to use this information 
(Dedijer & Jequier, 1987). For example, Ventura (1988) defines 
it as "the organized ability of a country, or any of its 
components, to adapt to the rapidly changing world by combining 
the acquisition, evaluation, and use of information with planned 
operations and activities".
The various forms of intelligence may be differentiated by 
comparing their time horizon and scope of data gathering. As 
shown in Figure 1.1, there is a significant overlap between 
competitor and competitive intelligence, and also between 
business intelligence and environmental scanning. On the scope 
dimension, competitor intelligence, competitive intelligence and 
issues management have a relatively narrow focus. All three 
concentrate on a particular competitive environment or issue.
On the time dimension, both competitor and competitive 
intelligence have a relatively short horizon, due to their focus 
on dynamic market factors. In contrast, strategic issues
11
management has a longer horizon, because it engages in policy 
matters that have multiple stakeholders.
Figure 1.1
Comparing Different Types of Intelligence Activities
Broad
SCOPE OF 
INTEREST
Narrow
Social
intelligence
Business 
intelligence / 
Environmental 
scanning
Competitive
Intelligence Strategic issues
i •
management
Competitor
Intelligence Ì
Short
TIME HORIZON
Long
Based upon: Aguilar (1973); Bernhardt (1994); Choo (1994); 
Choo & Auster (1993); Ewing (1990); Gilad & Gilad (1986); 
Porter (1980); Ventura (1988).
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This comparison suggests that the domains of business 
intelligence and environmental scanning are very similar. Both 
are concerned not only with the current business environment, but 
also with future possibilities and alternatives. This future 
orientation creates an overlap with the concept of scenario 
planning (see Foster, 1993; Wack, 1985).
Greene (1966, p. 3) has suggested that the end product of 
business intelligence is "processed information of interest to 
management about the present and future environment in which the 
business is operating". Therefore, it would seem that the two 
terms, business intelligence and environmental scanning, can be 
used more or less interchangeably. This dissertation will tend 
to employ the term environmental scanning in reference to the 
scholarly literature on the topic; business intelligence will 
tend to be used when considering both the process and product 
within the realm of the management practitioner.
Strategic intelligence can be conceptualised as the subset of 
business intelligence that is relevant to strategic management. 
It may be viewed as a major sub-set of the information management 
activities conducted by those at the top of the organisational 
hierarchy. Strategic intelligence aims to give the chief 
executive (and his top management team) a solid understanding of 
the business environment.
Ghoshal and Westney (1991) identified six uses of competitor 
analysis, as follows:
1. sensitisation - challenging existing assumptions to 
shake up the organisation
2. benchmarking - comparing the performance of the 
organisation against its competitors and best-in-class 
performers
3. legitimisation - persuading organisational members 
that a proposal is feasible and desirable
4. inspiration - triggering new ideas and motivating 
people to solve problems
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5. planning - using the intelligence to craft intended 
courses of action and to support planning activities
6. decision-making - contributing to specific operational 
and tactical decisions.
Each of these uses is also applicable to strategic intelligence.
The management literature suggests that chief executive scanning 
can improve business performance, especially in complex 
environments (see Daft et al., 1988; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; 
Jaworski, 1996). For example, strategic intelligence can help 
to overcome a classic paradox that confronts many business 
leaders: maintaining central control and coordination while 
promoting rapid and flexible responses by subgroups. The 
evidence also suggests that good intelligence is related to a 
greater satisfaction with planning, a better understanding of 
market conditions, and increased profitability (Diffenbach, 1983; 
Dollinger, 1985; Godiwalla et al., 1980; Lester & Waters, 1989) .
So far, the evolution, uses and benefits of strategic 
intelligence have been presented. The next section considers the 
roles of information and intelligence in the general management 
context, and particularly with respect to strategic management.
1.4 Information and management
"Information is the lifeblood of our company"
- the motto of Mitsui Corporation (Japan)
Information may now be the lifeblood of many organisations and 
their managers. Information is certainly an important resource 
for almost every organisation, regardless of whether it is 
engaged in religious, military, business or public service 
activity. Organisations have even been conceptualised as
information-based systems in various streams of literature (see 
Barnes, 1984; Beer, 1981; Daft & Lengel, 1986; Weick, 1979) .
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More generally, information and knowledge are quickly supplanting 
labour and capital as the key resources in the post-industrial 
age, and creating shifts in economic and social power (see Bell, 
1973; Toffler, 1980). Martin (1988, p. 2) has argued that "the 
prospects for social change and economic development depend 
increasingly upon information and its exploitation". In economic 
terms, information is no longer just an important factor of 
production, but a key enabler for the efficient and effective 
coordination and utilisation of other factors of production.
Information is central to organisational management activity. 
Managers collect, interpret and act upon information in order to 
gain a better understanding of their own organisation. They also 
use it to respond more effectively to external threats and 
opportunities. After his seminal study of managers, Henry 
Mintzberg (1973, pp. 71-72) concluded that although they have 
three primary roles (interpersonal, informational and 
decisional), "it is the informational roles that tie all 
managerial work together".
The two other primary roles identified by Mintzberg are directly 
related to information. Managers develop their interpersonal 
networks not just to influence others but also to gather and 
disseminate information (Kotter, 1982) while their decisions are 
inevitably based on information. Information supports different 
types of managerial decisions, and Mintzberg's typology of 
decisional roles which is detailed later in this chapter.
Advances in information technologies, growing interdependencies 
between local, national and regional economies, and tendencies 
toward greater transparency and accountability have all 
contributed to the rapid growth of data that is available in the 
public domain. In addition, organisations are likely to have 
access to a considerable volume of private information. As a 
result, a lack of data is declining problem for managers.
Instead, they face growing difficulties in isolating relevant and
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important information from a constantly growing set of available 
data that is largely irrelevant or unnecessary (see Davenport, 
1997; Koniger & Janowitz, 1995; Simpson & Prusak, 1995). 
Managers will have to be increasingly selective in filtering, 
analysing, and interpreting the information that comes their way. 
The most acute information overload problems are likely to exist 
at the senior executive or strategic management level of the 
organisation, as discussed in the next sub-section.
1.4.1 The role of information in strategic management 
Strategic management has been defined as "the set of managerial 
decisions and actions that align an organisation with its 
external environment and thereby determine its long-run 
performance" (Hofer & Schendel, 1978). Although the practice of 
strategic management is usually concentrated at the top of the 
organisational hierarchy, its scope commonly spans the entire 
organisation and its environment (see Hambrick, 1982; Sutcliffe, 
1994) and it tends to involve fairly unstructured and fragmented 
activities. Faced with a steady stream of emerging issues, 
senior executives will frequently shift their attention from one 
concern to another and rarely have the time to consider an issue 
in a comprehensive manner (see Stewart, 1967; Mintzberg, 1983).
The information to support these activities will be broad in 
scope, aggregated, forward-looking and externally-oriented. Top 
managers tend to make aperiodic but complex decisions that will 
have enormous consequences, in terms of both resource commitments 
and potential effects. These decisions tend to shape the future 
of the organisation by addressing effectiveness rather than 
efficiency issues and prompting a coordinated and integrated set 
of actions (see Hunger & Wheelen, 1997).
Data collected in the U.S. during the 1970s indicated that senior 
executives spent up to a quarter of their time monitoring (and 
interpreting) the external environment (Hambrick, 1981; Kefalas 
& Schoderbek, 1973) . However, as a social phenomenon, the 
acquisition and' use of information about the business environment
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is not likely to be governed by universal or invariant laws nor 
constrained merely by technical capabilities. Top managers with 
different backgrounds working in different industries and 
countries at different periods of time are expected to have 
different information seeking and processing behaviours.
Socio-economic factors and industry dynamics are known to 
distinctly shape the business environment (Hunger & Wheelen, 
1997) . Although managers may face the same external conditions, 
they are likely to perceive and interpret them in different ways, 
and take different actions (Starbuck, 1976). Sutcliffe (1994) 
argues that perceiving environmental information is very a 
complex process, because different sets of factors influence 
various environmental dimensions.
The acquisition and use of information by strategic decision 
makers has been the focus of more than two dozen reported studies 
since the early 1970s. Although much of this research has been 
conducted by management scholars, the information systems (IS) 
discipline has also become interested in this topic (see Ahituv 
et al., 1998; Davenport, 1997; Maier, Rainer & Snyder, 1997).
Despite this research interest, Boyd & Fulk (1994, pp. 12-13) 
contend that "little is really known about this critical scanning 
function, particularly how executives make choices about where 
and when to seek external information." Such a contention is 
very difficult to refute in the Chinese business context, because 
the limited scholarly knowledge on this subject comes from 
studies conducted in the West. Before looking at what is known 
about the specific area, it is appropriate to contextualise that 
review by examining the broader literature on strategic decision 
making and considering the role of information technology.
1.5 Strategic decision making
Strategic management is a comparatively new and overarching 
discipline with an intellectual framework that encompasses and 
seeks to integrate many functional business areas. Although it
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is problematic to define the word strategic, strategic decisions 
and actions may be considered as those that are intended to align 
the internal capabilities of an organisation with the external 
demands of its environment (Hax & Majluf, 1988). These
capabilities may be considered in terms of relative strengths and 
weaknesses, while the demands may be seen as opportunities and 
threats. This gives rise to the S(trengths)-W(eaknesses) - 
0 (pportunities)-Tthreats) framework (Andrews, 1971/1980).
Lorange (1980) identified the integrative and adaptive 
responsibilities of top managers. He mentioned that in addition 
to controlling and co-ordinating internal resources, they have 
to address external factors and respond to unfolding changes in 
the environment. Consequently, top managers must look outside 
their organisations in order to identify threats and 
opportunities, interpret potential problems, and implement major 
changes (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Hunger & Wheelen, 1997).
Strategy making (or strategy formulation) may be seen as one of 
three core elements of strategic management practice, along with 
strategy implementation and strategy evaluation (Hunger & 
Wheelen, 1997). Strategies are made or formulated in order to 
provide the organisation with "a sense of unity, direction and 
purpose, as well as facilitating the changes induced by its 
environment" (Hax & Majluf, 1988, p. 101). They can stabilise 
organisational behaviour and serve as a mediating force between 
the organisation and its environment (Mintzberg, 1979).
1.5.1 Traditional and emerging views of strategy making 
The traditional view of strategy making emphasises the objective 
evaluation of knowledge as part of a highly rational process 
(Andrews, 1971/1980; Ansoff, 1965 and 1979). There appears to 
be an assumption that both the degree of confidence in and 
commitment to a strategic plan can be enhanced by formulating in 
a highly objective manner. As a result, the role of a human 
strategy maker with subjective values and world views has been 
downplayed and sometimes even ignored.
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Significantly, this traditional view of strategic management (or 
its predecessor, business policy) is evident in the planning, 
design, and positioning schools of thought identified by 
Mintzberg (1990). It accepts that top executives may differ in 
how they formulate a specific strategy, and even in what approach 
they select to interact with the environment. However, those 
advocating the traditional view have generally assumed that the 
environment is an objective entity rather than something subject 
to inherent differences in perception and interpretation.
According to Knights and Morgan (1991), these orthodox models of 
strategic management became popular because they could be used 
to explain successes and failures, they could be used to 
demonstrate managerial rationality, and they facilitated and 
legitimised the exercise of power. Unfortunately, the realities 
of strategy making are seldom as simple as these models imply. 
This has prompted criticism of traditional strategic management 
models (see Hamel & Prahalad, 1989) and strategic planning in 
particular (see Mintzberg, 1994).
There is a growing consensus that the nature of the strategy 
making process will depend on many factors, including the 
objectives, size, structure, culture, and management style of an 
organisation (see Araujo & Easton, 1996; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 
1992; Martinsons, 1993). Mintzberg and Waters (1985) proposed 
a typology consisting of eight different approaches to strategy 
making, as listed in Table 1.1.
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) also found that strategy making, 
especially in dynamic environments, takes place in a less 
deliberate and a more emergent fashion than suggested by the 
traditional views of strategic planning and thinking (e.g. 
Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980). Subsequently, 
Mintzberg (1990) identified ten different schools of thought on 
strategy making, each of which may be more or less appropriate, 
depending on the context.
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Table 1.1
Eight Approaches to Strategy Making
TyPe____ Major features
Planned Strategies originate in formal plans; precise intentions exist and are backed up 
by formal controls to ensure surprise-free implementation; strategies (are the) 
most deliberate
Entrepreneurial Strategies originate in central vision; intentions exist as personal, unarticulated 
vision of a single leader, and so (are) adaptable to new opportunities; strategies 
(are) relatively deliberate but can emerge
Ideological Strategies originate in shared beliefs; intentions exist as collective vision of all 
actors, controlled normatively through indoctrination and/or socialisation; 
strategies (are) rather deliberate
Umbrella Strategies originate in constraints; leadership, in partial control of organisational 
boundaries, defines strategic boundaries; strategies partly deliberate, partly 
emergent and deliberately emergent
Process Strategies originate in process; leadership controls process aspects of thinking, 
leaving content aspects to other actors; strategies partly deliberate, partly 
emergent (and, again, deliberately emergent)
Unconnected Strategies originate in enclaves; actor(s) loosely coupled to rest of organisation 
produce(s) patterns in own actions; strategies organisationally emergent 
whether or not deliberate for actor(s)
Consensus Strategies originate in consensus; through mutual adjustment, actors converge 
on patterns that become pervasive: strategies (are) rather emergent
Imposed Strategies originate in environment; environment dictates patterns in actions 
either through direct imposition or through implicitly pre-empting or bounding 
organisational choice; strategies (are the) most emergent, although may be 
internalised by organisation and made deliberate
Extracted from Mintzberg and Waters (1985).
Given Mintzberg's earlier conclusion that managers are 
essentially "adaptive information-manipulators who prefer the 
live, concrete action" (Mintzberg, 1 9 7 3 ,  p. 3 3 ) ,  it is not 
surprising that he recently argued against the entire practice 
of rational planning because he contends that it "tends to be
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incompatible with strategy making" (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 240).
Based upon his extensive field research in the United States, 
Quinn (1980) asserted that strategy making is fundamentally a 
dynamic learning process, being incremental and iterative in 
nature. He suggested that new ideas are rarely planned in detail 
or timetabled. Instead, a blend of formal analysis, behavioural 
techniques, and power politics leads the top manager toward "ends 
which initially are broadly conceived, but which are then 
constantly refined and reshaped as new information appears" 
(Quinn, 1980, p. 3) . However, because it is difficult to 
disentangle the diachronic and synchronic aspects of this 
conceptualization, the issue of incommensurability does arise. 
Not surprisingly, Mintzberg and Waters (1985, p. 269) contended 
that "(m)ore research is required on the process of strategy 
formulation to complement the extensive work currently taking 
place on the content of strategies".
From another perspective, strategies may be refined and reshaped 
as top managers identify specific issues that require their 
attention. Efforts may focus on developing a good understanding 
of the issue as well as the implications of alternative actions 
that the organisation could take. This is consistent with the 
previously-presented definition of strategic issues management.
Both the process and issue perspectives suggest that strategy 
making involves a fairly continual and iterative sequence of 
cognition and evaluation of and response to signals and messages 
from both inside and outside the organisation. Indeed, the 
decisions made and actions taken at the top of an organisation 
often appear to be sparked by fundamental environmental change. 
Streams of unpatterned environmental events create uncertainty 
or equivocality, stimulate information processing, and lead to 
strategic adaptation (Hambrick, 1981, 1982; Culnan, 1983) .
Recently reported studies (see Hulland & Kleinmutz, 1994; Rediker 
et al., 1993; Smith, 1992) further indicate that managers use
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various combinations of analytic (interactive decision-making, 
quantitative data collection, systematic scanning, comprehensive 
data integration) and intuitive (top-down decision-making, idea 
collection, ad-hoc scanning, piecemeal integration of data into 
planning) decision making approaches. As a result, it seems 
appropriate to supplement the rational-analytic view of strategy 
making with a subjective-intuitive conception that recognises the 
individual strategy maker as a centre-stage actor. The two views 
are contrasted in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2
Rational-analytic view
Subjective-intuitive view
The subjective-intuitive view focuses on the interplay between 
objective factors and the subjective perceptions and values of 
strategy makers. It implies that a thorough understanding of the 
strategy making process is contingent on accounting for the 
cognitions, perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and resulting 
behaviours of the strategy maker.
In this view, the actions that an organisation takes in
22
responding to its environment are more likely to depend on top 
management's subjective perceptions of the environment rather 
than on the rational analysis of objective indicators. Rumours, 
opinions and anecdotes may play a role alongside facts, 
statistics and news reports, and even the latter set may be 
subject to varied interpretation. Thus, a strategic choice is 
likely to depend greatly on the cognitive map(s) of reality held 
by those involved in the process.
Related to this, the rational view of decision making, as it has 
been applied in classical economics, has fallen out of favour in 
the contemporary organisational and management literature. There 
is a growing acknowledgment that the process is unavoidably 
limited by the information processing capacities of decision 
makers. The bounded rationality of managers (Simon, 1960) 
implies that they will attempt to interpret a complex environment 
and create a simplified mental model of it. Large volumes and 
steady streams of information lead to the creation and refinement 
of these models (see Johnson-Laird, 1973). Decisions are then 
made in terms of behavioural alternatives within a mental model.
1.6 Models of decision making
Decades ago, Herbert Simon (1960) proposed a decision making 
model that initially consisted of three stages - intelligence, 
design and choice - and was later modified to include a fourth 
stage - implementation. The interest here is squarely on the 
first stage of the model, where a decision maker gathers 
information about the environment, either intermittently or 
continuously, in order to identify and define the problem.
The applicability of this model to strategic management was 
confirmed by the work of Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret 
(1976). Based upon their analysis of 25 strategic decision 
processes, they discerned three process phases. Problems or 
opportunities were recognised in an identification phase; 
alternative responses to those problems or opportunities were 
elaborated in a development phase; and a decision among those
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alternatives was made in the selection phase. This is detailed 
in Table 1.3. Significantly, information is sought out and used 
during each phase, not just at the beginning or in a subset of 
activities.
Table 1.3
The Role of Information in Different Decision Phases
Decision Phase Decision Routine Role of Information
1 Identification Recognise To recognise the need for decision 
making.
To recognise the situation as an 
opportunity, problem or crisis.
Diagnose To understand causes.
To determine cause-effect relationships.
2 Development Search To search for ready-made or memorised 
solutions.
To directly seek out alternatives.
Design To modify or custom- design a solution.
3 Selection Screen To eliminate infeasible or inappropriate 
alternatives.
Evaluate/Choose To choose an alternative by analysis, 
judgment, or bargaining.
Authorise To justify or explain the choice.
Extracted from Mintzberg et al. (1976).
Mintzberg and his colleagues (1976) identified three information 
routines: exploration, which involves the general scanning of 
information in order to recognise decision situations and build
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conceptual models; investigation, which involves the collection 
and analysis of specific information for problem diagnosis and 
the evaluation of alternatives; and dissemination, to let others 
know how the decision process is progressing.
Shrivastava and Grant (1985) acknowledged that these three phases 
and routines described the essential character of many strategic 
decisions, but they claimed that such a model failed to 
“distinguish the critical variations in the processes followed by 
different organisations" (p. 98). They went on to identify four 
prototypical patterns or models of strategic decision making. 
These were identified as: managerial autocracy, systemic 
bureaucracy, adaptive planning, and political expediency.
In the managerial autocracy model, “a single key manager was the 
primary decision making agent. The entire decision process 
revolved around his preferences and actions" (Shrivastava & 
Grant, 1985, p. 103). Very few competing views of the problem 
or alternative solutions were generated because the key manager’s 
perceptions of the problem or situation were adopted uncritically 
by other members in the organisation. In the systemic 
bureaucracy model, the activities, information flows and 
interactions that made up the strategic decision-making process 
were determined largely by well-established organisational 
systems and clearly-defined rules.
Meanwhile, in an adaptive planning model, a long-range plan was 
formulated by a professional planning staff or senior managers, 
but it was modified to accommodate changed organisational and 
environmental conditions. Finally, with a political expediency 
model, coalitions of decision-makers within an organisation 
promoted their respective perspective of the problem as well as 
their proposed solution(s) as the only legitimate and accurate 
view. Conflicts were resolved through negotiations and choices 
made through committee decisions.
More recently, Lord and Maher (1990) proposed a taxonomy which
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includes four different models of decision making: rational, 
limited capacity, expert, and cybernetic. Each provides a 
substantially different explanation of how people process 
information. As shown in Table 1.2, each also implies a unique 
combination of information requirements, choice process, 
perceptual requirements as well as type and timing of process.
Table 1.2
Com parison of Four Decision-Making Models
F e a tu re s Rational Limited Capacity Expert Cybernetic
Information
requirements
Knowledge of 
expectancies and 
utilities for many 
alternatives
Knowledge of 
expectancies and 
utilities for a few 
alternatives
Highly selective 
use of schema­
relevant 
information
Selective use of 
current data along 
with recall and 
evaluation of past 
actions
Choice
process
Optimization by 
maximizing 
expected utility: 
evaluation of all 
alternatives
Simplification by 
heunstic evaluation 
procedures and 
termination when a 
satisfactory 
alternative is found
Recognition of 
good alternatives 
through automatic 
matching with 
information in long­
term memory
Feedback-guided 
use of recognition 
and heuristic 
procedures
Perceptual
requirements
Accurate 
perceptions of 
the environment 
based on surface 
features
Accurate 
perceptions of a 
limited environment 
based on surface 
features
Accurate 
perceptions of a 
limited environment 
based on meaning
Accurate 
perceptions of a 
limited environment 
and ability to shift 
perspectives over 
time I
Type of 
process
Controlled, serial, 
analytic
Controlled or 
automatic use of 
heuristics: senal
Automatic, parallel Learning, controlled 
automatic: serial
Timing of 
j process
Prior to choice or 
behaviour
Prior to choice or 
behaviour
Poor or concurrent 
with choice or 
behaviour
Intermixed with 
choice or behaviour
Extracted from Lord and Maher (1990).
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Rational models assume that all relevant information is 
thoroughly processed in order to maximise a relevant outcome. 
In contrast, limited capacity models suggest that people process 
limited amounts of information in order to generate adequate but 
not optimal behaviours. Rather than assuming exhaustive 
processing, these models imply that processing will make use of 
heuristics or rules of thumb and continue until an acceptable 
alternative is identified.
Expert models assume that within a specific content domain, 
people make use of mental knowledge structures, or cognitive 
maps, that they have previously developed in order to help them 
process information. As Isenberg (1984) has found, experts are 
much better at recognizing meaningful patterns, and are also able 
to identify a set of effective solution heuristics, or rules of 
thumb, much faster than novices. As a result, they can quickly 
decide whether a situation is similar to one they have 
encountered before, comprehend familiar aspects of an event, and 
"often recognize immediately what novices require great effort 
to discover" (Lord & Maher, 1990, p. 14).
Like their rational counterparts, cybernetic models may be 
optimised in the long run, but result from "learning and 
adaptation, rather than by sophisticated processing before 
(either) choice or behaviour" (p. 15). Indeed, Hogarth (1981) 
has argued that such a dynamic perspective provides an 
alternative definition of rationality, based on evolutionary 
adaptation rather than stable optimisation procedures. The best 
way to solve a problem changes over time, and so it is important 
to understand how the problem and the context may have changed.
These cybernetic models are less effective when feedback is slow 
or if the courses of action pursued are costly to reverse 
(Steinbrunner, 1974) . They are more appropriate for applications 
that "require accurate, fast and frequent feedback" (Lord & 
Maher, 1990, p. 16). "Cybernetic models would be applied over 
time through interaction with the context of interest.
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Experimentation would substitute for extensive prior knowledge 
or complex analysis" (ibid, p. 18).
Lord and Maher (1990) acknowledge that industrial/organisational 
psychologists and management researchers have implicitly adopted 
either the rational or limited capacity models of information 
processing. However, they suggest that the expert or cybernetic 
models may be more consistent with observed behaviour (ibid, p. 
10) . As a result, this taxonomy of decision making models would 
appear to be a useful analytic tool for studying how information 
is acquired and used at the strategic management level.
1,5.1 Strategic issue diagnosis
Meanwhile, Jane Dutton and her colleagues responded to a call for 
more sophisticated process-oriented treatments of strategy 
formulation (see Hofer & Schendel, 1978) by proposing the idea 
of strategic issue diagnosis. Dutton, Fahay and Narayanan (1983) 
introduced this term to represent the triggering and 
interpretation of strategic issues, which are emerging 
developments, trends or events that have the potential to 
significantly affect organisational performance (Ansoff, 1980,- 
King, 1982) . The diagnosis of these issues is seen as "primarily 
an individual cognitive process that is particularly important 
for managers in the 'upper echelons' of management" (Dutton, 
1993, p. 341).
Since a strategic issue does not arrive in a nice, pre-packaged 
format, Dutton and Duncan (1987) model its diagnosis as an 
iterative and cyclical process that involves two major phases - 
activation and interpretation. The diagnosis process is 
activated when the top manager recognises an emerging 
development, trend or event that is potentially relevant to his 
or her organisation's strategy. Some organisations have created 
formal systems that put these issues on the strategic management 
agenda (King, 1982). In other organisations, strategic issues 
surface as a result of more intuitive and informal mechanisms 
that Mintzberg et al. (1976) labelled as action thresholds.
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Once the strategic issue has been recognised, the top manager 
will endeavour to understand or interpret it. According to 
Dutton and Duncan (1987, p. 283-286), he or she will engage in 
attempts to interpret two aspects of the issue - its urgency and 
its feasibility. Issue urgency refers to the perceived time 
pressure to take action as well as the perceived cost of not 
taking action with respect to the issue (Miller, 1982) . 
Meanwhile, issue feasibility includes two sub-dimensions - 1) 
perceived understanding - the degree to which the means for 
resolving the issue are understood, and 2) perceived capability - 
the degree to which the means for resolving the issue are 
available and accessible.
3cth anecdotal reports and personal experience suggest that such 
orderly representations of stages or phases belie the chaotic 
nature of managerial decision making. These simple models also 
fail to account for the social and political contexts in which 
even autocratic decision-makers tend to operate. However, the 
Dutton and Duncan (1987) model is useful because it highlights 
the difference between the information (and sources) that prompt 
initial recognition of a strategic issue and other information 
(and sources) are used later to understand or interpret that same 
issue.
Isenberg (1984) provides another perspective on how top managers 
address strategic issues and make decisions. He contended that 
"it is hard to pinpoint if or when they (senior managers) make 
decisions about major issues on their own" (p. 88) and 
subsequently concluded that top managers "frequently bypass 
rigorous analytical planning altogether, particularly when they 
face difficult, novel or extremely entangled problems" (p. 90). 
Their reliance on intuition and inspiration may be attributed to 
a common self-perception that they are a visionary 'guiding 
light' and/or 'dynamic brain' for their organisation.
In reviewing the literature on strategic decision making, 
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992, p. 18) conclude that "it is clear
29
that people are rational, but only boundedly so, that power wins 
battles of choice, and that chance affects the course of 
strategic decision making. It is also clear that a synthesis of 
bounded rationality and political perspectives provides a 
compelling description of strategic decision making." They add 
that strategic decision makers "satisfice rather than optimise, 
rarely engage in (a) comprehensive search, and often discover 
their goals in the process of searching" (ibid, p. 22). 
Following from this and the work of Rohrbaugh (1979; 1983), it 
would seem that the effectiveness of decisions at the strategic 
management level, however they are made, will depend greatly on 
timely, reliable and relevant information about the environment.
1.6.2 Managerial decision roles
Mintzberg (1973) proposed a model of the managerial use of 
information that includes information acquired from the external 
environment. In his conceptualisation, the interpersonal roles 
of the manager provide access and exposure to information from 
an assortment of both external and internal information sources. 
The manager in the informational role of monitor "continually 
seeks and receives information from a variety of sources in order 
to develop a thorough understanding of the organisation and its 
environment" (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 97).
This access to information combined with positional authority 
enables a manager to perform four decisional roles. As an
entrepreneur, the manager initiates improvement projects such as 
new lines of business or joint ventures that exploit an 
opportunity or solve a problem. As a resource allocator, the 
manager controls the distribution of all forms of organisational 
resources through, for example, budget allocation and setting of 
targets. As disturbance handler, the manager deals with
unexpected but important events. Finally, as negotiator, the 
manager engages in major negotiations with other organisations 
or individuals.
Information about environmental conditions, developments and
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trends is likely to be useful for each of Che four decisional 
roles. As discussed in the next section, the acquisition of such 
information has been the object of both prescriptive and 
descriptive writing.
1.7 Strategic intelligence systems
As m e  externa- business envircnmenr bprf r.es more dynamic, 
ccttplex and turbulent, it becomes more difficult to forecast the 
outcomes of specific actions or events based on expected 
probabilities. Inaccurate, incomplete or outdated information 
also becomes mors 
competitors, techi 
difficult to plan 
others, and easier 
windows of opportunity. While quick reactions and frequent 
adaptations to change can lead to dysfunctional and even
likely iEisenhardt 1989) .
molcgies , and business ru'.
i fruitful actions or imita
: to make strategic mistakes
hysterical behav their absence a'
impair the long-term performance of
Following from this , the failureL  to monitor and act upon 
information about the external business environment in an 
effective manner can constitute a large bottleneck to 
organisational health and development. Morgan (1992) makes the 
analogy to the visual system of a fly, which provides a 
comprehensive and sensitive view of its surroundings. He 
contends that the success of an organisation will depend largely 
on its early detection of subtle changes that are reshaping its 
environment as well as its ability to cope with emerging threats 
and opportunities. This suggests that the ability to perceive 
and response to weak and early environmental signals can provide 
an information-based competitive advantage.
A specific focus on intelligence gathering may also demonstrate 
an organisation's scope of interest to external parties. For 
example, Murphy (1939) suggests that it could be used to pre-empt 
unwanted competition, and signal the importance of a particular 
technology to potential suppliers or the importance of their
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patronage to targeted customers.
However, comprehensive information gathering is far from 
universal ideal. For example, Donald Schön (1983) noted that the 
only way to know about an event with certainty is to rely upon 
one (and only one) informant - possibly oneself at the risk of 
self-delusion. This is consistent with the expert type of 
decision making (Lord & Maher, 1990) and also favours bounded 
rationality, so that decision makers are not overwhelmed by 
excessive information (see Simon, 1960).
1.7.1 Intelligence system prescriptions
Despite Schön's perspective, the massive amount of available 
external data and the growing complexity of strategic decisions 
have prompted calls to formalise and systematise business 
intelligence activities. Formal scanning systems were advocated 
in seminal works on corporate strategy (Ansoff, 1965) and 
competitive strategy (Porter, 1980). In fact, Porter (1980) 
asserted that an organised mechanism to facilitate sophisticated 
competitor analysis is needed and even diagrammed a systems 
framework for competitor intelligence (p. 73).
Anne Huff (1979) proposed a 'strategic intelligence system' (SIS) 
that would provide a continual stream of intelligence to top- 
level decision makers. She defines this intelligence as 
information that is refined through integration, evaluation, and 
selective reporting. "Most intelligence production involves 
collecting and correlating large quantities of small details to 
answer questions raised by strategic choices" (Huff, 1979, p. 
188). She specified the following areas of SIS design:
• identifying and planning the intelligence effort,
• deciding what information to collect, and collecting it,
• integrating and analysing the information, and
• reporting and disseminating the resulting intelligence.
At the front end, questioning procedures would be used to 
identify both the information that is needed and the collection
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procedures to be used. The author built upon this design to 
outline a prescriptive framework for managing strategic 
intelligence (Martinsons, 1994). This outline responded to an 
growing need for a more informed understanding of managerial 
processes (and an implied interest to make the behaviour of 
managers more predictable for IS designers).
In this regard, Davenport (1993) suggested that organisations be 
considered in terms of both operational processes, that result 
in products or services valued by external or internal customers, 
and managerial processes that plan and control the business 
operations. He argued that while managerial processes typically 
consume a major proportion of organisational resources, they 
rarely deliver explicit outputs, and remain poorly understood.
Davenport (1993) insisted that there was little agreement on what 
constitutes a successful managerial outcome or, in fact how an 
outcome can be measured. He has argued "for a greater degree of 
structure in managerial work" (p. 275), even though he recognised 
that the creative and intuitive nature of these processes will 
make them the most difficult to document and redesign (p. 303). 
This difficulty is expected to be most acute for the upper 
echelons of management.
Nevertheless, based on an implicit need to make efficient and 
effective use of available resources, top managers may be 
encouraged to be “thoughtfully selective“ in their data 
collection and information usage. Unnecessary data and confusing 
information can lead to not only wasted resources, but also to 
paralysis by analysis, poor decisions, and general frustration.
In order to avoid such a waste of resources, prescriptions based 
on sound theory or empirical studies would be helpful. This was 
the author's intention when he identified the following 
characteristics of a successful intelligence effort: clear 
objectives, the active involvement of both managers and those 
interfacing with the environment, the use of both personal and
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informal sources, and well-defined scope boundaries (Martinsons, 
1994) . Earlier, peer networking, incentives for instituting a 
strong 'sense and report' culture, and formal reliance on 
designated corporate monitors were listed as important factors 
(Lenz & Engeldow, 1986). Subsequent research may be expected to 
refine current models and frameworks, improve our understanding 
of how strategic intelligence should and can be managed, and 
enable better prescriptive advice for practitioners.
However, it must be noted that Waterman (1988) argued against 
sophisticated prescriptions in this area because:
• competitors are not easy to identify;
• business is not necessarily a zero-sum game, firms may 
compete fiercely at one level even as they help each 
other at another level; and
• managers of competing firms are human rather than dumb 
or superhuman, and so their behaviour is difficult
to predict.
More generally, the dynamic nature of competition raises serious 
questions about the value of static models. Even if flexible 
models could be designed and implemented, the existence of a 
well-defined approach to strategy making, if not actually 
strategic planning, would still remain a prerequisite for the 
effective use of a formalised environmental scanning system.
Nevertheless, a better understanding of top managers and their 
activities, and specifically how they collect data and process 
information, would enable beneficial redesigns of managerial work 
and the development of appropriate information systems. In 
selective cases, radical process innovation or business process 
re-engineering (BPR) using IT as an enabler may be appropriate 
to dramatically improve key measures of business performance. 
Even where such re-engineering proves to be overly ambitious, top 
management performance could be improved through the application 
of computer-based information systems (CBIS).
34
1.~.2 Intelligence systems design
As technological advances and business conditions increase the 
incentives for applying IT to the work of top managers (see Gray, 
1993; Watson et al., 1991), a new type of CBIS has emerged. 
Eockart and Treacy (1982) coined the term "executive information 
systems" (EIS) to describe them. An EIS can be considered as a 
tool for internal monitoring and communication as well as 
environmental scanning and decision-making. Leidner and Elam 
1993) found that an EIS can increase the speed of problem 
identification, the speed of the decision-making process and the 
extent of decision-making analysis.
Nevertheless, Galliers (1991) cautions that a well-defined 
objective and quality design are necessary but certainly not 
sufficient conditions for the success of such a system. The 
intrinsic interest and involvement of top managers as well as 
their understanding of IT are among the key success factors for 
a strategic-level information system. Of course, the
implementation of such a system also raises the issues of 
subversion and avoidance by those entering or processing data 
that will be used by management decision-makers.
King (1978) was among the first to comment on the difficulties 
in developing CBIS to meet the information needs of senior 
executives. He noted that because those needs are contingent on 
how the business environment is perceived, the system must be 
flexible enough to accommodate uncertainty rather than being 
based on habit or stable patterns. In contrast, traditional 
management information systems (MIS) provide pre-specified 
information at pre-specified intervals. Even decision-support 
systems (DSS) largely serve lower-level managers and staff 
professionals who deal with more narrow and structured problems.
Not surprisingly, the successful development of intelligence 
systems for top managers continues to be problematic (Kahar.er, 
1996; McGonagle & Vella, 1996) . Although the systematic 
monitoring, analysis and prediction of the environment has been
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commonly prescribed (see Huff, 1979; Martinsons, 1994), there are 
significant differences in the intelligence 'systems' of 
individual firms. These differences may be attributed to several 
factors, including: the perceived complexity and turbulence of 
the environment; the culture and resources of the organisation; 
and the philosophies and styles of individual managers.
Since an IS may be formal or informal, standardised or ad-hoc, 
structured or subjective, its design should fit the 
implementation context (see Angell & Smithson, 1991; King, 1978; 
Tricker, 1993) . Some managers may receive intelligence as a by­
product of other data consolidation efforts, others may have 
identified key indicators that they want to monitor, and still 
others may have requested specific information. Even the last 
approach has its shortcomings, since it reflects what managers 
want rather than what might help them. The two may be quite 
different.
Consequently, a good understanding of both the perceived business 
environment and the end-user(s) appears to be a prerequisite for 
developing an effective intelligence system. For example, it is 
unlikely that an intelligence system created for the chief 
executive of a public listed company in London will be suitable 
for a family business patriarch in Hong Kong.
A key issue in designing an EIS is determining top management's 
information requirements. Although this step is part of the 
development process for most types of information systems, the 
task is more complex and subjective for an EIS (see Watson et 
al., 1991). It may be possible to support many of the 
information needs that strategic-level managers have with these 
so-called executive information systems (EIS). However, with 
organisations being thrust from relatively stable and simple 
environments to more turbulent and complex ones (see D'Aveni, 
1994), such a possibility requires an understanding of how top 
managers will act in a variety of circumstances.
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1.. 7.3 Intelligence systems in action
Sophisticated enterprise-wide intelligence systems are now known 
to exist in many Japanese and Western firms. For example, 
Mitsubishi has more than 13,000 employees in its 200 overseas 
offices, and they collect more than 30,000 pieces of business and 
competitive information each day. This data is filtered, 
analysed, and interpreted. The resulting intelligence is 
disseminated to all the member companies in the Mitsubishi 
keiretsu (business group).
Studies reported by Keegan (1973), Kennedy (1984), Preble et al. 
(1988), and Subramanian et al. (1993) indicate that U.S.-based 
multinational corporations have also stepped up their 
environmental analysis efforts since the 1970s. Many of them 
institutionalised global environmental scanning functions after 
the Iranian revolution of 1979-1980, and their intelligence 
activities have become progressively more sophisticated since 
that time. For example, El Sawy and Pauchant (1988) found that 
growing numbers of U.S. firms were using strategic planning 
(perhaps more correctly strategy making) methods that relied 
heavily on intensive intelligence gathering. Many of these firms 
continuously monitored the environment for discrete signals and 
evidence of trends that could affect their business while 
searching for information related to specific strategic issues.
Meanwhile, a professional group, the Society of Competitor 
Intelligence Professionals, was established in 1986. Since then, 
it has grown steadily from its U.S. base to over 3,000 members 
by 1995 and affiliates in many parts of the world (Kahaner, 
1996) . This society reports that nearly 20 per cent of larger 
companies now have a full-scale, formalised intelligence system 
while the figure for smaller firms is approaching 10 percent 
(quoted in Kahaner, 1996, p. 23).
Despite the emergence of an international society of intelligence 
professionals, there continue to be significant differences in 
prevailing practices. For example, Kahaner (1996, p. 35) has
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suggested that American and Japanese firms differ in terms of 
their environmental scanning emphasis. The Japanese tend to 
focus on technical developments and the technological prowess of 
competitors while their American counterparts concentrate on 
monitoring economic factors as well as the financial health of 
key competitors. These types of differences suggest a need to 
understand the practice of environmental scanning in a variety 
of contexts, and the reasons behind observed differences.
1.8 Chapter Summary and a Look Ahead
This chapter has introduced the phenomenon of strategic 
intelligence and considered its role in strategic management. 
Several models and typologies relevant to strategic decision 
making were introduced before the current and potential use of 
strategic intelligence systems was considered. A well- 
established body of literature has traced the evolution of 
environmental scanning in U.S.-based firms and examined specific 
aspects of this topic. In addition, anecdotal accounts indicate 
that intelligence gathering is a core business activity in Japan.
In contrast, very little is known about the use of intelligence 
systems or even the strategic management activities of Chinese 
businesses (notable exceptions include Redding, 1990; Tricker, 
1994; Warrington, 1982; Westwood, 1997). The author perceived 
this as a significant gap in the management literature and was 
keen to observe, describe, and explain how information about the 
external business environment was acquired and used by ethnic 
Chinese chief executives. As mentioned earlier, pre-handover 
Hong Kong represented an attractive context for such an 
investigation.
Before the methods and results of the study are reported in 
Chapters 4 through 6, the concepts and literature relevant to 
both the focal phenomenon, are reviewed in Chapter 2, and the key 
contextual factors in Hong Kong are discussed in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 2
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE: CONCEPTS AND STUDIES
As defined in Chapter 1, strategic intelligence is information 
about the external environment that is used in strategic 
management. The opening chapter discussed the nature of 
strategic decision making and considered the role of information 
in that process. It was argued that information is a key 
resource for the modern organisation and that assorted forms of 
strategic intelligence systems, which commonly employ IT, can 
support strategic decision making.
This chapter builds upon that general discussion by reviewing the 
theoretical and empirical literature related to environmental 
scanning. First, the relationship between the organisation and 
its external environment is discussed. Then, the theme of 
acquiring and using information in response to environmental 
uncertainty is developed, with the attributes and sources of that 
information being considered in detail. A literature review 
leads to the development of a model that underpinned the Hong 
Kong-based study which is the subject of this dissertation.
2.1 Organisât ions and envHrnnmmfr.»
The discipline of strategic management has been a relative 
newcomer in terms of studying the relationship between the 
organisation and its environment. This topic has been a major 
focus of study in organisation theory (OT) for at least half a 
century. Significantly, the primary focus and unit of analysis 
for organisational theorists has been the organisation whereas 
strategic management scholars have paid comparatively more 
attention to the cognitions and actions of individual managers.
In the past, an organisation was commonly theorised to be like 
a fortress, with distinct limits to its domains of activity and 
influence (see Aguilar, 1967; Duncan, 1972) . The effectiveness 
of an organisation was seen to depend largely on its ability to 
insulate its operations from the outside world, and thereby
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concentrate on improving its internal form and function. 
Organisations were counted upon not only to produce the goods and 
services needed by society, but also to preserve and protect the 
structures and values that underpinned it. It was also commonly 
believed that organisations, especially larger ones, controlled 
their own destinies. Following from this, many of the pioneering 
organisational studies adopted a closed systems perspective.
The representation of an organisation as a stable and clearly 
bounded entity, consisting of a collection of people and having 
a set of statutory property rights, has become a relic of a 
bygone era. Few contemporary organisations can be realistically 
considered as either static or circumscribed by well-defined 
boundaries. Instead, the free movement of materials, energy, 
information and even people between the organisation and its 
environment is common. Meanwhile, the organisation itself tends 
to evolve continually as part of a larger ecological system.
As a result, organisations may be seen as complex and open 
systems that share many features with biological systems (Morgan, 
1986). Based on a view that organisations interact constantly 
with their external environment, and are intertwined with it, 
organisational studies now tend to adopt an open systems 
perspective. Nevertheless, the appropriate application of 
systems thinking to organisational analysis remains subject to 
debate (see Checkland, 1994; Galliers et al., 1997).
While the traditional view of strategic management stressed the 
importance of analysing the external environment as part of a 
planning process, organisational theorists were busy developing 
contingency theories that linked the effectiveness of a 
particular organisational form to the nature of its environmental 
context (see Aldrich & Mindlin, 1979; Araujo & Easton, 1996). 
Consequently, managers have been encouraged to learn about and 
adapt to an ever-changing environment (Nonaka, 1991). 
Organisational performance may thus depend on the ability to 
process information about the external environment and make
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appropriate responses.
The external environment has been viewed as not only a source of 
resources and ecological variation, but also as a source of 
information (see Aldrich & Mindlin, 1978; Downey, Hellreigel & 
Slocum, 1975; Duncan, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Dill 
(1958) was among the first to treat the environment as a source 
of information for the organisation and its managers. He 
suggested that the assortment of people, objects and other 
organisations in the external environment emit a continuous 
stream of signals and messages. These signals and messages may 
be strong or weak (difficult to detect) , clear or confusing 
(difficult to analyse or interpret), factual or erroneous (not 
indicative of an actual change).
Arrow (1964) proposed a theory of information and control whereby 
these external signals and messages could prompt modifications 
in managerial perceptions and lead to changes in organisational 
structures, systems and processes. Organisational decisions and 
actions would thus follow from the analysis and interpretation 
of these signals and messages. They can also lead to the 
generation and transmission of additional signals and messages. 
Such an information processing perspective assumes that 
information not only motivates managerial thinking and problem­
solving, but is also an input and output in the process.
2.1.1 Information processing perspectives
Two distinctive orientations appear to exist within the 
information processing perspective (Choo, 1994) . The first 
considers an organisation to be a rational decision making system 
(Cyert & March, 1963/1992) . The bounded rationality and similar 
cognitive limitations of managers were mentioned in Chapter 1. 
This leads them to construct simple models of the real world, and 
then pursue a course of action that satisfices, or is perceived 
as "good enough" (Simon, 1976) . As a result, the task of 
organising is to design an environment that promotes rational 
behaviour. The structure of an organisation tends to control the
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premises upon which decisions are made, rather than controlling 
the actual decisions (Simon, 1976, p. 223).
Organisations first set their goals, then search for alternative 
ways to achieve them, and finally select a course of action. 
With this orientation, information serves to reduce or avoid 
uncertainty. It may also be perceived as an energy or a force 
that both stimulates and is stimulated by management activity 
(see Arrow, 1964). A manager recognising a problem would search 
for information in order to first understand the problem, and 
then to solve it. The search for information thus continues 
until a solution is found or a decision is made.
A second orientation within the information processing 
perspective considers the organisation to be a loosely-coupled 
social system. Individuals create or enact the environment to 
which an organisation then adapts (Weick, 1979; Weick & Daft, 
1983). Following from this, organisations are designed to 
promote a shared understanding of the environment and to 
facilitate actions on the basis of this shared understanding. 
From this orientation, actions may even precede goal-setting, and 
then be interpreted afterwards.
With this orientation, information seeking aims to reduce or 
resolve equivocality. Managers will search for information about 
the external environment in order to enact an environment, and 
then attend to that enacted environment. Daft and Weick (1984, 
p. 286) suggest that managers "wade into the ocean of events that 
surround the organisation and actively try to make sense of 
them." Organisational participants selectively attend to and act 
upon these events. Organisations will vary in terms of how much 
they actively search for information about their external 
environment, but they will follow a general pattern of scanning, 
interpretation, and learning (Daft & Weick, 1984; Huff, 1979).
Much of the existing OT literature identifies the decision making 
and interpretation orientations as rivals. However, they could
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complement each other in terms of understanding how managers seek 
out and use information (see Choo, 1991; March, 1988) . A 
rational and systematic decision making process may be more 
appropriate for solving problems if the circumstances permit the 
issues to be clearly identified. In contrast, enactment and 
interpretation may be more useful when either the issues or the 
available information are ambiguous.
The information processing perspective has given rise to an 
emerging stream of research that has tried to examine how 
managers in an organisational context acquire and use information 
about the external environment. This research stream has been 
characterised by a diversity of theoretical and empirical 
approaches. According to Dess and Rasheed (1991, p. 701), this 
could be "a strength in the sense that different perspectives 
provide alternative and richer insights than would have been 
possible if a uniform perspective had been adopted, but an 
extreme degree of theoretical and empirical diversity can also 
hinder the development of cumulative theory and research" .
The sections that follow review this environmental scanning 
literature, and focus specifically on the following aspects: the 
characteristics of the external environment; the acquisition by 
managers of information about the external environment; and the 
characteristics and sources of information. Constructs from this 
body of literature along with some of the more general concepts 
considered in Chapter 1 were incorporated into a model that could 
guide the design of an empirical research study.
2-2 The external environment
Starbuck (1976, p. 1069) contends that reality is distorted by 
assuming that "organizations can be sharply distinguished from 
their environments". Nevertheless, the environment may be most 
simply conceived of including all the entities and factors 
outside of the organisation that could affect its performance or 
even its survival. Duncan (1972, p. 314) defined the environment 
as "the totality of physical and social factors that are taken
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directly into consideration in the decision-making behaviour of 
individuals inside the organisation." His research instrument 
implied five distinct environmental sectors: customers, 
suppliers, competitors, socio-political considerations, and 
technological considerations.
Subsequent researchers have also found it helpful to sub-divide 
the external environment. Dill (1953) distinguished between an 
inner and an outer context while Bourgeois (1930) and Daft et al. 
(1983) were among others conceptualising an environment with two 
layers. An inner task or industry layer closest to the 
organisation typically includes sectors that have direct 
transactions with the organisation, such as competitors, 
customers, and resource suppliers. As shown in Figure 2.1, this 
inner layer closely resembles the competitive forces model 
developed by Porter (1980) while an outer general or remote layer 
includes sectors that only affect the enterprise indirectly.
Figure 2.1
A Two Layer, Six Sector Framework 
of the External Environment
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An early conceptualisation of the outer layer or macroenviromnent 
appears in the PEST model developed by Kenneth Andrews (1971) and 
his colleagues at the Harvard Business School. This model 
divides the outer layer of the environment into the political, 
economic, socio-cultural, and technological sectors. This model, 
has been widely used in the strategic management literature. For 
example, Fahey and Narayanan (1986) distinguished between a micro 
environment that comprised the social, economic, political, and 
technological sectors, and a task/industry environment that 
included the customer and competitor sectors.
Empirical studies such as Daft et al. (1988), Sawyerr (1993) and 
Auster & Choo (1993) have also employed a two layer framework of 
the environment, with two or three task sectors (customers, 
competitive, and resource suppliers) and four general sectors: 
economic, political/legal (regulatory) , technological and socio­
cultural. For example, Daft et al. (1988, pp. 137-138) defined 
six sectors in the external business environment as follows:
Customer sector refers to those companies or individuals that purchase the products 
made by the respondent's firm, and includes companies that acquire the products for 
resale, as well as final customers.
Competition sector includes rival companies, products, and competitive tactics: 
companies that make substitute products; products that compete with the respondent 
firm's products; and competitive actions between the respondent's firm and other 
companies in the same industry.
Technological sector includes the development of new production and service techniques 
and methods, innovation in materials and products, and trends in research and science.
Regulatory sector includes national, regional or local legislation and regulations, 
community policies, and political developments at all levels of government
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Economic sector includes factors such as stock markets, rate of inflation, trade balances, 
public sector budgets, interest rates, unemployment, and economic growth rates
Socio-cultural sector comprises social values in the general population, the work ethic, 
and demographic trends such as an increasing number of women in the work force.
Although a static representation of the environment prevails in 
the literature, Bourgeois (1980) implies that the sectors 
included each of the two layers would vary across firms, 
industries, and countries. For example, technology could be part 
of the task environment for a computer manufacturing firm but not 
for a retailer. Meanwhile, the regulatory sector may be part of 
the task environment for both electric utilities and banks, 
because of their frequent interactions with government agencies, 
but constitute part of the remote layer for other service 
organisations. A study covering more than one industry could
examine such a contingent perspective of the environment.
2.2.1 Environmental uncertainty
No single approach to conceptualising or measuring the 
environment has been generally accepted (see Sharfman & Dean, 
1991; Dess & Rasheed, 1991) . Assorted variables, many with 
overlapping operationalisations, have been introduced to 
represent different salient characteristics of the environment. 
This has made it difficult to compare results across studies. 
Nevertheless, there is a long-established consensus (see Cyert 
& March, 1963/1992; Thompson, 1967; Weick, 1969) that making 
sense of the environment is a fundamental task of the manager.
Related to this, a commonly investigated environmental variable 
is uncertainty. It can arise from a lack of information about 
a given situation or the inability to predict accurately either 
future environmental conditions or the outcomes of specific 
organisational choices (see Cyert & March, 1963; Duncan, 1972). 
Under ideal conditions, an organisation is able to obtain all the 
inputs it requires when it requires them. In addition, it is
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able to predict the demand for its outputs. However, anything 
less than perfect dependability for either its supply of 
resources or its forecasted demand for outputs would create 
environmental uncertainty.
Environmental uncertainty can be considered in terms of objective 
and perceptual measures. There has been some debate about the 
extent to which the environmental uncertainty perceived by 
managers is the result of the absolute conditions or those 
perceived by an individual (see Bourgeois, 1980; Starbuck, 1976), 
but the latter perspective now appears to be generally accepted.
Weick (1969) was among the first to argue that there is no such 
thing as an objective environment; it results from the parts of 
the external information flow that are "enacted" through 
attention and belief. Churchman (1971) and others have concurred 
with this view, suggesting that different people would be 
unlikely to interpret a given situation in the same way, because 
they have different beliefs and values. Duncan (1972, p. 325) 
also contended that the characteristics of organisational 
environments are "dependent on the perceptions of the 
organisational members and thus vary in their incidence to the 
extent that individuals differ in their perceptions".
Milliken (1987, p. 136) built upon this work in order to define 
environmental uncertainty as "an individual's perceived inability 
to predict (an organisation's environment) accurately" due to a 
"lack of information about specific actors and events" or "an 
inability to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant data". 
She went on to identify three types of environmental uncertainty: 
effect, response, and state.
Effect uncertainty is an inability to predict the effect of 
future environmental conditions on the organisation. Response 
uncertainty is an inability to predict the likely consequences 
of a given organisational action. State uncertainty occurs when 
observers perceive that the environment itself is unpredictable.
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This third type of uncertainty may be due to specific 
characteristics of the environment and/or the observer. It 
arises from an inability to understand the relationships between 
components of the environment or an inability to predict changes 
in those components. Milliken (1987) acknowledged that the 
importance of perception makes it appropriate to think of state 
uncertainty as perceived environmental uncertainty.
2.3 Managerial responses to environmental uncertainty
When the same environmental attributes are perceived differently 
by decision-makers, their responses will also differ. In their 
study of top executives in a dozen leading U.S. corporations, 
Donaldson and Lorsch (1983, p. 79) observed that "Among the 
corporate managers in each of the companies we found a 
distinctive system of beliefs. These interrelated beliefs act 
as a filter through which management perceives the realities 
facing it as a firm." Earlier, Dill (1958, p. 443) identified 
the cognitions of organisational participants as an intervening 
link between environmental 'stimuli' and overt 'responses' .
Daft and Weick (1984, p. 293) explained that
"one of the widely held tenets in organizational 
theory is that the external environment will influence 
organisation structure and design ... But that 
relationship can be manifested only if participants 
within the organisation sense and interpret the 
environment and respond to it. Almost all outcomes in 
terms of organisation structure and design .. . depend 
on the interpretation of problems or opportunities by 
key decision makers."
Related to this, March (1988) distinguished two ways of choosing 
among alternatives. With rational calculation, the decision 
maker must collect relevant information in order to evaluate and 
choose among alternatives in terms of their expected consequences 
according to his or her own preferences. Rational calculation 
may be contrasted with learning from experience, where decision
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makers choose among alternatives based upon rules developed over 
time. Guidance for future actions is sought by looking towards 
the past. With this approach, much of the information should 
exist in a confined space, either in the decision maker's own 
mind, if he or she has been in a similar situation before, or 
else with someone else who has the appropriate experience.
The two perspectives articulated by March (1988) may be seen as 
a subset of the four model taxonomy presented by Lord and Maher 
(1990) and discussed in Chapter 1. Such a taxonomy implies that 
organisational researchers must be alert to the different ways 
that a decision can be made and the role that selective cognitive 
perception plays in the decision making process. There is also 
an implication that suggestion that environmental uncertainty be 
studied in terms of perceptual measures.
Perceived environmental uncertainty may be expected to condition 
the intelligence phase (and perhaps also the design phase) of the 
Simon (1960) decision making process model that was presented in 
Chapter 1. However, the roles of equivocality and undecidability 
can not be ignored (see Yasai-Ardekani, 1986). Whereas 
uncertainty arises in the absence of information, equivocality 
occurs when there are multiple and conflicting interpretations 
of a given situation (Daft & Lengel, 1986). The external 
environment may yield signals that are simply not unambiguous 
enough to prompt an organisational response. Moreover, even if 
the received signals are unequivocal, the future may be beyond 
the influence (let alone control) of the observer, and hence 
inherently undecidable.
Duncan (1972) drew on earlier theorists such as Emery and Trist 
(1965) and Terreberry (1968) in order to decompose environmental 
uncertainty into two independent dimensions, complexity and rate 
of chcinge (or dynamism) . These two dimensions have been widely 
used in many subsequent studies. Complexity, along with similar 
constructs that have been termed routineity (Emery & Trist, 
1965), heterogeneity (Aldrich, 1979) and diversity (Mintzberg,
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1979), refers to the scope and depth of knowledge that is 
required to understand the external events, development and 
trends that are relevant to the organisation (Child, 1972; 
Sharfman & Dean, 1991) . Meanwhile, dynamism, which has also been 
termed instability (Emery & Trist, 1965), variability (Child, 
1972) and turbulence (Aldrich, 1979), refers to the frequency of 
unpredictable environmental changes.
Decision makers perceiving their environment to be complex and 
dynamic, with many rapidly-changing factors, would experience the 
highest levels of environmental uncertainty while simple and 
stable environments are associated with the lowest levels of 
environmental uncertainty (Daft & Weick, 1984; Duncan, 1972). 
Grover, Prekumar & Segars (1993) verified this relationship using 
an experiment-based research design.
Perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU), by itself, may not 
stimulate the acquisition of additional information. Daft and 
Weick (1984, pp. 287-288) suggested that decision makers would 
only be expected to seek out more information about aspects of 
the environment that they consider to be important. 
Consequently, the combination of perceived uncertainty and 
importance create what Daft et al. (1988, p. 125) define as
strategic uncertainty for top managers. They constructed and 
applied a score for the perceived strategic uncertainty (PSU) 
variable using the following formula:
PSU  = I  * PEU = I  * ( C + R ) ,  
where PSU = perceived strategic uncertainty 
I = perceived sector importance
PEU = C + R = perceived environmental uncertainty 
C = perceived sector complexity 
R = perceived sector rate of change
Daft et al. (1988) employed five-point Likert scales to measure
the importance, complexity, and rate of change of each sector. 
A sample of chief executives in the United States was asked to
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assess simultaneously all the task and general sectors. This 
enabled the researchers to compare and distinguish the salient 
characteristics among them. Auster & Choo (1993) and Sawyerr 
(1993) used the same approach to measure PSU in their subsequent 
studies of Canadian and Nigerian managers, respectively.
2.4 Information Acquisition
Various modes of intelligence may be used to acquire information 
about the external environment. Managers may scan the 
environment directly or learn from others, and have different 
scanning frequencies for different environmental sectors. Both 
intelligence gathering and dissemination may range from irregular 
(searches and periodic reports, respectively) to continuous 
(monitoring and real-time delivery, respectively), depending on 
the perceived information needs (Fahey et al., 1981).
In a variation on the Mintzberg et al. (1976) model that was 
considered in Chapter 1, a strategic intelligence effort may take 
the forro of reactive surveillance or proactive searching 
(Aguilar, 1967; Cyert & March, 1963/1992). A reactive search is 
stimulated by a specific problem (or issue) and directed towards 
obtaining information for a particular purpose. In contrast, 
proactive scanning is exploratory in nature, rather than being 
directed towards a particular problem (Aguilar, 1967) . This mode 
of intelligence gathering would be useful to recognise decision 
situations and build mental models during the initial phases of 
strategic decision making (see Mintzberg et al., 1976).
Aguilar (1967) differentiated between four styles of 
environmental scanning: undirected viewing, conditioned viewing, 
informal search, and formal search. In undirected viewing, the 
manager is exposed to information without having identified a 
specific purpose or information need. Undirected viewing 
typically alerts a manager that something has happened and that 
there is more to be learned about a situation. For example, the 
manager may converse with business associates during a social 
gathering. In conditioned viewing, the manager is exposed to
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information about selected areas and is ready to assess the 
significance of the information as it is encountered. For 
example, the manager may browse through specific publications 
that report regularly on topics of interest.
During an informal search, the manager actively looks for 
information to address a specific issue. For example, a manager 
who checks the results of a new pricing policy may be said to be 
engaging in a relatively limited and unstructured effort. 
Finally, with a formal search, the manager makes a deliberate or 
planned effort to obtain specific information or information 
about a specific issue. For example, a manager may 
systematically gather information about a potential new market. 
Jain (1984) has complemented this distinction by proposing a 
typology of four environmental scanning modes ranging from 
primitive through ad-hoc and reactive to proactive.
As the external environment becomes more turbulent and complex, 
it can be argued that managers face fuzzier problems. The need 
to address a steady stream of ill-defined problems will challenge 
the cognitive capacity of most managers. As a result, their use 
of scanning relative to searching may be expected to increase. 
In a relatively stable environment, scanning may be an 
unstructured process in which information is sourced through 
informal sources. However, higher levels of environmental 
uncertainty will tend to formalise and structure the scanning 
effort, and increase the reliance on impersonal sources and the 
processing of acquired information (Gilad & Gilad, 1988; Jain, 
1984; McGonagle & Vella, 1996).
The studies based on data collected in the 1970s suggested that 
top managers gained much of their information through irregular 
scanning (Fahey et al., 1981; Hambrick, 1981; Mintzberg, 1973). 
In contrast, El Sawy (1985) found that American chief executive 
officers (CEOs) were very systematic in their environmental 
scanning, using a limited number of mostly personal information 
sources. More recently, Eisenhardt (1989) reported that as
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environmental changes accelerated, effective executive teams 
■structured1 their environments through more thorough and 
consistent analytic processes. Senior executives in her sample 
of small U.S.-based computer firms made far more use of real-time 
information than forecast information. This seems to imply a 
reliance on selected personal and electronic sources.
The situational dimension of perceived environmental uncertainty 
has been a consistently good predictor of the amount of scanning 
that a chief executive conducts (Aguilar, 1967; Hambrick, 1982; 
Keegan, 1974; O'Reilly, 1982). More recent studies have 
indicated that if the perceived importance of an environmental 
sector is included as an additional variable, and multiplied by 
PEU to create a perceived strategic uncertainty (PSU) measure, 
the latter is an even better predictor of the amount of scanning 
that is conducted (see Auster & Choo, 1993; Daft et al., 1988).
Consistent with this perspective, Boyd (1989) reported that the 
perceived importance of environmental developments had a large 
impact on the amount of scanning. However, Boyd (1989, p. 95) 
concluded that "perceived importance is itself the most important 
predictor of scanning activity." This phenomenon was found to 
persist even when a situation is changing quite slowly and the 
manager already had a considerable amount of information about 
the issue of interest. Related to this, El Sawy and Pauchant 
(1988) identified three ways of bounding the environmental scope:
1) limiting the number of information sources used
2) limiting the type of environmental signals and 
messages that are monitored, and
3) limiting the number of issues that are tracked.
Alternatively, managers may cope by 1) developing a simplified 
representation of the problem, reducing it to its most salient 
characteristics, and/or 2) applying procedures or heuristics that 
have worked before. The objective becomes a satisficing rather 
than optimising course of action (Simon, 1976).
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2.4.1 Information seeking issues
Information has both an instrumental and a symbolic value (Larkey 
& Sproull, 1994). From an instrumental perspective, information 
may be acquired in order to reduce environmental uncertainty or 
equivocality, enable better decisions to be made, and thereby 
improve some measures of performance. Higher levels of 
environmental uncertainty and volatility have been found to 
increase the intensity of information seeking by managers in the 
U.S. (Culnan, 1983; Daft et al., 1988; Eisenhardt, 1988).
Significantly, Blandin and Brown (1977) suggest that the 
interaction between environmental uncertainty and information 
seeking may be bidirectional. Initially, information may be 
sought in an attempt to reduce the uncertainty surrounding a 
strategic choice. However, as new information is acquired, 
additional uncertainties from previously unforeseen aspects of 
an issue (or even different issues) may arise, and prompt further 
investigation. This suggests a dynamic linkage between 
environmental uncertainty and information seeking.
Information also has a symbolic value partly due to "its cultural 
importance as a symbol of status or reassurance" (Larkey & 
Sproull, 1994, p. 3) . As a result, managers may buy or trade 
more information than prescribed by economic considerations 
because they want to enhance their own image or 'play it safe'. 
They could also attend to information that is irrelevant to the 
issues at hand or the decision that they are making.
Nevertheless, information acquisition activities are expected to 
be driven largely by identified information needs, and aimed at 
addressing those needs. The needs are likely to be both 
contingent and dynamic, emerging from issues, uncertainties and 
ambiguities that are associated with a particular problem or 
situation. The needed information may be about the organisation 
or its external environment. The typical organisation today 
accumulates a large volume of information about its internal 
operations and resources. This information will shape an
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individual's perceptions of the surroundings and also contribute 
to organisational learning (Garvin, 1993; Nonaka, 1991).
Much of this information is collected in order to follow accepted 
rules or procedures and to meet stipulated requirements. 
Government regulations and organisational policies as well as 
standard operating procedures and general accounting practices 
will shape internal data collection and processing.
In addition, an organisation will commonly have concerns about 
many aspects of its external environment. Managers may want 
information to answer questions (what is happening out there?) 
or to help solve problems (what can we do about this?). As a 
result, their information seeking efforts are likely to range 
from a pure knowledge orientation at one extreme to a pure action 
orientation at the other. In the latter case, they may search 
for rules of thumb or heuristics, or even entire solutions that 
they can copy (March, 1991, p. 112) .
Information acquisition efforts are likely to be constrained by 
cognitive capacities and time pressures at the individual level 
and resource constraints at the organisational level (see Cyert 
& March, 1963/1992). The organisational capacity to absorb new 
information can be enhanced in different ways. These include 
introducing a systematic process, involving additional people 
inside and/or outside the organisation in that process, relying 
on specialist knowledge, and making use of IT.
However, the limited attention spans and cognitive capacities of 
managers ultimately make it both undesirable and impossible to 
be well-informed about every one of these concerns. As a result, 
it is critical to specify what information is required. Incoming 
streams of data can be filtered more effectively if the priority 
of different environmental sectors has been established and if 
specific issues of concern have been identified ahead of time.
Managers can choose from among many different types and sources
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of information as well as different methods and channels to 
acquire that information. Their preferences and choices may 
depend on the environmental issues or sectors that have been 
identified as priorities. Related to this, MacMullin and Taylor 
(1984, p.98) argued that problem types can act as surrogates for 
areas of interest, and proposed 11 problem dimensions that can 
help to identify information needs (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1
Problem Dimensions and Inform ation Needs
Problem Dimensions Typical Information Needs
1. Design Options, alternatives, ranges
Discovery Small, detailed sets of data
2. Well-structured Hard, quantitative data
Ill-structured Probabilistic or qualitative data
3. Simple Path to goal state
Complex Ways and means to simplify the problem
4. Specific goals Goal operationalisation and measurement
Amorphous goals Preferences and directions
5. Initial state understood Clarify unclear aspects of initial state
Initial state not understood Define initial state with soft data
6. Assumptions agreed upon Information to help define problems
Assumptions not agreed upon Worldviews and definitions of terms
7. Assumptions explicit Range of options, frames for analysis
Assumptions implicit Information to make assumptions explicit
8. Familiar pattern Procedural, historical information
New pattern Substantive, future-oriented information
9. High degree of risk Cost-effective search
Low degree of risk Best available information
10. Amenable to empirical analysis Objective, aggregated data
Not amenable to empirical analysis Experts’ opinions, forecasts, scenarios
11. Internal imposition Clarification of internal goals, objectives
External imposition Focus on the external environment
Adapted from MacMullin & Taylor (1984).
56
More generally, the outcome of a particular decision making 
process is likely to be shaped by both the type of information 
that is acquired and the information sources that are used to 
gather it (Das, 1986; Keegan, 1974). This makes it important to 
understand the perceptions and preferences of managers with 
respect to different types and sources of information.
2.5 Information Characteristics and Sources
The benefits of information are widely recognised to be both 
user-specific and context-specific. Related to this, Simpson and 
Prusak (1995, p. 414) suggest that the value of information "can 
only be measured in terms of the benefit obtained from its use", 
but conclude that this is very difficult to put into practice.
Nevertheless, many different dimensions can be used to 
characterise information. The most commonly mentioned in the 
recent literature include: accuracy (error-free transmission), 
comprehensiveness (completeness of coverage for a specific topic 
or issue), timeliness (lack of delay in transmission), and 
validity (accompanying signals that suggest the soundness or 
otherwise of the message). Although the characteristics of 
information per se are not central to this dissertation, readers 
are referred to Simpson and Prusak (1995) for a useful framework 
that includes five major elements - truth, guidance, scarcity, 
accessibility, and weight.
Managers can receive information in various forms. Hard 
information (alternatively termed factual or objective 
information) commonly takes the form of computer-generated or 
written numbers, texts, and graphs. It is most effective for 
conveying well-understood messages and standard data measurements 
(Daft & Lengel, 1986) . However, increased uncertainty and rapid 
change make it more difficult to acquire timely and reliable hard 
data (Weick, 1985) . In contrast, soft information (also known 
as impressionistic or speculative information) includes 
impressions, opinions, feelings, gossip, interpretations and 
predictions. It can supplement hard information in order to
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increase depth and understanding. Direct contacts with other 
people are the most common source of soft information.
A range of communication channels and media may be used to convey 
messages or signals to the user (Stamper, 1974) . Media refer to 
the mechanisms, such as meetings, telephone calls and memos, 
selected to transfer information from a source to a receiver, who 
is commonly the decision maker. These media have been 
categorised using at least two closely related concepts: social 
presence and information richness. Short, Williams and Christie 
(1978) suggested that characteristics such as sociability, 
personalness and sensitivity affect the extent to which 
communicators perceive each other to be psychologically present. 
Media with a low social presence, such as printed documents, are 
most appropriate for providing factual information while those 
with a high social presence, such as face-to-face interaction, 
will be most appropriate for delicate negotiations.
Meanwhile, Daft and Lengel (1984) proposed the concept of 
information richness, which they defined as the capacity of a 
communication to change or provide understanding within a given 
time period. Richness is seen to depend upon the variety of cues 
and the speed of feedback that a given communication provides. 
Face-to-face communications are thus very rich because they 
enable the use of multiple cues (verbal and non-verbal) and 
encourage immediate feedback. Computer printouts and similar 
reports are less rich because they lack these capabilities.
When faced with ambiguous messages about unclear situations, 
including those involving the external environment, top managers 
may favour information rich media. In his seminal study, 
Mintzberg (1973) found that managers had a strong preference for 
information that was both timely and rich in content. This is 
consistent with Churchman (1971), who portrayed people as 
knowledge producers who frequently test their interpretations of 
a given situation through dialogue and debate with other people.
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2.5.1 Information sources
Managers may select from among various information sources. A 
wide assortment of classification schemes have been proposed and 
used in the literature. A commonly used scheme (see Aguilar, 
1967; Auster & Choo, 1993; Culnan, 1983; Daft et al., 1988) has 
delineated personal (informal) sources from impersonal (formal) 
sources, and internal sources from those external to the decision 
maker's organisation. Both external and personal sources of 
information are held to become progressively more important as 
one ascends the management hierarchy (see Aguilar, 1967; El Sawy, 
1985). A classification of information sources that builds upon 
the conceptualisations of Culnan (1983), Auster and Choo (1993), 
and Sawyerr (1993) is shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2
A  Classification of Information Sources
Personal (informal) Im personal (form al)
Internal Superiors/mentors/peers
Subordinates/employees
Internal documents 
Electronic services
External Customers 
Competitors 
Business associates
Government and regulators 
Industry/trade associations/events 
Public mass media
There has been considerable debate about the relative value of 
different information inputs to the strategic decision making 
process (see Fahey et al., 1981; Rhyne, 1985) . Impersonal 
sources are useful largely because of the capability to 
systematically condense a broad set of information into an 
understandable and presentable form that shows external trends 
and shocks. Facts about discrete events can typically be 
collected and disseminated using these formal sources and 
communication media. Applications of IT, such as executive 
information systems and scanning systems, are an example of an 
impersonal source. Despite their omnipresence in modern
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business, a unique set of personal contacts may be useful for 
certain types of intelligence gathering.
Personal sources may be more consistent with informal and 
aperiodic scanning. Rather than getting a daily newspaper or a 
weekly industry report, managers will contact their peers or 
receive updates from their subordinates. These personal updates 
will come when circumstances rather than pre-programmed 
frequencies dictate.
Personal sources can also provide a better view of context- 
specific and intangible aspects of the external environment that 
would be filtered out by more formal media (Culnan, 1983; Weick, 
1985) . For example, computer-generated printouts are unlikely 
to be as meaningful as face-to-face communications (Auster & 
Choo, 1993). Richer media enable weaker and more subtle signals 
to be detected and tend to leave the user to do his or her own 
analysis, interpretation, and drawing of conclusions from the 
details provided (Daft & Lengel, 1986). As a result, written and 
personal sources may be provide complementary benefits. Weak 
signals from personal sources could be augmented by data from 
more formal sources and vice versa (Daft & Weick, 1984).
Internal intelligence may come from organisational documents 
(e.g. memos, circulars, reports) or discussions with employees. 
For example, boundary personnel, such as salespeople and 
purchasing agents, can pass on information from their regular 
contact with customers and suppliers, respectively. The use of 
such a lateral intelligence network challenges "the image of the 
CEO as the organisation's primary interpreter of, and ambassador 
to the external world" (Huff, 1979, p. 191) . However, it does 
offer the benefits of "many organisational eyes and ears open to 
external signals" (Stanat, 1990), and can be an effective means 
of getting timely and reliable data about the task environment.
External personal sources include discussions and meetings with 
those outside the firm, including customers, business associates,
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and government officials. Meanwhile, commercial and government 
publications are among the external impersonal sources. 
Computer-based data with the organisation and external electronic 
information services are also of growing importance.
Top managers are likely to be well-connected within their local 
business community and thus have access to many personal sources 
of information beyond their own organisation. As the level of 
strategic uncertainty increases, they may be expected to rely 
more on direct contacts with a few trusted sources. Such direct 
contact would provide them with data that is not diluted or 
distorted by passing through intermediaries (Daft et al., 1988).
Studies conducted decades ago consistently found that personal 
sources (and particularly subordinates and customers) were more 
important than impersonal ones (Aguilar, 1967; Kobrin et al., 
1980), but produced ambiguous evidence with respect to the 
relative importance of external and internal sources (Keegan, 
1974; Kobrin et al., 1980). Kotter (1982) also reported that 
successful general managers relied more on information from 
people rather than other sources.
An information sourcing study conducted by Jones and McLeod 
(1986) reported more specific results. Senior executives most 
frequently obtained and most highly valued information from their 
first- and second-level subordinates. Only 43 percent of these 
executives looked outside their own organisation for information.
Similarly, Auster & Choo (1993) identified internal and personal 
sources as the most frequently used by CEOs in the Canadian 
telecommunications and publishing industries, but they also noted 
the frequent usage of printed materials, such as newspapers, 
economic reports, and government documents. Similarly, Gates 
(1990) found that the chief academic officers of community 
colleges in Pennsylvania relied largely on personal sources 
within the organisation and small number of impersonal (often 
written) sources outside it.
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Meanwhile, Ghoshal (1988) found that for Korean chief executives, 
business associates were the most common source of information 
about the inner or task layer while printed sources in the public 
domain were used most often for information about the general or 
outer layer. This suggests that while executives use multiple 
and complementary sources to scan the environment, they preferred 
more timely and information rich sources when their focus was on 
market-related, dynamic or equivocal sectors of the environment.
The perceived characteristics of different information sources 
could help to explain the ambiguity of the reported results. 
Information sources vary on at least two independent dimensions: 
accessibility and quality (see Culnan, 1982; O'Reilly, 1982). 
Accessibility has been operationalised as the physical proximity 
of the source or the time, effort and cost needed to access it. 
Meanwhile, the key dimensions of quality include relevance, 
reliability, accuracy, quantity and timeliness (Auster and Choo, 
1993; Culnan, 1983). The use of an information source should be 
related to its perceived accessibility and its perceived quality.
Based on the work of Culnan (1983), O'Reilly (1982) and Auster 
& Choo (1993) , the perceived accessibility of an information 
source can be operationalised as the amount of effort needed to 
locate a source, and then to get the needed information from that 
source. Two questions have been commonly used to measure the 
perceived accessibility of a source:
1. How much of your time and effort is needed to approach, 
contact or locate each information source?
2. After contacting or locating the source, how easy is it to 
get the desired information from that source?
Based on the theoretical definitions of Zmud (1978) and the 
empirical findings of O'Reilly (1982) and Auster & Choo (1993), 
the perceived quality of an information source may be 
operationalised as the perceived relevance and reliability of the
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information provided by the source. Two questions have been 
commonly used to measure the perceived quality of a source:
1. How relevant is the information from each source about the 
environment? (relevant information has been defined as 
information that is needed and useful with respect to the 
goals and activities of the responding firm)
2. How reliable is the information from each source about the 
environment? (information is reliable when it is 
authoritative, dependable and personally trusted by the 
recipient).
Auster Sc Choo (1993) were the first to find that information 
source selection was based more on quality than accessibility. 
Their results contradicted previous reports from studies of R&D 
managers (Blandin & Brown, 1977) and welfare agency workers 
(O'Reilly, 1982) which indicated that perceived accessibility 
rather than perceived quality had the greater influence on the 
frequency with which an information source was used. This raises 
the possibility of situational factors contributing to the 
relative roles of quality and accessibility and/or a growing 
emphasis on the perceived quality of an information source. 
Remarkably, Culnan (1983) earlier found that information source 
selection was not simply a function of perceived accessibility, 
but that the complexity of the task determined the relative 
importance of accessibility as a factor in the use of a source.
The key concepts and relationships presented so far in this 
chapter along with Mintzberg's decisional roles, which were 
outlined in Chapter 1, may be incorporated into a general model 
of environmental scanning. This general model, depicted in 
Figure 2.2, was used a basis for designing a specific research 
model for the study of strategic intelligence in Hong Kong. The 
specific research model is presented in Chapter 4 and is based 
on the research context considered in Chapter 3 as well as the 
research framework discussed in Chapter 4.
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2.6 Environmental scanning studies
The strategic management and organisation theory literatures 
include dozens of reported studies that have considered many 
different aspects of the relationship between the organisation 
and its environment. More directly relevant to the topic of 
interest, Aguilar (1967) initiated the empirical study of how top 
managers learn about the external environment. The title of that 
report, Scanning the Business Environment, helped to popularise 
the term "environmental scanning".
In Chapter 1, environmental scanning or business intelligence 
activities were identified as an integral part of strategic 
decision making. These activities include searching for 
particular information as well as simply being exposed to 
information that could impact the organisation. In a study 
conducted for the British Library, Lester and Waters (1989, p.
3) defined environmental scanning as "the management process of 
using environmental information in decision making". Their 
conceptualisation included three activities:
1) the acquisition of data about the external environment;
2) the analysis and interpretation of that data,- and
3) the use of this processed information in strategic decision 
making.
This definition implies that environmental scanning includes both 
looking for information and looking at information. Earlier, 
Rouse and Rouse (1984) defined human information seeking as the 
process of identifying and choosing among alternative information 
sources. Information seeking can thus be considered as embedded 
in larger processes such as decision making, problem solving or 
resource allocation. Information needs are thus determined 
largely by the specific nature of the process. Since the methods 
and criteria for the selection or rejection of information in the 
scanning process also vary over time and depend on earlier 
results, it may be seen as a special case of information seeking.
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There was a steady flow of reported studies covering different 
and often multiple aspects of environmental scanning/business 
intelligence from the pioneering work of Aguilar (1967) up until 
19931. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 provide a chronological summary of the 
U.S.-based and non U.S.-based studies.
Table 2.3
U.S.-based Environm ental Scanning/Business Intelligence Studies
Author(s) Setting/M ethod Focus/Finding(s)
Aguilar (1967) Multi-method exploratory 
study of executives in U.S. 
corporations
Environmental scanning is an 
important management activity 
Personal sources are more 
important than impersonal ones
Keegan (1974) Interviewed 50 MNC 
executives
Little systematic scanning is done 
External sources are more 
important than internal ones
Fahey & King (1978) Interviewed 12 senior 
executives
Only two of 12 firms had formal 
intelligence systems
Hambrick (1979) Studied 195 executives of 
colleges, hospitals and 
insurance firms
Studied the amount, extent and 
focus of scanning activities
Kobrin et al. (1980) Survey of 500 multinational 
firms
Internal sources are more 
important than external ones 
Personal sources are more 
important than impersonal ones
Fahey et al. (1981) Interviewed 36 senior 
executives
Corporate scanning is 
unsophisticated
Stubbart (1982) Extended work of Fahey & 
King (1978) via executive 
interviews
Prescriptive scanning literature 
overstates benefits, understates 
risks
Lewis (1982) Studied s m a lle r  ($  100 
million/year revenue) firms
Studied sector importance, 
acquisition methods and source 
productivity
Culnan (1983) Surveyed 362 professionals in 
2 firms
Positive link between accessibility 
and use of information sources
1 The absence of reported studies of environmental scanning 
by CEOs since 1994 could reflect the maturity of this research 
stream in the West or a temporary hiatus.
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Kennedy (1984) Interviewed 61 MNC  
executives
Increased scanning and more use 
of qualitative data after Iran crisis
Jain (1984) Surveyed 186 F o rtu n e  5 0 0  
firms
Over 70% used primitive scanning
Dollinger (1985) Surveyed 73 U S. 
entrepreneurs
Positive link between 
environmental contact frequency 
and performance
Smeltzer et al. 
(1988)
Semi-structured interviews 
with 88 small business leaders
Small business owners/managers 
scan regularly, primarily using j 
external publications
Daft, Sormunen & 
Parks (1988)
Studied 50 small and medium 
manufacturing firms in Texas
Relationship between perceived 
environmental uncertainty and 
scanning behaviour
Preble et al. (1988 ) Studied 95 U S.-based MNCs Scanning systems sophistication 
Relative importance of 
environmental variables and 
information sources
Visudtibhan (1989 ) Studied U.S.-based MNCs Organisation-wide environmental 
information processing systems
Ghoshal & W estney  
(1991)
General Motors, Eastman 
Kodak and British Petroleum
Examination of the formal 
competitor analysis systems at the 
three firms
Jennings & Lumpkin 
(1993)
Interviewed 44 CEOS of 
Texan savings and loan firms
Explored relationship between 
scanning activities and Porter's 
generic strategies
Subramanian e t al. 
(1993)
Survey of 101 F o rtu n e  5 0 0  
firms
About 60%  (mostly prospectors) 
used advanced scanning systems, 
which were related to higher profits 
and higher growth
Table 2.4
Major non U.S.-based Environmental Scanning/Business Intelligence Studies
Authorfs) Setting/Method Focus/Finding(s)
Ghoshal (1987) Studied 6 South Korean 
c h a e b o ls
High degree of scanning 
isomorphism
Lester & W aters  
(1989)
Studied 7 large British 
companies
Decentralised and bottom-up 
scanning was common 
Great interest in and considerable 
use of on-line sources
Desai & Bawden  
(1993)
Survey of competitive 
intelligence in the British 
pharmaceutical industry
Emphasis on extraction from 
written sources
Limited use of personal sources
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Sawyerr (1993) Surveyed 44 CEOs in 
Nigerian manufacturing firms
Comparison with U.S. studies 
found economic and political 
sectors to be most important
Lasserre (1993) Surveyed the Asian 
operations of 167 European- 
based MNCs
Concluded that outsiders will find it 
very difficult to really understand 
Asian business environments
Auster & Choo 
(1993)
Surveyed 207 CEOs of 2 
industires in Canada
Found quality to be a better 
predictor of information source 
usage than accessibility j
The preceding tables indicate that a large majority of reported 
environmental scanning studies have been done in the United States. 
In fact, even three of the six non-U.S. studies are based on data 
collected in the United Kingdom and Canada, countries that share 
an Anglo-Saxon cultural heritage with the U.S. and also have 
relatively stable and well-developed economic environments.
The samples of senior executives in these studies have been drawn 
almost exclusively from public sector organisations or 
manufacturing sector firms that the authors have defined as large 
or medium and large. The research on both smaller organisations 
and service sector firms is limited. Lewis (1982) did explore the 
importance of five environmental sectors, the frequency of use for 
six information acquisition methods and the productivity of eleven 
common information sources in smaller firms, but even these had 
annual revenues of at least U.S. $100 million. Such a revenue 
stream would be characteristic of a large, or perhaps even very- 
large enterprise in the Hong Kong Chinese business context (see for 
example Yeung et al., 1995a,b).
Meanwhile, Smeltzer et al. (1988) found that most small business 
owners/managers in the U.S. (those heading up firms with annual 
revenues of less than US$ 100 million) perceived their environments 
to be stable. Nevertheless, they conducted regular environmental 
scanning by reading publications and listening to friends and 
family. In a study with a wider scope, Dollinger (1985) concluded 
that entrepreneurs devote a great deal of time to environmental 
scanning activities, and that the extent of their contact with the 
environment is positively correlated with firm performance.
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In addition to the concepts and relationships considered so far, 
and specifically included in the research model, a review of the 
empirical literature also reveals some study of both the strategy­
scanning relationship and the performance implications of scanning.
2.6.1 Scanning, strategy and performance
Hambrick (1979, 1982) analysed the effects of two strategy-related 
factors on scanning: the strategy adopted by the organisation and 
the nature of the industry to which the organisation belongs. 
Based on a survey of executives from the top three management 
levels of organisations in three industries (higher education, 
health care, and life insurance) , he found that the Miles and Snow 
(1978) typology alone was not a good predictor of the type or 
amount of scanning conducted, but that the industry did affect the 
content of what was scanned. Hospitals stressed the scanning of 
the engineering environment, insurance companies stressed the 
entrepreneurial environment, and colleges had a mixed emphasis.
Subsequently, Jennings et al. (1992) and Subramanian et al. (1993) 
also studied the impact of strategic factors on environmental 
scanning. Jennings et al. (1992) differentiated business-level 
strategy according to the generic classification of Porter (1980). 
The data from their sample of savings and loan firms indicated that 
those following a differentiation strategy tended to focus their 
scanning activity on opportunities for growth and the customer 
sector. In contrast, those following a cost leadership strategy 
tended to concentrate their scanning on competitive threats and 
tracked competitors' policies and tactics.
Subramanian et al. (1993) followed Hambrick (1979, 1982) by 
examining the relationship between organisational strategy, as 
classified according to the Miles and Snow (1978) typology, and the 
focus of the chief executive's environmental scanning. Applying 
the scanning system classification of Jain (1984), they found that 
most of the Fortune 500 manufacturing firms they sampled had 
reactive or proactive scanning systems . Firms following prospector 
strategies had the most advanced scanning systems (either reactive 
or proactive), followed by analysers, and then defenders (many with 
ad hoc scanning systems).
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The authors suggested that the limited product-market domains of 
the defenders reduced their external information needs relative to 
those of prospectors, whose focus on exploiting opportunities 
resulted in constantly changing product-market domains. Unlike 
Hambrick's earlier work, both Jennings et al. (1992) and 
Subramanian et al. (1993) found a strong relationship between 
organisational strategy and environmental scanning, although the 
direction of causation remained unclear.
Meanwhile, a meta-review indicated that the performance of both 
small and large firms is hurt by high levels of perceived 
environmental uncertainty (Bourgeois, 1985) . Specific studies have 
also related better business performance to distinctive patterns 
of strategic intelligence (see Daft et al., 1988; Dollinger, 1985). 
However, these results may be attributed to a higher level of 
organisational slack, which in turn enables a different scanning 
pattern. Simply stated, top managers in high-performing firms may 
be able to look for opportunities across a broad horizon even as 
their counterparts in lower-performing firms fight fires (Daft et 
al., 1988). The question of causality between scanning behaviour 
and organisational performance has not been addressed.
2.7 Gaps in the Environmental Scannino Literature
Despite the growing numbers of environmental scanning studies in 
the early 1980s, Mintzberg and Waters (1985, p. 269) still 
contended that "(m)ore research is required on the process of 
strategy formulation to complement the extensive work currently 
taking place on the content of strategies". More recently, Schwenk 
& Dalton (1991) and Shrivastava & Lim (1989) have identified the 
need for more investigation in the area of environmental analysis 
while Walsh (1995) has encouraged an increased focus on the less 
visible aspects of strategic management, and specifically mentioned 
information scanning and interpretation.
The gaps in the environmental scanning literature remain 
particularly acute for non-Westem settings. Most of what is known 
about these contexts comes from the work of Ghoshal (1987), who 
found scanning isomorphism among six South Korean chaebols, and 
Sawyerr (1993), who studied Nigerian manufacturing firms.
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CHAPTER 3
THE RESEARCH CONTEXT
Almost all of the management literature reviewed in Chapter 2 
comes from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. 
These countries share an Anglo linguistic and cultural heritage. 
In contrast, the data for this dissertation was collected in Hong 
Kong, where a very different societal culture has prevailed even 
after more than a century of British administration. This makes 
it important to consider explicitly the research context.
This chapter begins by introducing the concept of culture. The 
impact of society-level culture on management theory and practice 
is then discussed, with specific reference to strategic 
management. A comparison of the Anglo and Chinese cultures 
precedes an outline of the Chinese management philosophies and 
practices that have been found to predominate in Hong Kong.
The latter part of this chapter profiles Hong Kong in terms of 
its history and institutional framework. Economic and political 
development are reviewed while the distinguishing characteristics 
of its economic policies and business enterprises are 
highlighted.
3.1 Culture
Culture has been difficult to define, let alone examine, either 
by itself or in terms of its relationship to management practices 
(Kedia & Bhagat, 1988) . Decades ago, anthropologist Margaret 
Mead (1953) defined culture as "shared patterns of behaviour" in 
reporting her research of native rituals in Samoa. This implied 
that observing behaviour would be sufficient to study culture. 
However, there has been a subsequent recognition that it is also 
critical to understand the meaning behind the behaviour that is 
observed. Schneider and Barsoux (1997, p. 19) contend that "the 
same behavior can have different meanings and different behaviors 
can have the same meaning".
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Culture may thus be considered an integrated and complex set of 
interrelated and potentially interactive patterns that come 
together to characterize a group of people, and give it a unique 
social identity (Deutsch, 1973) . Hall (1976) contends that 
"there is not one aspect of human life that is not touched and 
altered by culture" (p. 16) and adds that "it is frequently the 
most obvious and taken for granted and therefore least studied 
aspects of culture that influence behavior in the deepest and 
most subtle ways" (p. 17).
It is generally accepted that culture is socially acquired rather 
than genetically (or logically) transmitted. It is thus 
comprised of learned rather than innate attributes. Kluckhohn 
and Strodbeck (1961) viewed culture as a shared and commonly-held 
body of general beliefs and values that define desirable and 
undesirable behaviours within a society. They, together with 
Hall (1976), have asserted that these beliefs and values dictate 
the way people think, behave, solve problems, make decisions, 
plan and lay out their homes and cities, and even organize their 
economic, political and transportation systems. Others have 
described culture as what humans have created in order to manage 
their environment (Malinkowski, 1944; Markus and Kitayama, 1991).
Although a precise definition for culture remains contentious, 
the varied conceptualizations commonly converge on a few 
principles. These include: it is shared by two or more people; 
it is defined by patterns of values, attitudes, and behaviours; 
and it can be characterised by a variety of indicators. These 
indicators encompass external adaptation (relationships with the 
environment), internal integration (relationship to other 
people), and linking assumptions in terms of language, space, and 
time (Schein, 1985; Schneider & Barsoux, 1997) .
The relationship between people and their environment is mediated 
(and perhaps even shaped) by culture along with other factors, 
such as resource availability, climate and geography, that are 
subject to limited control by humans (Triandis, 1972) . It has
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been argued that the environment is affected by and affects 
culture, potentially reinforcing, shaping or even changing 
radically the manifestations of cultural patterns (Hall & Hall, 
1990) . For example, the scarcity of a critical resource could 
stimulate changes in behaviours (rioting) and social institutions 
(the overthrow of an incumbent government) that would not have 
occurred in other circumstances (Boddewyn, 1970). As a result, 
it should be recognised that particular behaviours may be due not 
only to the group membership of the people concerned, but also 
due to their environmental circumstances.
Culture thus emerges as a latent and hypothetical construct 
characterised by "its forms and patterns, the interrelation of 
these into an organisation, and the way these parts, and the 
whole, work or function as a group of human beings lies under 
them" (Kroeber, 1952, p. 136). Although the construct is 
inherently complex, it is possible to label many different 
aspects or dimensions of it. A large body of literature on 
culture has identified and considered these dimensions (see Hall 
& Hall, 1990; Hofstede, 1980; Kluckholn & Strodtbeck, 1961; 
Schneider & Barsoux, 1997).
Significantly, these cultural dimensions exist at different 
levels of analysis. They include values, cognitive structures, 
and behaviours at the individual level; structures and rituals 
at the organisational level; and artifacts and attributes at the 
national or societal level. For example, the relative preference 
for making money or having leisure time (assuming that they are 
mutually exclusive) will vary from person to person, the workday 
routine will reflect most directly the culture of an 
organisation, while the degree of public compassion for the 
jobless will vary from society to society.
As "a collective programming of the mind which distinguishes one 
category or people from another" (Hofstede, 1980, p. 25), culture 
at the societal level may be expected to exert a significant 
influence on strategic management and information management
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practices. In his seminal study of about 116,000 IBM employees 
in over 60 countries, Hofstede found that societal culture 
explained 49 percent of differences in work-related values. This 
was far greater than the proportions explained by professional 
role, age, or gender. Despite the assorted criticisms of 
Hofstede's study (see House et al., 1997 for an example), it is 
generally agreed that the societal culture has a major influence 
on work-related values and attitudes as well as the management 
behaviours and practices that prevail in a particular work venue.
3.2 Culture's Consequences for Management
Businesses from developed countries are increasingly marketing 
their products to, and setting up operations in less developed 
countries. This has led to growing numbers of interactions 
between individuals from different societies, both within an 
organisation and outside of it. The effectiveness of these 
inter-cultural interactions depends upon the sensitivity of both 
sides. With the growing need for people who think differently 
to act together (Hofstede, 1980) , it is important to understand 
the key aspects of different cultures and their impacts. The 
success of an organisation or even an entire economy can depend 
upon recognising and accounting for cultural diversity.
With the globalisation of business activity and the key role of 
Anglo-based multinational corporations, the transferability of 
management theories from Anglo-dominated societies to other 
contexts has also become an important issue. Significantly, 
DiBella (1993) found that the cultural setting affects both the 
process and product of management practices.
Lammers and Hickson (1979) have warned that empirical studies 
that attempt to test either the culture-bound or culture-free 
thesis must overcome substantial obstacles that arise from their 
inherent complexity. Nevertheless, developments in recent 
decades such as the success of Japan have "alerted the largely 
Western world of management theory to the need for an 
understanding of alternative organisational principles" (Redding,
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1990, p. 236). Lee (1987) and Hofstede (1983) are among many who 
argue that management knowledge could be significantly advanced 
by challenging Western perspectives - in terms of both their 
assumptions and norms.
Very few cross-cultural studies have examined the impact of 
cognitive aspects on the practice of strategic management. 
However, Kiggundu, Jorgensen and Hafsi (1983) did find that 
several conventional theories related to the technical core of 
the organisation were transferable from their Anglo-Saxon origins 
to other societies and countries. In contrast, there were 
serious difficulties in the cross-cultural and international 
transfer of theories that related the organisation and its 
external environment.
This observation undermines the assumption of universal best 
practices. For example, while many now argue that organisations 
require flatter structures and more flexibility to cope with 
environment threats and conditions of economic adversity, an 
alternative prescription based on centralisation and stronger 
cost controls may also have some validity (Schneider & Barsoux, 
1997). Kiggundu et al. (1983) imply that context-specific 
factors will significantly influence the practice of strategic 
management, and particularly environmental scanning. However, 
their work leaves open the question of whether the difficulties 
arise from cultural, institutional or other unidentified factors.
As a result, it would be useful to go beyond this general level 
and incorporate one or more cultural or institutional dimensions 
into specific models or theories in order to explain observed 
differences between selected groups. The field of cross-cultural 
management has emerged from efforts to develop some of these 
models, theories and explanations. Although its broad scope 
precludes a comprehensive review here, a growing debate about the 
convergence of cultural values is outlined while the impact of 
cultural factors on strategic management and decision making is 
examined.
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3.2.1 Cultural cnnysraencs nr di vprgpnrs?
The field of cross-cultural management contains diverse positions 
on when management values and practices become similar. Kerr 
(1946) theorised that the technological imperative of 
industrialisation leads to a convergence in social institutions 
and values. This convergence hypothesis, subsequently extended 
by Harbison & Myers (1959) and Farmer & Richman (1965) , predicts 
that management practices will converge as different places 
attain a common stage of economic development. This assumes that 
modern management practices are readily transferable, and that 
individuals will modify their attitudes and behaviours in 
response to changing environmental conditions.
In contrast, Hofstede (1980; 1993) and others contend that 
societal culture not only exerts a major influence on management 
theory and practice, but also that it is highly resistant to 
change. As a result, fundamental differences in organisational 
management are expected to persist long after political, economic 
and technological conditions have converged. The lack of 
uniformity in management practice in the developed world tends 
to support this perspective.
Nevertheless, some suggest that management practices have 
converged at certain levels, but remain divergent at others (see 
Negandhi, 1983; Webber, 1969). A common argument is that the 
universality of technology and education will lead to similar 
human-work and firm-environment relationships, but interpersonal 
relationships will continue to differ because of cultural 
influences.
Child (1981) reviewed a large number of comparative management 
studies and concluded that management practices across nations 
are moving toward convergence at the organisational level (e.g., 
structure and technology) but continue to differ at the personal 
level (e.g., attitudes and behaviours). More recently, Adler 
(1997) has insisted that even multinational firms should not 
introduce universal management practices. Instead, she suggests
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that they should standardise the aspects of organisation that can 
be and should be similar (production, technology), and manage the 
remaining differences.
Since information management involves both technology and people, 
it may straddle the line between convergence and divergence. 
Escobar (1995) and Werther (1996) are among those who argue that 
the Internet and similar technologies have unleashed powerful 
forces that are quickly leading to a single information-based 
society with a globally-uniform culture. This perspective, which 
has received strong support in the U.S., implies that the concept 
of societal-level culture is rapidly becoming obsolete.
In sharp contrast, Huntington (1993) contends that culture is 
quickly replacing ideology and economics as the dominant source 
of contrast and conflict in the modern world. He acknowledges 
that Western culture has permeated the rest of the world at "a 
superficial level" that includes commercial logos and media 
images. However, he contends that "at a more basic level ... 
Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in 
other civilizations" (ibid, p. 40).
Shaw (1990) concurs with this divergence perspective, and 
suggests that intercultural business problems stem largely from 
differences in the way information about other people's behaviour 
is managed. As a result, it is unclear whether information 
management practices have been standardised by the universality 
of cyberspace or if they are among the lingering differences 
suggested by Adler (1997) .
As a more global economy and society do emerge, it seems critical 
not only to identify the similarities and differences in 
managerial attitudes and behaviours around the world, but also 
to understand the reasons behind the differences. Previous 
cross-cultural research in the area of information management has 
been limited largely to Western countries while the designs have 
constrained theory-building. Some studies have identified
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country-based differences with respect to both perceptions and 
practices (see Martinsons, 1994; Watson et al., 1997), but a 
cumulative analysis of their largely descriptive statistics leads 
to few unequivocal conclusions.
V 2 . 2  Strategic management- across mlnirps
As mentioned in Chapter 1, many of the classic frameworks and 
models in strategic management prescribed a rational and analytic 
approach based upon a functionalist and instrumental perspective 
(see Mintzberg, 1994; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). There was an 
assumption that the organisation and its environment are 
objective realities that will be perceived and analysed in 
similar ways by every rational manager.
However, the discussion in the first two chapters suggests that 
many factors including the bounded rationality and cognitive 
perceptions of managers, the uncertainties inherent in the 
external environment, and the political realities within an 
organisation or business network will affect how a strategic 
decision is made. For example, Mintzberg (1994) suggests that 
a strategy may emerge over time rather than be explicitly 
formulated and implemented because managers have a limited 
ability to control their environment and thus realise their 
intentions simply by taking actions when they become necessary.
Culture can also have an important influence on strategic 
management, in terms of affecting how managers see different 
things (even in the same environment) , how they subjectively 
create and enact different realities, and how they act in 
different ways (Schneider & DeMeyer, 1991). For example, 
assumptions about uncertainty and control may determine how much 
strategic planning is done as well as what information about the 
external environment is acquired, and how it is used.
Other aspects of strategic decision making will also be 
culturally affected. "Who makes the decision, who is involved 
in the process, and where decisions are made reflect different
79
cultural assumptions" (Schneider & Barsoux, 1997, p. 97) . 
Assumptions about time and change could influence how strategic 
decisions are made (and how quickly they are made) while the 
preferred levels of formalisation, centralisation and hierarchy 
will help to determine the extent of participation in those 
decision making processes. For example, less centralised and 
more participative decision making may be expected in societies 
that are less hierarchical and more group-oriented.
Nevertheless, even the same degree of subordinate participation 
in decision making may be based on very different rationales. 
Schneider and Barsoux (1997, p. 99) suggest that participation 
in some countries (like the United States) may be used to 
integrate different perspectives and preserve the rights of the 
individual to decide on their own future, in others (like Japan) 
it may be used to preserve group harmony and relationships, while 
in still others (like Sweden) it may be used to promote social 
welfare. This illustrates the importance of going beyond the 
Mead (1953) definition of culture, and examining not only the 
behaviours but also the explanations for those behaviours.
Culture is thus expected to significantly impact strategy making 
in terms of both contrasting behaviour and contrasting rationales 
for the same behaviour. At least one European-based study 
provides empirical support for this contention (Schneider, 1989) . 
Remarkably though, there has been little investigation of the 
organisation-environment interface outside of Western Europe and 
North America. As organisations expand their operations and 
enter new markets, international comparisons will be useful not 
only to identify similarities and differences between business 
processes in specific contexts, but also to explain them.
Sawyerr (1993, p. 297) has specifically noted the lack of 
comparative studies in the area of environmental scanning and 
recommended further investigation of the "differences between 
developing nations . . . and between developing and developed 
nations." These differences may be due to political, economic
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and cultural factors, among others.
The study reported here was conducted in Hong Kong, where the 
population is overwhelmingly Chinese and the dominant culture may 
be termed Confucian Chinese. As a result, it is appropriate to 
consider the contextual factors that might be expected to 
influence the results. The next section compares the Anglo and 
Chinese cultures and then outlines specifically the nature of 
Chinese management. A later section profiles the social, 
economic and political development of Hong Kong and identifies 
its distinguishing institutional characteristics.
3.3 Comparing the Ancrlo and Chinese Cultures
Based on a wealth of evidence from a variety of academic 
disciplines, it is now commonly accepted that there are 
fundamental differences between societies. Huntington (1993) 
contrasts different civilisations while Hofstede and Bond (1988) 
identify a divide between Eastern and Western civilisations.
Within the business literature, Ronen and Shenkar (1985) pointed 
out the vast differences between the Anglo and Far Eastern 
cultural clusters, Tricker (1988) and Martinsons (1991) have 
considered their implications for information management and IT 
application, respectively, while Martinsons and Hempel (1995) are 
among those who have examined Chinese management systems from a 
cross-cultural perspective.
It is acknowledged that there are substantial intra-cultural 
variations in both Anglo and Chinese societies. Neither the 
residents within the United Kingdom, the United States, the 
People's Republic of China or even those in a political territory 
like Hong Kong represent a sociological monolith. However, the 
empirical evidence indicates that these intra-cultural 
differences are much smaller than the inter-cultural difference 
between West and East, or between Anglo and Chinese societies 
(see Hofstede, 1980; Martinsons & Hempel, 1995) . As a result, 
it seems appropriate to focus on the differences between the
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Anglo and Chinese cultures at this point, and set aside the 
smaller intra-cultural variations for the time being.
3.3.1 The Hofstede Study
Hofstede (1980) identified four independent dimensions that could 
be used to differentiate one country or society from another. 
These work-related values were: power distance,
individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and
masculinity/femininity. Power distance refers to the degree to 
which power is distributed among members of a society. 
Individualism versus collectivism describes the way that 
individuals define themselves in relation to others in their 
society. Uncertainty avoidance signifies the attitudes towards 
risk and uncertainty that prevail in a society.
Masculinity/femininity refers to the balance between the tough 
and tender attributes found in a society.
Hofstede (1980) was unable to collect data from the People’s 
Republic of China (because IBM did not have business operations 
there at the time of his study), but his sampling did include 
three places where the Overseas Chinese, immigrants from mainland 
China, were the dominant population group - Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Taiwan. Hofstede's results identified stark differences 
between the prevailing work-related values of the three Chinese- 
dominated societies and the values of Anglo societies. Table 3.1 
shows the values on the four dimensions for the Anglo and Chinese 
clusters.
To be specific, Hofstede's results suggested that the societal 
culture of Hong Kong was quite similar to that in both Singapore 
and Taiwan; all three places scored comparatively high on power 
distance, low on individualism, and mid-range in masculinity. 
Their starkest contrast with the Anglo cluster (which included 
Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States) was on 
the power distance and individualism dimensions, as illustrated 
in Figure 3.1.
82
/
Table 3. 1
Work-Related Values
Power
Distance
Uncertainty
Avoidance
Individualismi
Collectivism
M asculinity/
Femininity
A nglo  cluster
61Australia 36 51 90
Canada 39 48 80 52
Great Britain 35 35 89 66
United States 40 46 91 62
C hinese cluster
Hong Kong 68 29 25 57
Singapore 74 8 20 48
Taiwan 58 69 17 45
Extracted from Hofstede (1980).
Figure 3.1
Contrasting the Anglo and Chinese Clusters 
on Power Distance and Individualism
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Hong Kong and Singapore also had two of the lowest scores on the 
uncertainty avoidance dimension. This implies that the Chinese- 
dominated city-states will have less structured organisations 
with few specialists or rules. However, the two city-states 
differ markedly in a fifth attribute, which Hofstede and Bond 
(1988) initially termed Confucian dynamism, and is now widely 
known as long-term orientation. Hong Kong was found to score the 
highest among the 20 economies around the Pacific Rim on this 
fifth dimension (with a score of 96) while Singapore ranked 
third, with a score of 88 (see Hofstede & Bond, 1988) .
Subsequent studies suggest that despite substantial differences 
in political and economic systems, the values in the People's 
Republic of China largely resemble those found in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan (Bond, 1987; Earley, 1989; Huo & Randall, 
1991; Shenkar & Ronen, 1987). A protracted period of centralised 
bureaucratic rule, whereby the state dominated civil society, is 
likely to have homogenised the values of both the Chinese who 
left the mainland and those who have stayed behind (Lau & Kuan, 
1988) .
Hofstede's original study was conducted some two decades ago and 
even the Confucian dynamism scores are based on data from the 
mid-1980s. In the interim, Hong Kong and other places in the Far 
East have undergone tremendous development and change. For 
example, Hong Kong only emerged as a leading international 
business centre in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the results of more 
recent studies, such as the comparison of the United Kingdom and 
Hong Kong reported by Lowe (1995), are consistent with Hofstede's 
findings, and thereby offer support for the continued divergence 
between Anglo and Chinese cultural values.
This continued divergence can be attributed to sharply 
contrasting philosophical, economic, and historical differences 
between the Anglo societies on the Atlantic Rim and the Chinese 
societies in Asia (see Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Hsu, 1981; 
Martinsons & Hempel, 1995). The perceptions, attitudes and
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behaviours of the two cultural groups have been strongly 
influenced by their respective religions and philosophies.
Western ethical values, which prevail in Anglo societies such as 
Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., stem largely from Judeo-Christian 
religion and Greek philosophy, while those of the Chinese are 
rooted in a neo-Confucian tradition that incorporates Buddhism 
and Taoism (Fung, 1948; Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Hsu, 1981).
Western religion and philosophy have promoted a focus on absolute 
standards, and preferences for contracting, freedom of
expression, fairness and equal opportunity, and precision and 
accuracy (Carlin & Strong, 1995) . Explicit social contracts, in 
the form of rules and laws, have been developed to govern 
society. Based on the principles of democracy, individuals or 
their direct representatives are involved in both creating and 
approving written laws, which are then elaborated and used by 
court judges, and enforced by police.
The cumulative evidence indicates that people living in Anglo 
societies are comparatively informal, direct, individualistic and 
competitive. They have also placed a comparatively high value 
on short-term results, voluntary association, progress and youth, 
while believing strongly in their ability to control nature. For 
example, the legal system inherited from the British as well as 
its frontier and immigration experiences have been cited as the 
major influences shaping the values of Americans (Grist, 1994; 
Hsu, 1981; Lawrence, 1990).
3.4 Confucianism and Chinese Culture
Western thought, including Christianity, has had a limited 
influence on Chinese culture (Carlin & Strong, 1995; Ma, 1988b; 
Tu, 1996) . Instead, the teachings of Confucius help to explain 
many of the cultural characteristics of Chinese societies. Bond 
and Hwang (1986, p. 214) insist that he commands "centre stage 
in almost all approaches to Chinese social behaviour" while 
Redding (1990, p. 2) considers Confucianism to be "the most
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apposite single-word label" for the values governing the social 
behaviour of the Overseas Chinese. Strictly speaking, 
Confucianism is not a religion, but rather a doctrine of life 
that promotes social well-being. The Analects of Rung Fu Ze, 
called Confucius by Western missionaries, serve as a guide to 
morality and the proper exercise of political power.
According to Hofstede and Bond (1988), Confucian teaching 
includes four key principles:
1. Social stability based on five unequal relationships
between people. These "wu lun" are ruler/subject, 
father/son, older brother/younger brother, husband/wife and 
older friend/younger friend (also teacher/student). These 
relationships are based on mutual and complementary- 
obligations ,• the senior partner provides protection and 
consideration in return for the respect and obedience of 
the junior partner.
2. Family as the essence of social organisation. A person 
is foremost a member of a family rather than an individual, 
and he/she has a responsibility to maintain harmony. 
Social relations should always be conducted to preserve the 
"face" (dignity, self-respect and prestige) of all 
involved.
3. Human benevolence in treating others as one would want 
to be treated. Although this does not extend as far as the 
Christian doctrine of loving thy enemies, the criticism of 
others in the in-group is frowned upon in contrast to its 
perception as a therapy in Western cultures.
4. Everyday virtue. This includes continually trying to 
acquire new skills and knowledge, working hard, not 
spending more than necessary, being patient and 
persevering.
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As seen from these principles, Confucianism encourages both a 
deep affection for kin and the maintenance of asymmetrical 
interpersonal relationships (such as the wu lun) . It also 
stresses the need to balance relationships at the individual, 
family and social level with virtues such as li (respect, social 
propriety and order) , jen (kindness and benevolence towards 
others), hsiao (filial piety), and chung (loyalty to principles).
As a result, the Chinese have traditionally maintained social 
order through a harmony-within-hierarchy arrangement rather than 
a coherent system of law enforcement (Bond & Hwang, 1986) . A 
hierarchical order of status and roles "was founded on the 
criterion of moral cultivation, with knowledge as either of 
secondary importance or the direct reflection of moral 
achievement". Hierarchical relationships between people and 
codes of behaviour for each role were included in the early 
Confucian idea of social order.
The values, preoccupations and processes of Chinese societies 
have also been shaped by a succession of strong central 
governments (in both the Imperial and Communist eras), the 
prevalence of subsistence agriculture, and long periods of 
isolation from the outside world (Fung, 1948; Hsu, 1981; 
Martinsons & Hempel, 1995) . This has led to a circumstantial 
orientation and the rule by man that may be contrasted with the 
legalistic orientation and the rule of law that prevail in Anglo 
societies (Hsu, 1981; Martinsons & Hempel, 1995; Tu, 1996).
Lau and Kuan (1988, pp. 5-6) suggest that the principles 
legitimising the authority of the Chinese government "can be 
subsumed under the notion of Mandate of Heaven. [They 
rationalised] the continued rule of those who could preserve 
social and cosmic harmony as well as promote the well-being of 
its subjects. The power of the traditional government was 
supreme and unchecked until the situation was so serious that 
peasant rebellions toppled it and made way for its replacement" . 
More recently, the role of the state as a paterfamilias has been
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taken up by both Chinese political and business leaders.
As a result, the Chinese score much higher on both power distance 
and collectivism than do those sampled in Anglo countries. This 
implies a greater concern with in-group welfare (rather than 
self-interest) , greater acceptance of unequal power distributions 
(and social hierarchies) , and higher levels of cooperation within 
the in-group. The Chinese place less emphasis on immediate 
outcomes, have more respect for ancestors and those in authority, 
and concentrate on maintaining harmony with nature rather than 
exerting control over it (Hsu, 1981; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). 
Bond and Hwang (1986, p. 213) contend that "the Chinese 
preoccupation with social order" mirrors "the Western 
preoccupation with individual freedom."
The Chinese emphasise the importance of obligations and duties 
that promote conformity, collective solidarity, and obedience 
while downplaying assertiveness and creativity. Interpersonal 
relations stress integrity and dignity instead of the Anglo focus 
on openness and spontaneity. Their non-religious socialisation 
also highlights the inherent duality and contradiction of many 
situations and leads to very pragmatic perspectives (Bond, 1986) .
3.4.1 Cultural influences on Chinese business
The economic development of East Asia has increased international 
interest in its predominant neo-Confucian culture. Before the 
recent financial crisis across the region, it was even 
hypothesised that the cultural inheritance had been a comparative 
business advantage for East Asia under the global market 
conditions of recent decades (Kahn, 1979; Hofstede & Bond, 1988).
According to Redding (1992), the Western multinational, the 
Western-state influenced firm and the Chinese family business are 
among the five major and distinct recipes for achieving business 
and economic success. Each emerged in a different context, 
reflecting the ways in which societies coordinate economic 
behaviour.
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The Chinese family business (CFB) has been the primary force 
behind economic growth and capitalism of East Asia with the 
exception of Japan and South Korea (Whitley, 1991; Redding, 
1990) . It can be seen as a product of its culture, with its key 
characteristics following from the principles of neo-Confucianism 
(see for example Ko, 1995; Martinsons & Hempel, 1995). Indeed, 
Redding (1990) drew an analogy to the link made by Max Weber 
(1985) between 17th century Protestantism and the behaviour of 
Western European capitalists. Weber (1951) had suggested that 
Confucianism failed to promote the kind of entrepreneurial 
behaviour required in the early stages of capitalism.
In contrast, Redding (1990) argued that the moral basis of 
entrepreneurial behaviour could be found in the Confucian ethic 
as well as in the Protestant ethic. He further identified three 
defining characteristics of neo-Confucian or Chinese capitalism 
as: paternalism - the importance of the family and the father 
figure at the centre; personalism - a reliance on interpersonal 
bonding as the basis of transaction; and insecurity - a sense of 
uncertainty which fosters hard work, the urge to accumulate 
wealth, and a will to maintain control. Relationships that blur 
the boundary between business and social activities have also 
been the norm.
These characteristics are partly the consequence of Chinese 
immigrants coming to a colonial setting like Hong Kong (and 
previously Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore 
as well). Most of these newcomers were largely ignorant of the 
laws in the strange new land and were unable to either read or 
speak its official language(s). As a result, they would rely 
greatly on kinship institutions and informal networks for social 
and business support, as a defense against harsh and hostile 
treatment by the host society (Chan & Chiang, 1994) .
The start-up enterprises of these Chinese overseas typically 
represented an effort to seize opportunity niches that were 
under-served or abandoned by major business groups. Many of them
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established co-ethnic partnerships, especially among family or 
kin members, in order to share the financial risk. Ethnic 
resources would also tend to provide much of the labour supply, 
with informal family and kin networks being used to recruit, 
supply and replenish labour for the immigrant business owner.
Family and kinship labour would be comparatively cheap, reliable, 
resourceful and loyal because social obligations would invariably 
come before employer-employee relations, and make the latter 
subject to social control of the family/kin network. Such labour 
would also be very resilient and flexible, a critical attribute 
in the early stages of a business, when the demand for labour may 
be highly variable and unpredictable.
3.5 Chinese Leadership and Management
The high power distance in Chinese societies results in very- 
centralised organisations (especially in terms of decision­
making) with a directive style of management (Whitley, 1991). 
Tricker (1994) suggested that this centralisation extends to 
corporate governance, with boards of directors in Overseas 
Chinese enterprises playing a comparatively minor role.
At the operational level, Chinese employees expect the 
organisation to look after them (like a family member) and in 
return demonstrate their loyalty to the organisation and 
deference to their boss. This enables and promotes an autocratic 
and paternalistic leadership style with little bureaucratic 
regulation (Westwood, 1997). Consequently, followers are far 
more likely to participate in preliminary discussions than in 
the subsequent decision-making process, and there is a tendency 
to avoid a public conflict that may result in a loss of face.
Fukuda (1983) has contrasted the Chinese pattern of leadership 
with that of the Japanese. He states that the leaders of 
Japanese organisations act as coordinators to achieve their group 
goals. They not only admit dependence on their subordinates but 
use this situation to maintain group harmony. Conversely, the
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Chinese pattern of leadership emphasises a rational commitment 
to leaders, but no admitted dependence on subordinates nor 
emphasis on maintaining group harmony.
3.5.1 Chinese thinking and decision making
Watson and Buede (1987) also suggest that the Chinese have a 
different mode of decision-making; the fatalistic legacy of their 
philosophies provides a stark contrast to the Western humanist 
tradition. The Chinese are said to perceive the world to be 
based on a network of relationships (see for example Bond, 1986) . 
This tends to make them socially-oriented and situation-centred 
rather than individually-oriented or self-centred (Hsu, 1981).
Tricker (1988, p. 40) asserted that in order to fully understand 
the Chinese, Westerners must recognise that they possess "a 
different [set] of coordinates as well as a different scale of 
values." This implies that an etic approach (see Mead, 1953), 
whereby a group or society is studied and understood on its own 
terms rather than those imposed by outsiders, would be useful.
Nevertheless, the Chinese way of thinking has been described as 
utilitarian and pragmatic (Nakamura, 1960), making them highly 
sensitive to outside conflicts and inconsistencies. They prefer 
subjective and synthetic decisions and have a reduced need for 
internal planning as a result of their hierarchical structures. 
"Non-Westernized Chinese thinking can be characterized as 
intuitive, moving from experience via contemplation to 
understanding" (Tricker, 1988, p. 39).
Hofstede and Bond (1986) contend that science benefits from 
analytic Western-style thinking, whereby truth emerges from facts 
and figures. In contrast, management and government are based 
on the art of synthesis, which is more consistent with Eastern 
thought. They suggest that the rapid development of Confucian 
societies in the recent past was enabled by an ability to put 
Western analytically-derived technologies into practice using 
their synthetic abilities. More recently, Mintzberg (1994) has
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claimed that there is a basic incompatibility between analytic 
planning and synthetic strategy making.
Eastern religion and philosophy, as represented by Confucianism, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism and Shintoism, sees human truth as 
partial, whereas the Christian, Muslim and Judaic religions are 
very much concerned with a Universal Truth (Hofstede & Bond, 
1988, Hsu, 1981). Eastern societies emphasise virtue and 
practical ethics, and leave room for feelings, intuition and 
spirituality, but do not attempt to resolve the issue of truth.
3.5.2 Chinese information management
Tricker (1988) considered the cultural aspects of information 
based on the characteristics and culture of Chinese business 
techniques. He noted that the classical paradigms of the 
information systems (IS) literature are rooted in Western 
thought. However, the transformation process by which an agent 
acquires and interprets information is culturally significant and 
may even be culturally dependent. He concludes that cultural 
factors have a part in IS research and information resource 
management, especially when there are international, cross- 
cultural dimensions. More recently, Martinsons & Westwood (1997) 
highlighted some of the characteristics which contrast Western 
and Chinese societies in order to explain the distinctive 
patterns of MIS use found in Chinese businesses.
There is a prevailing view, but probably not a general consensus, 
that the Western reductionist, empirical and quantitative 
approach to problem-solving is more appropriate for computer- 
based decision support systems than its Chinese counterpart (see 
Martinsons, 1991; Zhang & Angell, 1989). The former acknowledges 
that uncertainty is hard to eliminate, but does not preclude its 
reduction. As a result, "a great deal of effort has been devoted 
to modelling decision processes, environments and even judgments 
[as with expert systems]. An analytic process of decomposition 
and recomposition [with quantitative methods to imply 
objectivity] has been emphasised" (Zhang & Angell, 1989, p. 15).
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It has been argued that the Chinese are comparatively more 
flexible in dealing with uncertainty (see Hofstede, 1980; 
Redding, 1990). Perhaps the deepest insight from Taoism is a 
profound awareness that change and transformation are both 
inevitable and universal. With less initiative to act 
independently and a lower perceived capacity to influence events, 
there may be a reduced need to gather information and assess 
possible outcomes (Boisot, 1987; Martinsons & Westwood, 1997).
Following from this, a weaker link between the level of perceived 
environmental uncertainty and the level of information sourcing 
or environmental scanning activity would be expected. Moreover, 
transplanting Western decision technologies, without appropriate 
adaptation, is also likely to "mislead rather than effectively 
guide Chinese decision-makers" (Zhang & Angell, 1989, p. 4).
These perspectives are also relevant to the reported study. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, it has been argued that top managers will 
seek out more information in response to perceived environmental 
uncertainty (Daft et al., 1988). The common link between 
uncertainty and the lack of information about specific events and 
relationships implies that additional information will invariably 
provide a better basis for predicting the future. Management 
information systems claim to make needed information more 
accessible and easier to understand, while decision support 
systems make it possible to perform more effective information 
analysis (Zhang & Angell, 1989, p. 6).
The literature reviewed here suggests that assorted cultural 
factors will have a significant impact on strategic management 
activities and decision making in general. The neo-Confucian 
cultural heritage of the Japanese and Chinese also helps to 
explain their distinctive management systems (see Redding, 1990; 
Whitley, 1991) . Similarly, the Confucian-based Chinese culture 
that prevails in Hong Kong would be expected to have a 
significant effect on the strategic intelligence activities 
conducted there. However, institutional factors also exert an
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influence. As a result, the sections that follow consider the 
economic, social, and political development of Hong Kong.
3.6 Economic Development in Hong Kong
Hong Kong represents a remarkable economic story as well as a 
unique political situation. As a British colony before July 
1997, Hong Kong was perceived by numerous observers to be "a 
borrowed place on borrowed time." Nevertheless, its favourable 
business environment and strategic location, at the crossroads 
of Asia and adjacent to mainland China, attracted businesspeople 
from all over the world and allowed many local enterprises to 
flourish. The modern concrete and glass jungle that surrounds 
Victoria Harbour attests to the economic success of Hong Kong.
The global importance of Hong Kong also far exceeds that to be 
expected for a place with less than 7 million people living on 
a small fraction of its 1000 square kilometres. Its rapid 
development has been cited to show the merits of a laissez faire 
economic policy (see E. Chen, 1995) . As a polycentric city with 
global connections and a critical economic dependence on 
services, Hong Kong is not only a bellwether for the world's most 
populous country (Martinsons et al. , 1997), but also a vanguard
of the post-industrial age (Hall, 1997; Martinsons, 1993).
Hong Kong was the first economy in the developing world to be 
ranked among the world's ten largest trading communities, and it 
has maintained that elite status since 1991 (Government 
Information Centre, 1997). Hong Kong became a major player in 
the global economy despite its rather humble circumstances in the 
1800s. Even as the British progressively gained sovereignty over 
Hong Kong in the 19th century, the wisdom of the acquisition was 
seriously questioned; one foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston, 
dismissed it as "a barren rock with hardly a house upon it!".
Both the history and destiny of Hong Kong are highly 
interdependent with those of mainland China. From the early 
1800s until the middle of this century, the territory served as
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a staging post for trade between China and the West. However, 
the Communist takeover of mainland China in 1949 (and the Korean 
War) led the United States and the United Nations to impose 
embargoes on China trade. These effectively suspended Hong 
Kong's role as an entrepot even as a flood of refugees from 
Communist China rapidly boosted its population during the 1950s.
This large immigrant group included many entrepreneurs from 
Shanghai; their capital and expertise enabled the 
industrialisation of Hong Kong. Its initial manufacturing 
outputs were textiles and clothing, but by 1960 this product line 
had been extended to include plastic, toys and leather goods. 
Over the next two decades, Hong Kong thrived on its industrial 
base, with new outputs including printing materials, metal goods, 
machinery, timepieces, and electronic goods. Many local 
producers initially subcontracted work from a few large retailers 
in the United States and Western Europe. These business 
relationships were later extended, creating a global market of 
branded goods produced in Hong Kong.
Regional economic development steadily raised the prominence of 
sectors such as financial services, transportation and 
telecommunications while increasing tourism led to the emergence 
of the hospitality and retailing trades. By the late 1970s, Hong 
Kong was a thriving and diversified export-driven economy. 
However, the enactment of an Open Door Policy by the PRC sparked 
further restructuring. Hong Kong re-emerged as the gateway 
between China and the outside world, and its economic focus 
shifted from light industry to services.
3.6.1 Economic transformation
Hong Kong's economic transformation is evident from the changing 
contributions of different sectors to its gross domestic product 
(GDP) . The most notable dynamic has been the continuously 
declining role of manufacturing. Its share of GDP dropped from 
34 percent in 1970 to 11 percent in 1995 while employment fell 
from 47 percent to 21 percent of the total labour force. The
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contribution of the services sector rose from 60 percent in 1970 
to 83 percent in 1995 while its share of employees grew from 41 
percent to 72 percent (Government Information Centre, 1997). 
Financial services, insurance, real estate and business services 
has been a particularly vibrant sub-sector. It has grown at an 
average annual rate of more than 20 percent since 1985, and by 
1995 it accounted for 28 percent of total gross domestic product 
in Hong Kong (Government Information Centre, 1997).
Much of this economic shift can be related to the rising cost of 
doing business in Hong Kong. The inability of land and labour 
supply to meet demand has led to rapidly escalating rental prices 
and wage rates. These have enriched property developers and 
speculators while allowing the overall standard of living in Hong 
Kong to rise rapidly. However, they have also prompted many 
local enterprises to relocate their labour-intensive work. 
Between 1981 and 1996, about two-thirds of all Hong Kong 
manufacturing firms set up plants in southern China. By 1997, 
over 30,000 Hong Kong-owned factories were employing about five 
million people in Guangdong Province (Government Information 
Centre, 1997; Sung, 1997). Remarkably, most of the value added 
to goods produced by Hong Kong now comes from the mainland 
(Magnier, 1993; Redding, 1994).
Leading service providers in Hong Kong have also moved their 
back-offices northwards, across the border into mainland China. 
At the same time, several venture capitalists have established 
"software factories" in Guangdong province, often with the co­
operation of the national government of the PRC or its provincial 
counterpart.
Despite the limited amount of production taking place in Hong 
Kong during recent years, the economy remained buoyant throughout 
the political handover period. A business-as-usual posture and 
a U.S. dollar-linked currency enabled it to remain remarkably 
stable during the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Thousands of 
multinational firms have maintained their regional headquarters
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in Hong Kong, primarily because it is seen as the best base for 
China business. Sung (1997, p.3) asserts that Hong Kong “has 
been able to reap most of the blessings that come from being in 
close contact with a large, low-income population while avoiding 
most of the curses generally associated with such a 
relationship".
3.6.2 Business in Hong Kong
Redding (1990) and Warrington (1982) are among those reporting 
that explicit or long range business planning is rare in Hong 
Kong. This characteristic may be attributed to a favourable 
business environment, a stable legal system, and the precarious 
political situation in pre-handover Hong Kong. However, the 
predominance of small and simply organised enterprises, which is 
consistent with a neo-Confucian cultural heritage, is arguably 
the most important explanatory factor.
Small firms tend to have simple structures and strong autocratic 
leaders (Mintzberg, 1983) and this is very evident in Hong Kong. 
A low degree of organisational specialisation and limited 
administrative resources make it necessary to concentrate 
decision-making. This process often takes place informally, in 
the mind of the leader. Smaller firms with their limited 
resources are more likely to adjust to, rather than influence 
changes in environmental conditions. They are able to make 
incremental strategic changes in lieu of broad and long-range 
decisions (Quinn, 1980). Small businesses also tend to focus on 
personal relationships and cooperation, especially in turbulent 
markets. Personal contacts are likely to be based on mutual 
need, trust and affiliation (Smeltzer et al. , 1988; White, 1986).
The Hong Kong economy is dominated by small, family-owned 
enterprises. According to recent statistics, Hong Kong only had 
about 60 organisations with over 1000 employees (Hong Kong 
Government, 1997). About 98 percent of the nearly 500,000 
registered establishments had less than 50 workers and most had 
fewer than 10 full-time staff!
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Niche strategies and a reliance on both Chinese management 
systems and sub-contracting gave them the flexibility and 
resilience to thrive in dynamic markets (Martinsons & Hempel, 
1995; Siu Sc Martin, 1992; Sit & Wong, 1989) . However, these same 
characteristics impair both organisational growth and the use of 
advanced technologies (see Lau & Snell, 1996; Redding, 1994).
1.6.1 Infrastructural support for development
The recent evolution of the Hong Kong economy has dramatically 
increased its levels of trade and transshipment activity. With 
exported and re-exported goods annually worth more than US$
20,000 per person, Hong Kong has been the world's top trading 
economy on an earnings-per-capita basis (Hong Kong Government, 
1996) . Local businesses have geographically dispersed their 
operations, created wider webs of business relationships, and 
expanded their product ranges. This has complicated management 
control and coordination requirements in Hong Kong. Thus, the 
progressive development of a comprehensive transportation and 
communications infrastructure may be seen as a critical enabler 
for the economic modernisation of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong has capitalised on its fine, natural, deep-water 
harbour and strategic location to rank as the world's busiest 
container seaport since the early 1990s (Government Information 
Centre, 1997) . Its air passenger and cargo loads also rank high 
on a global scale. A massive public works project to realise the 
Hong Kong Government's Port and Airport Development Strategy 
(PADS) is to further enhance these facilities. Hong Kong also 
has extensive road and railway links and cost-effective public 
transportation systems. Recent or current projects aim to 
improve its physical links to the rest of the PRC.
Hong Kong had the world's first fully digitised telephone system 
entirely connected via optical fibre cables and implemented the 
first mobile telephone network operating underground - in the 
cross-harbour tunnels and underground mass transit railway. In 
the mid-1990s, it was among the world's ten busiest international
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telephone traffic hubs and had one of the highest numbers of 
cellular phones and pagers per capita (Petrazzini & Ure, 1997) .
The emergence of Hong Kong as a major hub for financial and 
commercial services would have been impossible without such a 
comprehensive telecommunications infrastructure. The pervasive 
adoption of basic office technologies has also been critical (see 
Burn & Martinsons, 1997) . IT is routinely used to provide 
innovative services such as remote booking and ordering services 
as well as telephone banking, electronic funds transfer and 
smartcard transactions for retail purchases and transportation 
fares. Nearly all large- and medium-sized organisations in both 
the private and public sectors have raised productivity and 
service levels by using IT (Bum et al., 1993; Burn & Martinsons, 
1997) . The IT penetration rates are particularly high in the 
financial services, transportation, communication, and 
wholesaling industries (Tye & Chau, 1997).
Despite the presence of a few pioneering information systems (see 
Bu m  Sc Szeto, 1997; Loebbecke & Blanning, 1997; Martinsons, 1997; 
Martinsons & Hosley, 1992), Hong Kong remains surprisingly weak 
in the managerial and transformational application of information 
technologies (see Martinsons, 1994; Tye & Chau, 1995; Yeung et 
al., 1995a,b). The implementation of inter-organisational 
systems such as electronic commerce has also lagged behind places 
such as Singapore (see B u m  & Martinsons, 1997; . This has 
raised concerns about the economic competitiveness of Hong Kong, 
especially since many firms have left only a managerial "brain" 
there after moving their operational "body" to mainland China.
The remarkable progress and transformation of the Hong Kong 
economy has required more than just a strong supporting 
infrastructure. It has also been critical to develop good 
relationships with overseas markets and investors. Perhaps the 
most important relationship has been that with mainland China, 
which has called for a high degree of flexibility and pragmatism.
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3.7 The Relationship with China
Prior to the political handover in 1997, Hong Kong had to 
consider the interests of the FRC - its northern neighbour, 
future political master and awakening economic giant - when 
dealing with nearly every significant political, social or 
economic issue. The set of agreements under which Hong Kong 
became a British colony were not recognised by the post-1949 
Communist Chinese regime. Nevertheless, the PRC has provided the 
colony with critical supplies of food, water and energy. The 
very existence of Hong Kong as a capitalist haven was thus 
dependent on the benevolence of mainland China.
Pre-handover Hong Kong was "a part of China that happens, for the 
time being, to be administered by someone else. Hong Kong is 
Chinese not only geographically, but also ethnically, culturally 
and often emotionally . . . separated from China only by the 
artifice of political arrangements" (Youngson, 1983, p. 1). 
Despite being administered by the British for more than 150 
years, the vast majority of its population has always been ethnic 
Chinese. Mass migrations from the southern and coastal provinces 
of China brought successive waves of Chinese to the territory. 
In the 20th century, these groups have fled political turmoil in 
the 1930s, war in the 1940s, and Communism since the 1950s.
3.7.1 Chinese business characteristics
The vast majority of Hong Kong residents were born in mainland 
China or are direct descendants of those who were. The Cantonese 
dialect of Chinese, which originated in Guangdong province on the 
mainland, is an official language of Hong Kong alongside English. 
Not surprisingly, Martinsons and Hempel (1995, p. 2) suggest that 
"Beneath a business veneer which resembles that found in the 
West, there is a deeply-rooted and different social culture." 
Although Hong Kong is an international business centre, it can 
be seen to have added Western ideas onto a Chinese foundation 
rather than really mixing the two cultures.
In fact, Hong Kong is the epicentre of several concentric Chinese
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business circles (see Hicks, 1987; Siu & Martin, 1992) . The 
innermost of these includes Taiwan, Macau, and Guangdong province 
in the PRC while another encompasses Southeast Asia and all of 
mainland China. The southern Chinese have historically had a 
peripheral role in state politics. With family welfare as the 
top priority, they have been among the world's most successful 
traders and business people.
Nowhere has this been more evident than in Hong Kong. Hofer 
(1993, p. 68) has even claimed that the territory "exists only 
for commercial reasons. Everything else in life ... is secondary 
to the business of earning profits". The remarkable progress 
made by Hong Kong since the 1950s supports a classical view that 
economic development can be achieved if a government practises 
non-intervention. Similar to the three other East Asian dragons 
(Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), it has adopted liberal trade 
and taxation policies, controlled foreign exchange rates and 
allowed unrestricted capital flows in order to encourage rapid 
economic development (Lasserre, 1981).
Based on a strong belief in free trade and private investment, 
the Hong Kong Government has maintained a positive non- 
interventionist policy, and confined its economic functions "to 
the provision of a viable political and physical infrastructure" 
(Lau & Kuen, 1988, p. 24). These functions of the state have 
included pegging the local currency the U.S. dollar, controlling 
the land supply through periodic auctions, and owning both a 
massive housing stock and the major local transportation 
providers. Nevertheless, the supply and demand of all but the 
most basic goods and service has be determined primarily by 
market forces. Such a policy has arguably enhanced "Hong Kong's 
capacity for breathtaking change" (see Chetham, 1997, p. 27 for 
evidence to support this claim) .
Even compared to market-based economies such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom, Hong Kong has had less government 
regulation that interferes with or controls business activities.
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A hackneyed adage suggests that in Hong Kong, an enterprise can 
be established in the morning, made operational by lunch, and 
become profitable by dinner.
3.7.2 Economic volatility in an open economy
Perhaps paradoxically, the largely non-interventionist British 
colonial administration gave Hong Kong a high degree of political 
stability in the 150 years before 1997. However, as a fairly 
small and very open economy, Hong Kong has been (and will 
continue to be) prone to developments in neighbouring economies 
and overseas export markets. Han Su-yin (quoted in Hofer, 1993, 
p. 68) suggests that although "squeezed between giant antagonists 
crunching huge bones of contention ... (it) has achieved an 
existence which is baffling, infuriating, incomprehensible, and 
works splendidly - on borrowed time in a borrowed place".
Despite a solid legal system and a stable political framework, 
Hong Kong has also experienced a comparatively large number of 
internal shocks. These have included banking crises in 1965 and 
1984-85, social unrest spilling over from the Culture Revolution 
in the PRC during the late 1960s and early 1970s (including the 
1966 Star Ferry riots), a stock market crash in 1973 (with a 55 
percent fall in value), a currency trauma in 1983, closures of 
the stock and futures exchanges in 1987, and a pervasive sense 
of pessimism after the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.
In the years between the signing of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration in 1984 and the formal transfer of political 
sovereignty in 1997, there were wild swings in local confidence. 
The lowest point came after the Tiananmen Square massacre, when 
the stock market (which is perhaps the best barometer of business 
and social sentiment) collapsed and there was a significant 
'brain drain' (emigration of professionals).
Conversely, in 1992 and especially 1993, the dramatic growth of 
global interest in China created a whirlwind of economic activity 
in Hong Kong. Many of the emigrants returned (often with
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'insurance' - a foreign passport) and thousands of others came 
to the territory looking for part of the action. The value of 
the stock market nearly tripled within a single twelve month 
period. Recent evidence of the environmental volatility in Hong 
Kong is provided by Fortune magazine, which featured a June 1995 
cover story entitled "Death of Hong Kong" only seven months after 
proclaiming it to be the world's best city for business.
Annual growth rates in Hong Kong have experienced a "switch-back 
of almost violent turbulence" (Redding, 1994, p. 73) for several 
decades, but unemployment never emerged as a significant problem 
during the era of British rule. The Hong Kong Chinese business 
community has exhibited a remarkable capacity to adapt to 
environmental change. As the PRC assumed the political 
sovereignty of Hong Kong from Britain, this attribute was being 
tested severely once again.
3.8 Post-Handover Hong Kong
Based upon the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (SAR) is to enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy. Its current social and economic systems are to be 
maintained until 2047 under a "one country, two systems" concept. 
Nevertheless, there are many reasons for concern as an icon of 
capitalism comes under the political control of the world's last 
major Communist government.
The national government in Beijing can choose to utilise, to 
learn from, to adapt or even to destroy the Hong Kong model. 
However, the Chinese leadership is unlikely to simply ignore 
their newly (re-)acquired territory. Whether it is the economic 
“golden goose” for China or the social and political “renegade" in 
the country, Hong Kong is likely to attract a disproportionately 
large amount of interest from both domestic and foreign parties 
for many years to come.
Hong Kong could now serve as a role model for the rest of the 
PRC, demonstrating that Chinese businesses can function
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effectively in an open, market-based economy where there is 
little state intervention or interference. It may also provide 
a model for the Chinese management of information, especially if 
ethnic Hong Kong Chinese chief executives are found to acquire 
and use information differently from their Western counterparts.
3.9 Closing Comments on Context
This chapter has highlighted the cultural and institutional 
factors that shape the research context for the study. It is 
suggested that the basic character of business and society in 
Hong Kong reflects the dominance of the ethnic Chinese in the 
local population and their neo-Confucian cultural heritage. 
Meanwhile, the territory's institutional framework has been 
strongly influenced by decades of British administration, an 
openness to the global market economy, and a chronic need for 
Hong Kong's business and political elite to consider the 
interests of mainland China. This leaves open the question of 
how the pattern of strategic intelligence in pre-handover Hong 
Kong will compare to that observed previously in Anglo cultures.
The next chapter presents the framework that was used to address 
this question and related ones while also outlining the research 
philosophy of the author. Subsequent chapters report and discuss 
the results of the study, and thus enable conclusions and 
implications to be drawn from them.
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Chapter 4
THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
This chapter presents the framework for the research. It is 
divided into six sections. The first identifies the focus, 
objectives, and intended contribution of the study. The second 
outlines the major research questions and areas of interest. The 
third presents the author's research philosophy and provides the 
rationale for employing both a larger-scale survey and a smaller 
number of case studies. The fourth and fifth sections detail the 
process of data collection and analysis for the survey and the 
case studies, respectively. The assumptions and limitations of 
the methodology are discussed in a sixth section.
4.1 Research Focus. Objectives and Contribution
The focus of the study was on a key element of strategic 
management - the acquisition and use of information about the 
external business environment. Chapter 1 introduced the topic 
of strategic intelligence while Chapter 2 demnstrated that it 
has been a popular subject for scholarly study in recent decades. 
There is now a fairly rich body of environmental scanning 
literature, but nearly all the reported studies have been 
conducted in Western settings. The major studies reported before 
the late 1980s used data drawn from organisations that were 
almost exclusively based in the United States. More recently, 
studies conducted in Canada, Korea, Nigeria, and the United 
Kingdom have been published.
The general purpose of this study was to extend the existing body 
of environmental scanning literature by observing, describing and 
(to the extent possible) developing explanations for the 
strategic intelligence patterns in a distinctive context. As 
Carroll and Johnson (1990, p.ll) contend, it is important to 
research not only "how decisions are made in terms of the 
information used, (and) the way information is combined, . . . but 
also the situational effects on decision making".
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Some 25 centuries after Sun Zi first documented its importance 
to military strategy, the context for the strategic intelligence 
phenomenon returned to Chinese organisations. However, this time 
the data were collected in Hong Kong, on the eve of its political 
transfer from the United Kingdom to the People's Republic of 
China. The aim of the study was to find out how Hong Kong 
Chinese chief executives perceived the pre-handover environment 
and how they sourced information in order to recognise, 
understand and address strategic issues.
Carroll and Johnson (1990, p. 14) suggest that research may be 
conducted to examine a particular decision, a particular type of 
decision, a particular decision maker, or aspects of the decision 
process in general. Based upon this typology, the study looked 
at a particular group of decision makers (ethnic Chinese chief 
executives in Hong Kong) and a particular type of decision, the 
sourcing of information about the external environment in the 
context of strategy making or strategic issue diagnosis.
The primary research objective was to systematically observe, 
describe, and illustrate the acquisition and use of information 
about the external environment by Chinese chief executives in 
pre-handover Hong Kong in order to develop explanatory theory. 
Chinese businesses have been renowned for their ability to 
succeed amidst environmental uncertainty (Ko, 1995; Redding, 
1990) . This reputation prompted an interest in how ethnic 
Chinese CEOs in different economic sectors - goods-producing as 
well as service-providing and private as well as public - 
perceived the pre-handover Hong Kong business environment, and 
how they scanned their environments in response to perceptions 
of uncertainty as well as strategic needs.
The secondary research objective was to compare and contrast the 
results from Hong Kong with previously reported studies of 
environmental scanning in other contexts. This work is believed 
to be the first to consider strategic intelligence activities in 
the heart of Asia and by ethnic Chinese managers. Consequently,
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an appropriate research design would enable 1) meaningful 
comparisons with many previously-reported environmental scanning 
studies, and 2) the development of explanations for any 
differences that were observed.
These comparisons and explanations were expected to build upon 
and advance cross-cultural knowledge in the fields of strategic 
management and information management. The research thus 
implicitly sought to examine the applicability of Western (and 
primarily Anglo-American) management theories and practices in 
a predominantly Chinese cultural environment. Given the 
perspective presented in Chapter 3, there were reasons to believe 
that this study of Chinese chief excutives in pre-handover Hong 
Kong would uncover both behaviours and rationales for behaviours 
that were different from those of managers in countries with an 
Anglo cultural heritage.
The research goals were descriptive and explanatory rather than 
prescriptive. The primary aim was not to prescribe how managers 
in Hong Kong or elsewhere should engage in strategic intelligence 
activities. The study was expected to contribute significantly 
to our knowledge and understanding of how information about the 
business environment is collected and used by top managers, 
especially when facing an impending environmental discontinuity. 
The conclusions and implications drawn from the results are 
likely to interest at least three groups: organisational 
designers, management practitioners, and IS specialists.
With respect to the first of these groups, Daft et al. (1988, p. 
137) suggest that "gradually unravelling the sequence of 
activities associated with interpretation of the environment and 
strategic responses may provide a stronger normative basis for 
saying how firms can be designed to increase company performance 
in light of strategic or environmental contingencies". This is 
in line with the information processing perspective considered 
in Chapter 2.
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Meanwhile, growing numbers of organisational leaders all over the 
world may be expected to face the same fast pace, turbulence and 
information richness that characterised pre-handover Hong Kong. 
Many of these strategic management practitioners are likely to 
be interested in the environmental perceptions and information 
sourcing behaviours found in this study. Their interest would 
stem largely from a desire to benchmark their own activities. 
However, a few managers, even non-Hong Kong ones, may want to go 
further. They may not copy the observed patterns, but may use 
them to better understand the behaviours (and underlying 
rationales for the behaviours) of potential adversaries or 
collaborators. As Chinese businesses extend their impact 
internationally, such a knowledge base will become progressively 
more valuable to non-Chinese management practitioners.
The focus on information also leads to the issue discussed at the 
end of Chapter 1 - how can information technology be applied to 
support strategic management activities. The findings and 
inferences about the degree and nature of current and potential 
computerisation of strategic intelligence activities will be 
relevant to the vendors, sponsors, designers and users of IT 
products, such as EIS and related decision support tools, as well 
as those providing information-based services . By understanding 
the hows and whys of environmental scanning by Hong Kong Chinese 
CEOs, they should be able to offer products and services that are 
better suited to their intended customers and end-users.
4.2 Research Questions (and Areas of Interest)
Top managers are known to have limited data collection and 
information processing capabilities while even the largest 
organisations have finite amounts of available resources. As a 
result, every chief executive must make strategic choices, both 
in terms of the process that will be used to develop strategies 
and the content of those strategies. During the strategy making 
(or formulation) phase, the key questions include: what is 
happening in the external environment? what issues merit 
strategic management attention? what information sources will
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be most useful to understand the external environment? what 
information sources should be tapped in order to gain a better 
understanding of a specific strategic issue?
The constrained capabilities and resources of managers and 
organisations together with the endless stream of happenings in 
the external environment and wide variety of alternative 
information sources give rise to a very long list of potential 
research questions. Based on the literature reviews presented 
in the first three chapters, and the time and resources available 
for this study, a decision was made to address the following 
major questions:
What uncertainties in the external business environment were 
perceived by Chinese chief executive officers (CEOs) in pre­
handover Hong Kong?
What sources were used by these CEOs to acquire information about 
the external business environment?
What perceived characteristics of these sources influence their 
degree of use?
A subsidiary question, related specifically to the political 
handover, was:
To what extent was the impending change of political sovereignty 
a strategic consideration for Hong Kong Chinese CEOs?
Associated with this, the study considered the following:
Perceived strategic uncertainty (PSU) in the pre-handover Hong 
Kong environment, and the following specific variables:
• the perceived uncertainty of different environmental sectors
the complexity of different sectors 
the rare of change of different sectors
• the jmpnrrance of different environmental sectors
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[based on Daft et al, 1988]
Sources used by Hong Kong Chinese CEOs to acquire information 
about the external environment
• the frequency of use of different information sources
external vs. internal, personal vs. impersonal
• the influence of educational level on information source use
• the sources used in different clprisinn-makina mips
• the sources used for specific strategic issues
Relative importance of accessibility and quality in the selection 
of an information source
e pprceiveri quality of different information sources 
e perceived accessibility of different information sources
Information source use during strategic issue diagnosis
• the general approach to strategy making
• strategic issues addressed in pre-handover Hong Kong
• use of information sources during different diagnostic phases
As suggested by the model presented in Chapter 2, assorted 
relationships between perceived environmental characteristics, 
environmental scanning activity, information source 
characteristics as well as the educational level and decisional 
roles of the managers could have been selected for investigation. 
The current and potential role of computer-based information 
systems in the strategic intelligence activities of Hong Kong 
Chinese CEOs could also have been explored in various ways.
Before identifying the specific hypotheses that were formulated, 
and detailing the methods that were used both to test these 
hypotheses and to study related aspects of the focal phenomenon, 
the author's philosophy on research design will be outlined.
4.3 Research Philosophy
A research design refers to the overall structure and orientation 
of an investigation (Bryman, 1989). It is the arrangement of the
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conditions associated with the research process in a manner that 
aims to combine relevance to the purpose of the study with an 
economy in procedure (Sellitz et al., 1976) .
A research design serves as the blueprint for the collection, 
measurement and analysis of data (Phillips, 1971) . In contrast, 
research methods are the operational techniques used to gather 
the data and to process it. In recent years, the tremendous 
advances in statistical techniques and information technology 
have spawned an increase in quantitative research studies. 
Instead of merely following this herd instinct, careful 
consideration was given to the design and methods that would best 
suit the research questions and areas of interest identified in 
the previous section.
A rigorous methodology is an important attribute in a substantial 
research project. Such a methodology will include a system of 
explicit rules and procedures upon which the research is based, 
and against which claims for knowledge as a result of it can be 
evaluated. By definition, scientific knowledge is provable by 
both reason and observation, a scientific methodology must 
address both these issues in terms of logical validity and 
empirical verification.
A scientific methodology will also facilitate communications 
between scientists, including social scientists. It serves as 
a set of rules for reasoning whereby facts can be evaluated in 
order to draw inferences. It amounts to the use of logical 
structures and appropriate procedures for observation and 
verification (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1989) . The use of such a 
methodology helps to ensure adherence to a logical reasoning 
process. Since theories can be established or verified only on 
logical grounds, they must be corroborated with or verified by 
empirical evidence.
Scientific research has been widely characterised as involving 
a systematic sequence of observation, description, explanation,
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and prediction. However, in the social sciences, which is 
commonly defined to include management studies, the first parts 
of the sequence have attracted the most attention. Countless 
numbers of descriptive studies have been reported in working 
papers and presented at conferences. Research that provides 
explanations and predictions has been less common, perhaps 
because this type of research is not as easy.
There is no universally-accepted scientific methodology. 
Scientists "have not yet settled among themselves on a single 
model of what science is" (Lee, 1989) . Moreover, science is 
rarely free of error and/or bias. Gould (1980) has stated that 
"Science is not an objective, truth-directed machine, but a 
quintessentially human activity, affected by passions, hopes and 
cultural biases. Cultural traditions of thought strongly 
influence scientific theories". According to Max Born (1950), 
"There is no philosophical high-road in science with 
epistemological sign-posts. No, we are in a jungle and find our 
way by trial and error, building our road behind us as we 
proceed. We do not find sign-posts at cross-roads, but our own 
scouts erect them to help the rest".
Nevertheless, the choice of a research method must consider the 
purpose of the research and the nature of the phenomena to be 
investigated (Galliers, 1992; Gay & Diehl, 1996; Yin, 1994). 
Morgan & Smircich (1980) have argued that with a subjective 
approach, the basic epistemological stance is to obtain 
phenomenological insight, whereas an objective approach seeks to 
construct a positivist science.
The general purpose of the reported study was not only to observe 
and objectively describe the strategic intelligence patterns of 
Hong Kong Chinese organisations, but also to begin developing a 
subjective understanding of this management phenomenon. 
Moreover, it is noted that the focal phenomenon a) can not be 
studied outside of its normal setting, b) is only partly amenable 
to quantification, and c) its social context is essential to this
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work, and must be explicitly considered. These conditions 
together with the pioneering nature of this phenomenon in the 
Chinese business cultural context make it appropriate to use both 
arms-length and close-up methods of data collection (Marshall 
& Rossman, 1989; Yin, 1994).
In order to answer the aforementioned questions, the study aimed 
to go beyond the observation, description and analysis of Hong 
Kong Chinese chief executive scanning, to include interpretation 
and explanation. Much time and effort were spent designing the 
study (and countless colleagues around the world were consulted 
during the process) because the design was perceived to be a 
fundamental basis for assessing the ultimate credibility of the 
results that are reported. Also, since a Ph.D. is primarily an 
apprenticeship in research, it was considered important to 
demonstrate an understanding of, and competency in, multiple 
methods.
Two very different methods were selected to collect and analyse 
the data in this study. It was believed that the methods could 
complement each other in terms of advancing knowledge of a focal 
phenomenon in a specific context. Consequently, the research was 
designed to include both a cross-section of quantitative data 
from a larger-sized sample of CEOs and a wider range of more in- 
depth data from a smaller number of these informants. The 
statistical analysis of cross-sectional survey data would enable 
the testing of specific hypotheses that had received empirical 
support in the Western management literature (reviewed in Chapter 
2) or that were suggested largely by the nature of Hong Kong 
business and society outlined in Chapter 3. Complementary to 
this, the collection, analysis and interpretation of selective 
contextual data was expected to enable more meaningful insights 
and explanations and thereby promote a deeper understanding of 
strategic intelligence in the Hong Kong Chinese business context.
The subsections that follow discuss the two methods used in this 
study and provide a rationale for their selection.
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4.3.1 Survey research
"Traditional survey research usually serves as a methodology of 
verification rather than discovery" (Gable, 1994, p. 114). 
Surveys seek to confirm relationships that are hypothesised to 
be common across a population, and thereby enable general 
statements to be made about the object of study. Gable (1994, 
p. 114) argued that they "can accurately document the norm, 
identify extreme outcomes and delineate associations between 
variables in a sample". The ability to report general (but 
static) patterns and characteristics would enable specific 
hypotheses to be tested in a particular context.
Unfortunately, the use of a closed survey instrument "buys 
'objectivity' and testability at the cost of deeper 
understanding" (Gable, 1994, p. 114). The rationale for specific 
patterns of strategic intelligence may be expected to depend 
significantly on its context. As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is 
important to go beyond observations (or responses to 
questionnaires) and search for the meaning behind and beneath the 
activities (Schneider & Barsoux, 1997, p. 20).
The value of a survey to study the focal phenomenon may thus be 
enhanced by using it in conjunction with other qualitative 
research methods. Attewell and Rule (1991, p. 367) are among 
those who have noted the complementarity between survey and 
fieldwork approaches. The robustness of research results is 
likely to be increased through the use of multiple methods. As 
a result, a sole reliance on survey-based research was deemed to 
be inappropriate for this study, particularly given the author's 
belief in the benefits of methodological pluralism.
The aforementioned research objectives would require not only a 
survey, but also a complementary approach that could provide a 
deeper understanding of how information is used by Hong Kong 
Chinese chief executives in the diagnosis of specific strategic 
issues, and the rationales that led to specific patterns of 
strategic intelligence acvitivity. This led to the selection of
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a case study approach to complement a survey. The desire to 
probe deeply into the processes and mechanisms of strategic 
intelligence favoured this combination of methods while the 
compact urban context facilitated it.
4.3.2 Case studies
The case study is an approach or research strategy (not a method 
per se) that seeks to understand the problem being investigated, 
and provides the opportunity to ask penetrating questions and to 
capture the richness of behaviour at the individual, group or 
societal level. Yin (1984, p. 2) states that "a case study from 
a research strategy point of view may be defined as an empirical 
enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and its 
context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources 
of evidence are used. It is particularly valuable in answering 
who, why and how questions in management research".
Meanwhile, Hartley (1994, pp. 208-209) defines a case study as 
"a detailed investigation . . . with a view to providing an 
analysis of the context and processes involved in the phenomenon 
under study". It may be considered an umbrella term for a number 
of different research methods that focus on a specific activity, 
instance or event. The methods that may be used in a case study 
include: direct and indirect participant observation, document 
reviews, content analysis, semi-structured interviews, and 
repertory grid analysis (Hartley, 1994; Yin, 1984).
A defining feature of case research is its ideographic approach. 
The primary goal is "to understand the case itself; only later 
might there be efforts to generalise from the case to broader 
principles" (Carroll & Johnson, 1990, p.38). This is in contrast 
to nomothetic approaches, that seek to discover and test general 
principles or laws that apply across cases, and downplay the 
importance of an individual case.
Smith (1989, p. 62) comments that "although the use of case
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studies can lead to charges of anecdotalistn, for many research 
topics within management, this method is clearly the most 
appropriate". The thorough and careful study of real-life cases 
can enable the study of interactions between different variables 
or events. The case study allows the investigator to concentrate 
on specific instances in an attempt to identify interactive 
processes that may be significant if not crucial, but transparent 
to larger-scale surveys. As a result, case studies will provide 
a richer picture than most other possible research approaches.
The case study can focus on the description of a process, or a 
sequence of events in its nature setting. Such a study of 
individual or group behaviour makes it possible "to ascertain the 
number and variety of traits, qualities and habits, combined in 
a particular instance" (Remenyi, 1990, p. 47). Nevertheless, 
Snell (1996) cautions about the need "to carefully sift, weight 
and analyse all the data" in order to increase objectivity.
The depth of enquiry possible through case studies is 
significantly greater than with surveys. For example, although 
attempts have been made to ascertain perceptions and attitudes 
by means of questionnaires, the results have typically been 
unsatisfactory (see Kvale, 1996; Smith, 1989). It is difficult 
to do justice to an attitude or perception by ticking Yes or No, 
or even selecting a rating between 1 and 5.
The case study can go beyond this superficial analysis and 
consider the responses, the variations in responses among 
respondents, and the reasons behind these variations. For 
example, respondents who are asked to rate the uncertainty level 
of the environment can offer explanations and caveats for their 
scores. This additional information is clearly advantageous in 
explaining the responses and observations.
The case study follows the logic of the scientific experiment 
rather than the logic of the survey. Thus, it is not necessary 
(or feasible) to replicate a case study many times. The case
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study is not designed to measure the frequency of occurrence for 
specific events, but rather to lend support for, or enable the 
development of theoretical propositions (Yin, 1989) . The 
contribution to knowledge made by a case study is more important 
than its strict ability to be generalised. Following from this, 
a case study may be considered to be a valid form of research for 
advancing our understanding of a phenomenon in a specific 
context, provided that it is carried out systematically.
Used in isolation, case studies offer a high level of data 
integrity but a low level of data currency (Yin, 1989). Data 
integrity refers to an amalgam of internal validity and 
reliability. Currency refers to the capability of generalising 
results, or external validity. For example, in-depth interviews 
enable the researcher to interact with an informant and to 
collect rich data such as the reasons behind unconventional or 
seemingly imitative behaviours. Unfortunately, time and resource 
constraints typically limit the quantity of such interviews.
Benbasat et al. (1987, p. 370) identified the following strengths 
of case study research: 1) the researcher can study an artifact, 
a technology or a phenomenon in a natural setting, learn about 
the state of the art, and generate theories from practice; 2) the 
method allows the researcher to understand the nature and 
complexity of the process taking place, and 3) valuable insights 
can be gained into new topics emerging in young and dynamic 
fields such as strategic management and information management.
Case studies may be based on qualitative or quantitative methods 
or a combination of the two. Purely qualitative research has its 
own weaknesses: 1) the inability to manipulate independent 
variables, 2) the risk of improper interpretation, and 3) the 
lack of power to randomise (Kerlinger, 1986, p. 348) . 
Nevertheless, it has been noted that logical inferences are 
possible, since in terms of epistemology, they are quite 
independent of statistical inferences (Smith, 1989).
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It is also naive to assert that any form of research will be 
without bias. Even in the pure sciences, the bias of the
researcher is reflected in the study focus, the chosen
experiment, and the process used to conduct the experiment. Case 
studies of human behaviour can never be perfectly objective due 
to the biases of both the supplier and recipient of the data. 
Bias may be introduced both when data is captured from different 
data sources (especially other people) , and when the data is 
interpreted after it has been written down.
There are at least three difficulties in obtaining unbiased 
testimonials from observers (Chan & Chiang, 1994; Gordon, 1981):
1. the difficulties of accurately remembering past events,
2. the difficulties in disclosing personal feelings
3. the difficulties in revealing data that might reflect poorly 
on themselves or colleagues.
The reliance on more than one source of evidence, often termed 
triangulation, can help to reduce bias. This, in turn, can 
improve the validity and the reliability of the research. A 
synthesis of multiple perspectives and different data sources can 
moderate the inherent weaknesses of the case study strategy, and 
make it a more powerful approach.
Within the case study design, it is possible to use indirect 
and/or direct research approaches. Only an indirect approach is 
relevant to determine managerial perceptions and attitudes. 
However, either approach may be used to study how managers 
acquire information about their business environments. The 
indirect methods have traditionally been more popular. They 
essentially consist of asking the manager to estimate the time 
spent on various activities, and outline the general nature of 
those activities. This has been done through the administration 
of a questionnaire or a brief interview with the manager.
These indirect methods are fast, require less time (and hence 
cost), and are typically more amenable to statistical analysis,
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because a large number of managers can be sampled. A major 
problem with the findings from indirect methods is their 
reliability and validity. Self-estimates can be very inaccurate 
and inconsistent. Managers may supply biased figures or 
unconsciously attempt to rationalise their estimates. Moreover, 
the human memory becomes unreliable after a period of time, and 
so informants may rely on a significant amount of guesswork when 
providing retrospective reports (Carroll & Johnson, 1990) .
For the reasons given above, data obtained from more direct or 
intensive methods can usefully complement or even substitute for 
that obtained from less direct ones, such as a survey. The more 
direct methods of collecting data include diary content analysis, 
work sampling, structured observation, and the interpretive 
recall interview (Gay & Diehl, 1996; Merton & Kendall, 1956). 
With the interpretive recall interview, the informant is asked 
to recall a specific sequence of events, where these took place, 
with whom, and so on (Gorden, 1981) . While describing the 
details, the informant is prompted to explain why certain things 
happened the way that they did. This can be done on a random 
sampling basis, or on a systematic and structured basis.
More direct methods promise greater reliability and validity than 
their less direct counterparts, but they demand comparatively 
more time and effort, and higher levels of involvement and 
commitment from the informant or observed party. For example, 
the design of diaries or elaborate protocols and the subsequent 
observation or interaction, respectively, represent a large 
investment that is difficult to justify since only a few 
informants can be directly observed or subjected to detailed 
interviews. Consequently, work activity studies or interpretive 
recall interviews are usually intensive (within a few 
organisations) rather than extensive (across many organisations) .
4.3.3 rnmh-inina research methods
The study reported here combined a quantitative (and essentially 
positivist) research method with a quantitative (and
119
interpretive) one. The merits of this approach, whereby 
different methods are used to investigate different facets of the 
same phenomenon, can be debated.
Some scholars insist that there is a fundamental clash between 
qualitative and quantitative methods in the social sciences (see 
Brannen, 1992; Bryman, 1989). However, Gable (1994, p. 112) 
claimed that research designs that extensively integrate both 
fieldwork (e.g. case studies) and survey research, while rare, 
are well worth the effort. The decision to integrate them in 
this study followed from the research questions which were 
addressed as well as personal belief that quantitative and 
qualitative techniques can be complementary and even synergistic 
rather than antithetical.
Burrell and Morgan (1979) defined the traditional positivism of 
scientific enquiry as an epistemology "which seeks to explain and 
predict what happens in the social world by searching for 
regularities and causal relationships between its constituent 
elements". They suggested that case studies may be employed 
within this perspective by involving content analysis or other 
embedded techniques.
A basic epistemological paradox of social science is the 
requirement to have subjective human beings objectively explain 
human phenomena (Smith, 1989, p. 52) . The author concurs with 
Smith (1989), in that the objectivity of scientific knowledge, 
with its attendant need for researchers to stand back a bit must 
be balanced with the requirement not to stand back too far. 
Otherwise, the findings are easily distorted by distance as well 
as by the act of interpretation. This, in turn, would merely 
reinforce the gap between academic assumptions and the real-world 
situation, and lead to prescriptive advice that is impractical.
Compromise is inevitable given the fundamental conflict between 
generality, realism and precision. Since reality is not a tidy 
set of sequential or independent events, statistical methods are
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insufficient to uncover and explain the complex and interwoven 
interactions between organisations and their environments. There 
is often a need for deeper abstraction and investigation to probe 
into structures and causal mechanisms that underlie quantitative 
results. Wynekoop (1992) acknowledged this, and suggested that 
quantitative 'micro-level' analyses should be integrated with 
qualitative 'macro-level1 analyses in order to help explain how 
macro-level factors affect the behaviour of individuals.
Previous research in different Western countries indicates that 
contextual factors such as size, industry/product and ownership 
all significantly affect the environmental scanning activities 
(Hambrick, 1979; Jauch & Kraft, 1986; Jennings & Lumpkin, 1992) . 
However, the specific nature of the research topic, with its 
focus on the most senior executive level, the limited 
understanding of information management in the Hong Kong context, 
and the notorious secrecy of East Asian business leaders 
(Ghoshal, 1988; Redding, 1990) made a stand-alone survey a poor 
choice at this stage of the knowledge-building process.
As a result, this study of strategic intelligence/environmental 
scanning was carried out in two parts. The first part was a 
larger-scale survey of Chinese chief executives in two different 
industries - one classified by the Hong Kong Government (1997) 
as a goods-producer and the other as a service- provider.
The second part consisted of case studies, whereby chief 
executives of a matched pair of organisations (one a widely- 
acknowledged leader, the other a newcomer or challenger) in four 
different industries were the subjects of more intensive 
investigation. This research design followed from the objectives 
of observing, describing and beginning to explain the strategic 
intelligence phenomenon in the pre-handover Hong Kong context.
4 1  4 Secondary data collection
The initial activities for this research effort involved 
literature reviews and secondary data collection. These were
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largely undertaken during the period from July 1993 to December 
1994. The areas of literature/published information that were 
reviewed included: strategic management (with a focus on strategy 
making and strategic decision making) , business intelligence, 
neo-Confucian cultural characteristics and Chinese 
management/thinking, and the Hong Kong business environment.
As a result of the latter area of review, a largely qualitative 
perspective of the overall Hong Kong economy was developed, as 
reported in Chapter 3. This was followed by the profiling of 
specific industry environments (using archival material and 
talking to industry observers). Four industries that represented 
a partial cross-section of the Hong Kong economy were selected.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, manufacturing now accounts for less 
than 25 per cent of the GDP and employment in Hong Kong. As a 
result, it was deemed appropriate to select one goods-producing 
industry and three service-providing industries, as classified 
by the Hong Kong Government. Several negative responses to 
requests for cooperation from industry associations severely 
constrained the choice of the goods-producing sector. The large 
size of the printing industry, in terms of its economic 
contribution and employment, and the support of its industry 
association for this study, eventually led to its selection as 
the goods-producing industry of interest.
In order to encompass both the public and private sector 
economies, the following service-providing industries were 
chosen: securities, Chinese lanaguage newspapers, and 
universities. Given the relatively few newspaper firms and 
universities in Hong Kong, it was natural to select the 
securities industry (along with the printing industry) as the 
basis for the larger-scale survey. Chief executives in the other 
two industries, along with their printing and securities 
counterparts, were the focus of case studies.
Largely quantitative data was collected by administering a
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questionnaire to chief executives in the printing and securities 
industries. Meanwhile, given the time and resources available, 
it was considered appropriate (and endorsed by the dissertation 
committee) to conduct case studies of two chief executives in 
each of the four industries. The next two sections detail the 
data collection and analysis procedures employed for the survey 
and case studies.
4.4 Survey
4.4.1 The sample
The survey sought to examine the natural behaviours of Chinese 
chief executives in pre-handover Hong Kong. Nearly 99 percent 
of all establishments in Hong Kong (and 97 percent of those in 
the manufacturing sector) employed less than 100 people (Hong 
Kong Government, 1995) . A very small number of Hong Kong firms 
were owned and/or led by non-Chinese. These were excluded from 
the sample population of the reported study.
A work force below 200 had been used to distinguish small and 
medium firms from their larger counterparts in Hong Kong (see Sit 
& Wong, 1989). Meanwhile, very small businesses were defined as 
those with fewer than 20 full-time staff (see Yeung, Foster & 
Ogunmokun, 1995). Based on the organisational demographics of 
the Hong Kong economy, the focus was on smaller Chinese-run 
firms, although, in contrast to Johnson & Kuehn (1987), firms 
with more than 100 staff were not explicitly excluded.
Nearly all of the previously-reported surveys of environmental 
scanning used the individual respondent, usually the chief 
executive, as the unit of analysis. The nature of smaller 
businesses in general (see Welsh & White, 1981), and especially 
the paternalistic and autocratic characteristics of Chinese 
management (Martinsons & Hempel, 1995; Redding, 1990), made it 
most appropriate to follow this tradition in this study.
In order to consider the industry effects, samples were drawn 
from both the goods-producing (printing and packaging industry)
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and service-providing (securities industry) sectors of the Hong 
Kong economy. The two selected industries were of considerable 
importance to the Hong Kong economy (both in terms of revenues 
and employment) . They also reflected many of its distinctive 
characteristics, such as a healthy rate of growth and fairly low 
entry barriers leading to high levels of competition. Each had 
some foreign-owned competitors, including recent entrants from 
the PRC, but was dominated by local firms that fit the definition 
of a Chinese family business (see Redding, 1990; Sit & Wong,
1989) . Detailed profiles of these two industries are provided 
in Appendix A.
4.4.2 The questionnaire
It is almost impossible to replicate faithfully any research that 
deals with the social world in an open system. However, this 
study sought to generate findings that could be compared to those 
obtained in studies conducted elsewhere. In order to facilitate 
such a comparison, the measurement of major variables followed 
Auster & Choo (1993), Daft et al. (1988), Duncan (1972), Hambrick 
(1982), and Sawyerr (1993). The major areas examined were:
a. perceptions of uncertainty in different environmental 
sectors;
b. relationships between perceived environmental uncertainty 
and scanning patterns;
c. selection and usage of information sources for scanning the 
environment;
d. decision-making roles.
The survey instrument was adapted from Auster & Choo (1993), Daft 
et al. (1988), and Hambrick (1982). The weaknesses and 
idiosyncrasies of certain environmental scanning measures has 
been discussed by the aforementioned researchers and in other 
articles (see Buchko, 1994; Sharfman & Dean, 1991). For example, 
Buchko (1994) considered the reliability and validity of the 
perceived environmental uncertainty scales and identified some 
shortcoming as well as inconsistencies.
1 2 4
It is accepted that the measurement of environmental uncertainty 
remains a research challenge. However, the comparative 
management aspect of this study made it important to generate a 
data set that could be compared with previous results from other 
settings. The use of these well-established constructs and 
measures also addresses implicitly many concerns about content 
validity and reliability (in terms of internal consistency). 
Nevertheless, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted in 
order to further ensure the content and construct validities of 
the instrument.
The questionnaire considered ten information sources that had 
been commonly used in previous studies (see Aguilar, 1967; Auster 
& Choo, 1993; Culnan, 1983 ; Daft et al., 1988) . An eleventh
source, family and friends, was added because of its identified 
salience in Chinese culture (see Bond & Hwang, 1986; Martinsons 
Sc Hempel, 1995; Redding, 1990). Consistent with several other 
studies including Culnan (1983), Auster & Choo (1993) and Sawyerr 
(1993), these sources were classified on two dimensions: 
internal/external to the organisation and personal/impersonal. 
This classification is shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1
Classification of Information Sources
External Sources Internal Sources
Personal
Sources
e Customers
e Competitors
e Business and professional 
associates
e Family and friends
e Superiors and mentors 
e Subordinates (and employees)
Impersonal
Sources
e Mass media
e Government and regulations 
e Trade publications and events
e Internal documents 
•  Electronic services
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As advocated by Farh, Hoffman & Hegarty (1984), the amount of 
scanning was measured by combining the demonstrated level of 
interest and frequency of receiving information methods from 
Hambrick (1982) . This approach is consistent with Auster & Choo 
(1993) and Sawyerr (1993) .
A Chinese language version of the instrument was created and back 
translated in order to ensure bilingual consistency. Minor 
revisions, to reduce potential ambiguities, were made to both the 
English and Chinese versions after pilot testing with graduate 
students at the City University of Hong Kong and the University 
of Toronto. The final versions of both the English- and Chinese- 
language questionnaire appear in Appendix B.
Before this study was conducted, it was not known whether the 
scanning behaviour of Hong Kong Chinese CEOs was similar to any 
of those previously found in Canada, Nigeria and/or the United 
States, or if the pattern in Hong Kong had its own distinct 
profile.
Nevertheless, based upon the relationships identified in the 
review of the existing environmental scanning literature and a 
consideration of how the Chinese culture and the pre-handover 
Hong Kong business environment might influence them, a number of 
hypotheses could be foarumulated. The survey was designed to test 
the hypotheses presented in next sub-section.
4.4.3 The hypotheses
External political and economic events, especially those 
occurring in mainland China, had greatly influenced the pace and 
direction of economic development in Hong Kong for many decades. 
Confidence levels and business performance had often been 
buffeted by the winds of political and economic change in the 
PRC. Hong Kong has been an important source of foreign exchange 
earnings, capital, and technology transfer for mainland China 
since the latter adopted an Open Door Policy and began its 
economic reforms in the late 1970s.
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The economies of Hong Kong and the (rest of the) PRC had largely 
complementary factor endowments and their symbiotic relationship 
had enabled the rapid development of the trade and financial 
service sectors in the territory. Events to its north (the so- 
called China factor) may be expected to influence greatly the 
future of Hong Kong. For example, continued economic growth in 
the Hong Kong SAR would hinge largely on the ability of the PRC 
to sustain its social stability and economic development.
The impending transfer of sovereignty from Britain to China cast 
a large shadow over Hong Kong for many years before the actual 
handover date. The foremost question in its collective psyche 
was: what will happen after 1997? Some assurances were provided 
by the terms of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and a premise 
that Hong Kong only continued to exist because the political 
leaders in Beijing perceived it to be a convenient and valuable 
gateway to the outside world.
Nevertheless, Hicks (1987) and Mushkat (1990) were among those 
who insisted that there were equally plausible optimistic and 
pessimistic scenarios related to the post-1997 era in Hong Kong. 
The mass media in many overseas countries, and particularly in 
the United States, fanned the flames of alarmism by emphasising 
the things that could and would go wrong in post-handover Hong 
Kong. For example, Kraar (1995) reported that the local populace 
had acute concerns about crime and corruption as well as 
infringements on human rights and free markets. Many of these 
handover-related worries would be heightened by the fact that 
most Hong Kong residents were PRC refugees or their offspring.
In addition to the political and general economic concerns, the 
manufacturing industry in Hong Kong also had to worry about being 
squeezed between higher-technology competitors from places such 
as Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and those from lesser- 
developed, lower-cost economies such as Indonesia, Thailand and 
Vietnam. Without the benefit of established brand names or 
demonstrated customer loyalty, local firms had to remain cost-
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competitive while moving toward higher value products.
Although Hong Kong manufacturers had assumed considerable levels 
of both commercial and political risk, they seldom acted as 
forces of disequilibrium or innovative producers. They were 
renowned for successfully imitating and adapting foreign 
innovations and designs (Davies, 1996; Redding, 1990). Since 
local firms engaged in little of their own research and 
development, it was important for them to follow the latest 
technological developments closely and monitor the sources of key 
inputs. Remarkably, Hong Kong imports raw materials from over 
100 countries. These circumstances led to the first hypothesis:
Hla: The economic and political/legal sectors are perceived
to have a higher perceived strategic uncertainty for 
securities firms than other four sectors of the 
environment.
Hlb: The economic, political/legal and technological
sectors are perceived to have a higher perceived 
strategic uncertainty for printing firms than other 
three sectors of the environment.
Aguilar (1967) characterised environmental scanning by its amount 
(frequency and intensity), its focus (the kind of information 
acquired), and its mode (regular or periodic). Gathering more 
information is a coping strategy available to those facing 
uncertainty (Culnan, 1983) . However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
managers face time and resource constraints, their own cognitive 
limitations, and related information overload problems.
Kefalas & Schoderbek (1973) found that executives did more 
scanning in dynamic environments while Daft et al. (1988)
reported that scanning frequencies rose along with PSU levels. 
This implies that managers will seek out more information 
primarily to reduce their levels of perceived uncertainty in 
areas that they consider to be of importance to their firm.
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Remarkably, Auster & Choo (1993) and Sawyerr (1993) found 
significant positive relationships between PSU and the amount of 
scanning in Canada and Nigeria. This led to the second 
hypothesis:
H2: The amount of scanning is positively related to the level 
of perceived strategic uncertainty.
Aguilar (1967) and Culnan (1983) were among those differentiating 
between internal and external as well as personal and impersonal 
information sources. Based on the information richness theory 
considered in Chapter 2, the richer media of personal information 
sources will be used when direct communications are needed in 
order to minimise the loss of meaning or distortion of data (see 
Daft Sc Lengel, 1986; Daft & Weick, 1984) .
Although the research evidence from the U.S. indicates that small 
business managers prefer to rely on personal sources (Schafer, 
1990; Smeltzer et al. , 1989; Specht, 1987), other studies
indicate that multiple sources are used to interpret uncertain 
environments (see Auster & Choo, 1993; Daft et al. , 1988). Daft 
et al. (1988) also suggested that personal and impersonal sources 
may complement one another to give a better view of an uncertain 
environment. Managers may be expected to use both types of 
sources in order to understand better the nature of developments 
in the environmental sectors that they perceive to have the 
highest levels of uncertainty. This led to the third hypothesis:
H3: The use of both personal and impersonal information sources 
is positively related to the level of perceived strategic 
uncertainty.
Information may be collected from many different sources. The 
decision to use a particular information source may be related 
to its accessibility and/or its quality. Older studies found 
that decision-makers had a pronounced tendency to rely on readily 
accessible sources, with less regard for the quality of the
129
supplied information (Blandin & Brown, 1977,- Gerstberger & Allen, 
1968; O'Reilly, 1982) . Culnan (1983) was the first to contradict 
these findings. A subsequent study (Auster & Choo, 1993) also 
found source quality to be a more important factor for explaining 
the frequency of information source use (FISU) than either source 
accessibility or the overall level of perceived environmental 
uncertainty. This led to a fourth hypothesis:
H4: Perceived source quality is a better predictor of the 
frequency with which an information source is used than 
either perceived source accessibility or the overall level 
of perceived environmental uncertainty.
Managers have assorted experiences and preferences as well as 
different educational backgrounds and personalities. Very few 
previous studies had considered whether information source use 
was related to the specific traits of decision makers. Among the 
few that have addressed this area, O'Reilly (1982) found that 
more educated respondents were less likely to use files as an 
information source while Culnan (1983) found that personal 
information sources were the most frequently used in two firms 
that had over 70 per cent university degree holders.
The educational level of the population in Hong Kong had rapidly 
risen in advance of the handover, as progressive improvements in 
economic prosperity and political development prompted a rapid 
expansion of the education system. A transition from an elitist 
to a mass market model took place in the secondary school system 
from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s. A similar transition at 
the university level was observable from the late 1980s to the 
mid 1990s (see Howlett, 1996) .
As a result of these transitions, the younger generation of Hong 
Kong business managers can be distinguished from its older and 
more experienced counterpart by a much higher percentage of 
formal qualifications, both in terms of secondary school diplomas 
and university degrees. In fact, people in pre-handover Hong
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Kong without an MBA degree increasingly face a "glass ceiling" on 
their professional career prospects. As a result, it is deemed 
useful to study how the educational backgrounds of managers 
influenced their use of information sources.
Individuals with higher educational backgrounds may be expected 
to have enhanced reading abilities. This can in turn lead to the 
increased use of impersonal sources. More educated managers may 
also have a wider range of personal contacts, including those 
made during successive stages of schooling. These personal 
sources will provide more immediate feedback. Consequently, as 
long as the investment in these different sources (in terms of 
maintaining contact with people, subscribing to information 
services, etc.) can be justified, top managers may be expected 
to make greater use of both impersonal and personal sources in 
order to cope with additional uncertainty. This theory is 
supported by the findings of Auster and Choo (1993) in Canada. 
As a result, a fifth hypothesis was formulated as follows:
H5a: Education level is positively correlated with the use
of impersonal information sources.
H5b: Education level is positively correlated with the use
of personal information sources.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Mintzberg (1973) provided a framework 
for understanding managerial roles. He categorised ten 
managerial roles into three groups: interpersonal, information 
and decisional. Information is the critical input to decision 
making. The relationship between environmental scanning and the 
four roles within the decisional grouping, namely entrepreneur, 
resource allocator, disturbance handler and negotiator, was 
studied previously in North American settings.
Both Auster & Choo (1994) and McLeod, Jones & Poitevent (1993) 
found that information about the external business environment 
was more likely to be gathered in the entrepreneurial role. This
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is consistent with the contention in Mintzberg (1973) that 
"Entrepreneurial work begins with scanning activity". Managers 
use information gathered through environmental scanning to first 
identify key issues, and then to design and select from specific 
courses of action (Mintzberg, 1973; Auster & Choo, 1994).
In a metropolis like Hong Kong that was about to be reunited with 
its motherland, a huge developing country, there were expected 
to be assorted business opportunities. Thus, the entrepreneur 
role was anticipated to prompt the largest amount of 
environmental scanning. This led to a sixth hypothesis:
H6: Information about the environment is more frequently
used in the entrepreneur role than in any of the other 
three decisional roles identified by Mintzberg.
The relationship between information source use and decisional 
roles has received little attention. Jones, Saunders and McLeod 
(1994) found that face-to-face meetings were preferred when 
engaging in entrepreneurial projects. Resource allocation and 
disturbance handling activities relied largely on written sources 
while managers in negotiator roles tended to use personal and 
written media.
Auster & Choo (1994) also found that information from personal 
sources was frequently used directly for decision-making, 
particularly in the entrepreneur role. Thus, the cumulative 
evidence from the West suggests that personal sources are used 
more frequently than impersonal ones for entrepreneurial 
decisions, but impersonal ones are used for resource allocation 
and disturbance handling. This led to the final hypothesis:
H7a: Personal sources are used wore frequently than
impersonal sources in the entrepreneurial decision 
making role.
H7b: Personal sources are used less frequently than
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impersonal sources in the resource allocation and 
distrubance handling decision making roles.
The relationships considered in the seven hypotheses are depicted 
in Figure 4.1, which may be seen as the model guiding the survey 
cart of the research.
Figure 4.1
The Research Model
Characteristics of 
the Environment
Characteristics of 
the Information
Characteristics of 
the Manager
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4.4.4 Data collection and analysis
The Members List of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Hong 
Kong Business and Industrial Directory were used to randomly 
select companies from the securities and printing industries, 
respectively. Each selected firm was subsequently contacted, to 
ensure that it was an independent, single-business firm with an 
ethnic Chinese chief executive. The names and addresses of the 
CEOs were verified during this contact and added to a list. This 
procedure was continued until the list included 200 CEOs in each 
industry.
Letters that requested participation in the study and mentioned 
the support of the relevant industry association were mailed out 
to the 400 listed CEOs. Only 26 affirmative responses were 
received within three weeks of this mailing. A follow-up, 
conducted using telephone and facsimile, resulted in 38 more CEOs 
agreeing to participate. Five potential informants subsequently 
declined to, or were unable to participate. In six other cases, 
someone other than the CEO proposed to participate. This reduced 
the final sample size from 64 to 53.
The possibility of non-response bias was examined by using late 
respondents as proxies for non-respondents. A comparison of 
those responding before and after the follow-up found no 
significant differences in either firm characteristics or manager 
demographics. This suggested that the sample was highly 
representative of the target population.
The 53 participating CEOs represented a 13 percent response rate 
from the initial mailing. Undeniably, a larger percentage would 
have been preferable. Nevertheless, the response was considered 
to be satisfactory for the purposes of the study and perhaps even 
encouraging given the context, which is discussed further in the 
Limitations section of this chapter.
A standardised questionnaire was used to obtain a certain level 
of consistency among the respondents. A face-to-face session was
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held with each respondent in order to enable a more comprehensive 
and detailed exploration of the interplay between 
actions/behaviours and context/circumstances. This personal 
administration of the questionnaire, combined with a discursive 
dialogue, was used in order to overcome the problems that are 
commonly associated with postal surveys (see Huber & Power, 
1985) . In addition to facilitating the completion of a 
structured questionnaire, these personal interviews led to 
varying amounts of dialogue, discussion, and even debate. As a 
result, the respondent became an informant. Additional probing 
was conducted in a several cases where the chief executive was 
friendly and forthcoming.
The data analysis included assorted statistical tests. Means and 
standard deviations were calculated for most variables while t- 
tests were used to determine whether there were significant 
differences between the two industries. Correlation coefficients 
were employed to consider relationships between demographic and 
behavioural variables while a regression analysis was used to 
determine how three different factors - overall environmental 
uncertainty, perceived source accessibility and perceived source 
quality - influenced the frequency of information source use.
4.5 Case Studies
This part of the study combined the advantages of rich detail 
from a single retrospective case with those from data collection 
from multiple sites (see McGrath, 1964; Yin, 1994). Yin 
(1984/1994) suggests that such multiple-case designs are 
desirable for description, theory building or theory testing. 
Comparisons across cases can provide analytical generalizaion 
(Yin, 1994, pp. 108-109), whereby cases are revealed as similar 
to each other (literal replication) or different for reasons that 
help to develop theory (theoretical replication).
The selection of the chief executives and their organisations in 
this multiple-case design was not intended to allow internal 
replication (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, evidence gathered from
135
each subsequent case did, to some extent, serve to confirm or 
disconfirm inferences drawn from previous ones. Meanwhile, the 
goal of illustrating- how external information is acquired and 
used by chief executives prompted an embedded case design.
The strategic issue was an embedded unit of analysis within each 
case of a CEO's information management activities. Each CEO was 
first asked to identify two or three specific issues that had 
received their attention. Then each issue was considered in 
terms of the acquisition and use of information about the 
external environment. Yin (1994, p.42) noted that such an 
embedded case design helps an investigator to examine the 
operational details and contingent relationships associated with 
a given phenomenon.
4.5.1 Selecting the cases
Case studies may be selected either because they appear to be 
typic*al or else because they seem to be unusual or extreme (Yin, 
1994) . A typical case may be expected to reveal the general 
situation while an unusual one could provoke distinctive 
insights. Consistent with the purpose of this study, an attempt 
was made to select typical cases.
The primary focus of each case was on the top manager of a 
single-business organisation with relatively independent 
operations. The cases were drawn from the following four 
industries: printing, securities, higher education, and Chinese 
language newspapers. Each of these had a defined task 
environment and information sourcing behaviours that were 
expected to be related to varying levels of environmental forces 
as well as government policies or regulations. A total of eight 
chief executives, two in each of the four industries were 
selected. Since eight is considerd to be the luckiest number in 
the Chinese culture, it was believed that invited CEOs would feel 
more honoured and inclined to participate in the case studies if 
they were among a select group of eight peers.
136
As noted in the general management literature (see Ghoshal, 1988; 
Healey & Rawlinson, 1993), it is not easy to gain access to top 
managers. This has been found to be particularly true of Chinese 
business chief executives (see Redding, 1990; Siu & Martin, 
1993) . As a result, no attempt was made to get a random or 
representative sample. Instead, existing relationships between 
the researcher and senior-level managers and professionals in the 
Hong Kong community were leveraged as the participation of chief 
executives was sought.
The process of getting a commitment to participate from the 
desired number of CEOs, and completing the data collection 
process with each one, proved to be very tedious, time-consuming 
and frustrating. Most of the targetted organisations had one or 
more gatekeepers to their chief executives. The gatekeeper was 
often the personal secretary of the top manager.
Despite the aforementioned relationships of the researcher and 
the summary of the results that was offered as an incentive for 
participation, a total of 13 other chief executives politely 
declined direct requests to participate before the eventual set 
of eight was complete. Consequently, patience and perseverance 
may be seen as critical success factors in the process of 
identifying, obtaining the cooperation of, and studying chief 
executives, particularly in a Chinese business culture.
4.5.2 The informants
The general purpose of the study and the sincere curiosity of the 
investigator were clearly (and sometimes repeatedly) communicated 
to potential informants. The amount of time that was expected 
to be required as well as the option for anonymity were also 
mentioned explicitly. Each element in this approach was 
perceived to be helpful in raising the level of interest of 
potential informants and/or the personal trust and rapport 
between the researcher and those particpating in the study. 
Nevertheless, several informants still exhibited a considerable 
amount of suspicion, perhaps because they were unfamiliar with
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academic research and/or because the researcher was non-Chinese. 
In two cases, substitutes had to be found for chief executives 
who had agreed previously to participate.
The eight chief executives had widely differing levels of 
enthusiasm and preparedness in discussing their perceptions and 
experiences. Nevertheless, all of them did appear to speak quite 
freely. Consistent with the guidelines provided by Huber and 
Power (1985), the CEOs were asked, in appropriate cases, to 
provide documentary evidence to support their responses. Where 
the informants expressed no objection, the interactive sessions 
were tape recorded in an attempt to provide a record of the 
richness and diversity of the data that was collected from in- 
depth probing, cognitive mapping, and more casual dialogue.
Three of the eight chief executives requested anonymity for 
themselves and/or their organisations. This is not surprising 
given the nature of the Chinese business culture (outlined in 
Chapter 3) and the secrecy ethos that is prevalent in Hong Kong 
(see Lasserre, 1993; Redding, 1980; Siu & Martin, 1992). The 
aforementioned informants wished to ensure that their names and 
those of their organisations would not be mentioned in reporting 
this study. They expressed or implied fears about revealing 
business strategies, the best sources for environmental 
information, and/or organisational shortcomings.
As a result, three of the case studied organisations in this 
disseration are identified only by a two-word designation, a noun 
to denote industry (Printer, Securities, Newspaper, or 
University) preceded by an adjective to denote their position as 
either one of the established industry leaders (Leading) or newer 
challengers (New) in the industry. These organisations were 
given the short-hand designations as follows: Leading Printer, 
Leading Newspaper, and New University.
4.5.3 Designing the interactive sessions
Face-to-face contact time with top managers is both precious and
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»difficult to arrange. As a result, the design of the case study 
procedure sought to maximise the research value of these direct 
contact opportunities while incorporating a variety of data 
gathering techniques.
A reasonable understanding of each informant's organisation and 
industry was developed by reviewing archival records and other 
documents before meeting with the informant. Each interactive 
session aimed to identify two or three strategic issues that had 
been recently faced by the informant and to determine how 
information about the external environment had been acquired and 
used in diagnosing each strategic issue.
The form of interaction was based on the focused interview as 
first described by Merton and Kendall (1956) and later amended 
by Judd et al. (1991) . Originally, Merton and Kendall described 
two requirements for this type of interview: the persons 
interviewed have to be involved in a particular situation, and 
the interviewer has to theoretically analyze the situation 
beforehand. Judd et al. (1991) broadened this definition to 
include any interview where the interviewer has some advanced 
knowledge of the experience to be discussed, irrespective of 
whether or not the investigator has observed and analyzed the 
specific situation.
For this study, the interviewees were asked to recall their 
experiences and behaviours in specific incidents where they had 
received and used environmental information. The interview 
design was based largely on the principles of the Critical 
Incident Technique (CIT), which seeks to focus on complete and 
recent incidents with clear consequences. The CIT was developed 
at the American Institute for Research in 1947, where it was used 
in studies to determine critical requirements for the work of 
pilots, air force officers, scientists, air traffic controllers, 
and hourly wage employees (Flanagan, 1954).
The CIT was used to collect data because it was consistent with
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the aim of analysing complete sequences of acquiring and using 
information from the external environment, and to understand the 
cognitive processes associated with this process. At least two 
previous environmental scanning studies (Aguilar, 1967; Keegan, 
1974) employed a simplified version of this method.
4.5.4 The interactive case protocol
A specific sequence for the questioning process, formally termed 
a protocol, was developed before undertaking the interactions 
with the chief executives. This document concisely summarised 
the objective and scope of the case study (for the benefit of the 
investigator) , and listed the questions to be asked of the 
informants. The protocol was developed largely using concepts 
drawn from the strategic management or environmental scanning 
literatures that were reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2. Pre-testing 
with two academic colleagues and a practising manager led to some 
elaboration of definitions and minor modifications in phrasing.
Semi - structured interviews with the chief executives were used 
to ask questions about specific strategic issues and the related 
acqusition and use of information about the external business 
environment. A variety of qualitative data was elicited from the 
chief executives in order to gain a deeper understanding of the 
strategic intelligence phenomenon in the context of pre-handover 
Hong Kong. The researcher probed the what, how and why of 
strategy making or strategic issue diagnosis, and the use of 
information to support this process.
The major focus of each session with the chief executive was on 
critical incidents of acquiring and using information about the 
external business environment. Specifically, each informant was 
asked to identify and briefly describe two or three "strategic 
issues" about which such information was received. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, Dutton and Duncan (1987) presented a model of 
strategic issue diagnosis as an iterative process involving two 
major phases - activation/recognition and interpretation. 
Consistent with this model, the following questions were posed:
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Please try to recall a development, trend or event in the 
external environment that has attracted your attention, and 
led you and your organisation to consider a new initiative, 
a change of direction, or some other significant action.
Would you please briefly describe this development, trend 
or event?
How did you first become aware of this development, trend 
or event? (triggering information and its source)
What led you to decide that this development, trend or 
event was a strategic issue for your organisation? 
(activation/recognition)
Would you please describe the strategic issue for me in 
enough detail so that I can visualise the situation.
What information sources have you relied on in order to 
better understand this issue? (interpretation)
Which of these information source (s) has/have been the most 
useful in terms of helping you understand the issue?
Have you determined the urgency of taking action on this 
issue? If so, what information was useful to help make 
this determination?
Have you determined the feasibility of taking a specific 
action on this issue? If so, what information was useful 
to help make this determination?
As indicated above, the chief executive was prompted to recall 
and describe the nature of the strategic issue or problem that 
had been addressed, the substance of the information about the 
external environment that had been sought out during strategic 
issue diagnosis, the sources for the information, how the
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information was used, and (if appropriate) what the end results 
were of acquiring and using the information.
Finally, the chief executive was asked about the strategic 
posture (analyser, prospector, reactor, defender), strategy 
making approach (based on Mintzberg & Waters, 1985), and business 
planning approach (based on Rhyne, 1985) that he perceived to 
best represent his organisation. At the end of the session, he 
was also invited to comment on the role of different types of 
information and information sources for the strategy
making/business planning process in his organisation.
4 5.5 Cognitive mapping, triangulating, and tape recording 
A cognitive mapping procedure was developed so that the chief 
executives would rank the eleven aforementioned information 
sources in terms of three dimensions: the frequency with which 
they used them, their perceived accessibility, and their 
perceived quality. However, the pre-testing indicated that a 
ranking of all eleven sources would be both very time-consuming 
and difficult for informants.
As a result, a modification to this part of the protocol was 
made. The case-studied chief executives were only asked to 
select the "top five" of the eleven information sources on each 
of the three dimensions, and then rank order the selected 
sources. Data about the use of information sources were 
triangulated by having the personal secretary of each chief 
executive perform a similar ranking of the "top five" sources 
used, either before or after the focal interview.
The researcher had previously requested each of the personal 
secretaries to keep a week-long log of their bosses' 
interactions, including scheduled and unscheduled meetings; 
letters from outside the organisation and memos from within it; 
and incoming telephone calls. This request was intended to 
encourage the personal secretaries to rank their bosses' 
information source use based on sampled data rather than mere
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perception. Each informant was asked to explain the rationale 
behind their rankings, especially for the sources appearing at 
the top of their lists.
Each interactive session was tape recorded, subject to the 
permission of the informant. Only two of the eight executives 
and one of the personal secretaries did not permit such 
recording. Tape recording relieved the researcher from the 
burden of note taking. It enabled him to concentrate on the 
issues of concern and also helped to facilitate a greater level 
of rapport with the informant. The tapes also enabled later re­
analysis of the discussions, thereby adding to the rigour of the 
study.
The sessions where tape recording was not permitted tended to be 
less time-efficient as the researcher endeavoured to take notes 
while maintaining a smooth flow of dialogue. The interactive 
sessions with the eight chief executives varied in duration and 
formality. Some were limited to the initially-scheduled, 
heavily-scripted interview. However, in three cases, a 
subsequent informal and ad hoc conversation took place over lunch 
or dinner.
Considerable care was taken to make efficient use of time during 
the interactive sessions. However, an effort was also made in 
each case to ensure that, if necessary, it would be possible to 
hold further discussions at a later time. Each of the chief 
executives was also provided with a copy of a short questionnaire 
that requested (largely demographic) data about the informant and 
his organisation. Completed questionnaires were later collected 
from the informants, and their responses were used to triangulate 
specific details obtained previously from secondary sources.
4.5.6 Data analysis
Miles and Huberman (1984, p. 21) identify data reduction as the 
first flow of activity in qualitative data analysis. This is the 
process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and
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transforming the raw data that are collected. The researcher was 
careful to comb through the data collected from the interactive 
sessions as well as associated documents in order to find 
patterns that suggested general principles. This process 
occurred over the extended period of the study. Data were 
summarised and coded with themes being teased out and clustered 
along the way. Nevertheless, it was possible to identify content 
analysis, cognitive mapping, and interpretation as cornerstones 
in the processing of the case study data.
The second major flow of analysis activity identified by Miles 
and Huberman (1984) has been termed data display. It involves 
the organised assembly of information to permit conclusion 
drawing. This can be in the form of text, matrices, graphs, 
networks or tables and charts. In this study, the data related 
to each strategic issue were first summarised explicitly on the 
basis of the specific case - the chief executive of a particular 
organisation in a particular industry. The descriptive details 
of each strategic issue diagnosis were then mapped onto a coding 
scheme based upon the conceptual framework from Chapter 2.
As advocated by Miles and Huberman (1984/1994), matrices were 
developed to relate environmental sectors, decisional roles, and 
information sources. The process of mapping the issues onto 
relevant environmental sector(s), decisional role(s), and 
information sources was proved to be inexact science. For each 
issue, two colleagues were asked to read through the provided 
descriptions and then perform the aforementioned mapping. They 
produced similar but not identical results, and so a third 
individual was asked to arbitrate in situations where alternative 
mappings had been made.
Limited quantitative analysis was undertaken to obtain 
descriptive statistics. Where appropriate, data from the two 
cases in an industry were compared and discussed. Such a pair­
wise analysis of the strategic issues and intelligence activities 
was typically enhanced by collecting secondary data about the
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relevant industry.
Subsequently, data from the eight cases were aggregrated, 
analysed and interpreted on the basis of the pre-handover Hong 
Kong macroenvironment. Finally, the aggregated profile was 
compared to (and contrasted with) previous, Western-based 
findings. This approach contextualised the study, provided 
insights into "Hong Kong Chinese information management" from a 
cross-cultural perspective, and facilitated the development of 
both explanatory theory and recommendations for further research.
4.6 Design «minutions
The research design was based on the assumption that a chief 
executive or a small number of senior managers had the entire or 
principal responsibility for making the strategy that aligns the 
organisation with its environment. The Western-based management 
literature indicates that even when chief executives do not do 
all the scanning, they are largely responsible for interpreting 
and acting on information integrated from various internal and 
external sources (El Sawy, 1985; Hambrick, 1981). The high power 
distances and patriarchal leadership/headship that characterise 
Chinese societies imply that such an assumption is even more 
likely to be appropriate in the Chinese business culture.
The primary focus in both the survey and the case studies was the 
top manager (chief executive, managing director). However, the 
personal secretary of each case-studied top manager also ranked 
the information sources in order to enable triangulation. 
Archival records, documents supplied by the informant, and other 
materials in the public domain (where available) were used to 
supplement this primary data. This multiple perspective 
methodology helped to ensure that a wide range of rich and 
relevant data was collected.
Another assumption was that the environmental scanning activities 
of top managers would be significantly constrained by factors 
such as time, their cognitive capacity and organisational
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resources. Consequently, they would have to choose among 
alternative intelligence activities, such as scanning broadly 
(and perhaps superficially) across the general environment or 
focusing narrowly on certain aspects. Comments offered by the 
informants strongly indicated that this condition was satisfied.
The issue of whether strategy is formally designed or informally 
evolves was investigated, but this work does not make any 
assumptions about strategy implementation, whereby an 
organisation may seek to align itself with its environment.
4.7 Design Limitations
A postal survey is an efficient approach to generate a large 
sample of responses from a relevant segment of the population in 
a modern urban setting like Hong Kong. However, it is restricted 
to a small number of simple questions in order to avoid 
misunderstandings or misconceptions. Large numbers of questions 
or those that are more complex and open-ended are likely to 
reduce the response rate in such an arms-length questionnaire. 
The reliability of data collected using a postal survey is also 
questionable, since the process does not provide for two-way 
communication. The lack of direct human interaction means that 
the researcher must, to a large extent, anticipate responses and 
ensure that the included questions are sufficient to meet the 
intended research objective.
Yeung (1995) detailed the difficulties of conducting postal 
surveys in Hong Kong compared to places like the United States 
and the United Kingdom. He identified several unique obstacles 
in Hong Kong that could be attributed to cultural and economic 
factors. These include a high degree of personalistic trust and 
the fast pace of business that produces severe time constraints.
Harzing (1997) subsequently examined how respondents from 
different countries react to a large-scale mail survey. She 
reported that Hong Kong had the lowest response rate of all the 
22 countries, and echoed Yeung (1995) in terms of how difficult
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it was to conduct arms-length research in Hong Kong. Harzing 
(1997, pp. 660-661) concluded that "personal interviews would 
seem the only way to acquire information from Hong Kongese 
respondents".
At least three factors may be expected to discourage the 
participation of Hong Kong Chinese business chief executives in 
academic research: 1) the demands placed on them as a result of 
their role and responsibilities; 2) the absence of tangible 
benefits for such participation; and 3) the secretive nature of 
the prevailing business culture, as noted in Chapter 3.
Consequently, it was decided to collect the primary data by 
personally administering a questionnaire to each of the CEOs who 
had agreed to participate in the survey phase of the study. This 
approach, while very resource intensive, fit well with the 
autocratic and personalistic nature of Chinese business (Redding,
1990) and, as suggested by Huber & Power (1985), was helpful to 
assure data reliability and validity.
Given the intensive nature of this phase of the study, the 
selection of the cases was based largely on availability rather 
than a random representation of Hong Kong organisations. This 
approach was consistent with the aim of these cases - to enable 
a detailed description of how Hong Kong Chinese CEOs actually 
conduct their diagnosis of strategic issues and the role that 
information about the external environment plays in this process.
Critics may also express concern about the lack of objectivity 
in data gleaned from interview sessions. Chan and Chiang (1994, 
p. 21) suggest that when a person talks about events in which he 
has been an active participant, "that dialogue is contextualised 
within a particular interaction matrix that involves two 
personalities (the interviewer and the interviewee) ... and is 
filtered through the glaze of language, which is inherently 
unstable, in flux, and changes in interpretation and emphasis 
over time. There is little guarantee that the words uttered by
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one will not be misinterpreted or misrepresented by another." 
Many factors, such as the personality of the informant, the 
personality of the researcher, the process of the interaction, 
the venue of the interaction, and the existence of distractions 
can affect the outcome of an interview (Carroll & Johnson, 1990) .
With the limited use of multiple data collection and analysis 
methods, and the central reliance on interpretive recall 
interviews, it is recognised that the results of the case studies 
represent "espoused" practice and theories, and may not fully 
reflect actual practice or theories-in-use (Argyris & Schon, 
1974) . However, similar caveats would appear to be applicable 
to most social science research. For example, a person who knows 
that they are under observation will undoubtedly exercise more 
care in doing their work and display an increased tendency to 
follow policies and procedures.
Meanwhile, with an arms-length questionnaire, self-interest would 
encourage respondents/informants to re-interpret their own 
actions in a favourable light (Huber & Power, 1985) . They may 
highlight personal strengths and downplay their weaknesses, and 
over-dramatise their role in a specific event (see Chan & Chiang, 
1994, pp. 23-25). Carroll and Johnson (1990, pp. 33-37) 
identified three specific threats to the usefulness of self- 
reported responses:
1) in recalling what they did in any specific instance, they 
may forget parts of the focal process,-
2) they may reconstruct the process in terms of what they 
usually do or are supposed to do rather than what they 
actually did,-
3) they may rationalise by creating a logical story or saying 
what they the audience wants to hear, instead of the truth.
Remarkably, the recognition of such human behaviour has led some 
theorists to distinguish between a life as lived, a life as 
experienced, and a life as told. "A life lived is what actually
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happens. A life experienced consists of the images, feelings, 
sentiments, desires, thoughts, and meanings known to the person 
whose life it is ... A life as told, a life history, is a 
narrative influenced by the cultural conventions of telling, by 
the audience, and by the social context." (Denzin, 1989, p. 30). 
Similar distinctions may apply to the recall of specific events 
and issues. Thus, the data from both the survey and case studies 
could be subject to lapses, errors, exaggerations, distortions, 
and fabrications of human memory/imagination as well as the 
limitations of interpretation by a non-participant researcher.
However, an informal review of articles in Long Range Planning 
and Strategic Management Journal indicated that the reliance on 
CEOs as single informants has been common in strategic decision 
making and process research. Significantly, Hambrick (1981) is 
one of several studies concluding that the perceptions of CEOs 
with respect to both firm strategies and their own behaviours 
were closer to a set of objective measures of the same phenomena 
than those of their subordinates. Thus, while these top managers 
are far from unbiased sources of data, CEO-centred data 
collection offered an attractive combination of rigour, relevance 
and 'doability' (Carroll & Johnson, 1990; Huber & Power, 1985) .
In instances where it was deemed appropriate or useful as a spot- 
check, efforts were made to achieve a degree of control in data 
validation. This was done by a) reviewing the internal 
consistency of the interview, b) questioning the informant about 
certain matters again at a later date, and c) matching the data 
with that from other sources. The researcher also involved 
professional colleagues to code the strategic issues in terms of 
environmental sectors, decisional roles, and information sources. 
This was done in order to promote objectivity in the data 
analysis stage of the study.
The next two chapters present the results of the survey and the 
case studies, respectively. As a result of the research 
framework and specific methods that were adopted, these results
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are believed to provide a fairly insightful and reliable profile 
of the processes and content of strategic intelligence activities 
in pre-handover Hong Kong.
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CHAPTER 5 
SURVEY RESULTS
This chapter reports on the results of the survey and the testing 
of the seven hypotheses that were outlined in Chapter 5. First, 
a profile is provided of the chief executives who responded to 
the questionnaire and the firms in the securities and printing 
industries that they represented. The responses of those CEOs 
are then presented. Separate sections report on their 
perceptions of uncertainty in different sectors of the pre­
handover Hong Kong environment, the amount and focus of their 
scanning, the information sources that they used, and finally how 
these information sources related to the educational backgrounds 
and decision-making roles of the chief executives.
5.1 Profiles of the CEOs and their Organisations 
Twenty-nine CEOs from the securities industry and 24 from the 
printing industry completed the questionnaire. They and their 
companies are profiled in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, respectively. 
Thirty-one (or 58 percent) of the respondents, 17 from the 
printing industry and 14 from the securities industry, chose to 
work with the Chinese version of the questionnaire. This 
justified the decision to develop a bilingual instrument.
The respondents from the securities industry tended to be younger 
and more educated than those from the printing industry. They 
also had comparatively less overall work experience and a short 
tenure in their current positions. Only 21 percent of the 
securities CEOs had reached their 45th birthday while 49 percent 
of the printing CEOs had passed this milestone. Somewhat 
surprisingly, 28 percent of the respondents from the securities 
industry were actually below the age of 35 compared to only 8 
percent of those from the printing industry. Although more than 
75 percent of those from the securities industry had attained 
some form of post-secondary qualification, the majority of those 
from the printing industry had not. The mean lengths of CEO 
tenure were six years for the respondents from the securities
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industry and 12 years for those from the printing industry.
Table 5.1
Profile of the Sampled Chief Executives
Securities (n=29) Printing (n=24)
Age
Below 25 2 (7%) 1 (4%)
25-34 6 (21%) 1 (4%)
35-44 15(52% ) 10 (42%)
45-54 4 (14%) 8 (33%)
Above 55 2 (7%) 4 (16%)
Length of tenure as CEO
5 years or less 18 (63%) 7 (29%)
6-10 years 6 (21%) 5 (21%)
11-15 years 3 (10%) 6 (25%)
16-20 years 2 (7%) 3 (12%)
More than 20 years 0 (0%) 3 (12%)
Education Level
Primary or below 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Secondary 7 (24%) 13 (54%)
Post-secondary non-degree 10 (35%) 5 (21%)
Bachelor degree 11 (38%) 5 (21%)
Masters degree or above 1 (3%) 1 (4%)
The securities firms represented in the survey tended to be both 
younger and smaller than their counterparts from the printing 
industry. Full-time employees in the securities firms ranged 
from 13 to 120, with mean and median values being 33 and 19, 
respectively. Meanwhile, the sampled printing firms had between 
10 to 219 full-time staff, with their mean and median employee 
numbers being 46 and 21, respectively. Only three out of the 53 
sampled firms, all from the securities industry, had someone with 
an explicit responsibility for environmental scanning.
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Table 5.2
Profile of the Firms Represented by the Chief Executives
Securities (n=29) Printing (n=24)
Number of Em ployees
Below 20 16 (56%) 12 (50%)
21-50 9 (31%) 6 (25%)
51-100 3 (10%) 2 (8%)
101-200 1 (3%) 3(13% )
Above 200 0 (0%) 1 (4%)
Age of Firm
Below 5 years 16 (55%) 6 (25%)
6-10 6 (21%) 7 (29%)
11-15 3 (10%) 3(13% ) 1
16-20 3 (10%) 4(17% )
Above 20 years 1 (3%) 4 (17%)
Explicit Scanning Person/U nit
Yes 3 (10%) 0 (0%)
No 26 (90%) 24 (100%)
The Cwo industry samples were representative of their respective 
populations in terms of both the age and size of the firm. The 
differences between the samples were consistent with many of the 
attributes that distinguished the securities industry from the 
printing industry in Hong Kong. During the interviews conducted 
with the CEOs, the printing industry was cited repeatedly as a 
more traditional and established industry in the local economy.
The emergence of the printing industry in Hong Kong was largely 
the result of an effort by the first wave of Communist refugees 
from mainland China to capitalise on a market niche that was 
under-served by existing businesses. Informal family and kin 
networks were a critical factor in its early development and the 
respect that came with age and experience was still perceived to
153
In contrast, the securities industry was widely acknowledged to 
be a “young man's game”, with plenty of energy and an openness to 
new ideas being among the key attributes for its top executives. 
The growth of the securities industry had accompanied Hong Kong's 
recent economic shift towards financial and business services.
5.2 Environmental Uncertainty and Scanning
The first hypotheses predicted that the economic and 
political/legal sectors would have the highest perceived 
strategic uncertainty (PSU) for the securities industry. 
Meanwhile, the socio-cultural sector was predicted to have the 
lowest PSU for the printing industry.
The sector characteristics as perceived by the informants are 
shown in Table 5.3. As noted in Chapter 4, the scores shown in 
this table are based upon five-point Likert scales.
Table 5.3
Perceived Environmental Characteristics
be an important attribute for its top managers.
Securities Printing
Importance Complexity
Rate of 
Change Importance Complexity
Rate of 
Change
S ec to r
M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD
C u sto m er 4.41 0 .6 8 3 .07 0 .92 3.38 0 .9 0 4 .50 0.72 3.21 1.06 3 .46 0 .88
C om petition 3.83 0 .93 3.21 0 .90 3.31 0 .8 9 3 .96 1.00 3 .50 0 .98 3 .29 0.91
T echno log ical 3 .38 1.05 3 .14 0 .88 3 .00 0 .8 0 4 .04 0.81 3.71 0 .9 5 3 .54 1.06
P olitical/legal 4 .28 0 .7 5 3.97 0.78 3 .79 0 .77 2.63 1.06 2.54 0 .93 2 .92 1.06
E conom ic 4 .59 0 .5 7 4.21 0.68 3.93 0 .75 3.83 1.13 3.21 1.06 3 .29 0 .95
S ocio-cultural 3.21 1.01 2.72 0.88 2 .66 0 .9 7 2.63 1.06 2.37 0 .9 7 2 .42 0.83
The economic and political/legal sectors were perceived to be the 
most important, complex and dynamic by the CEOs from the
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securities industry. Although the customer sector was ranked 
second in terms of importance, its scores on both complexity and 
rate of change were significantly lower than those of the 
economic and political/legal sectors. In contrast, the customer 
sector was perceived to be significantly more important than any 
other sector by the printing industry CEOs while technology was 
both the most complex and the most dynamic sector.
The perceived characteristics of the political/legal sector 
represented the most significant difference between the to 
industries. As mentioned above, it was perceived as an 
important, complex and dynamic sector by the CEOs of securities 
firms. In sharp contrast, the CEOs of printing firms perceived 
the political/legal sector to rival the socio-economic sector as 
the least important and least complex sector.
The formula developed in Daft et al. (1988), and mentioned in
Chapter 2, enabled the perceived strategic uncertainty (PSU) of 
each sector to be calculated by multiplying its score on 
importance with the sum of its scores on complexity and rate of 
change. The two industries differed considerably in their PSU 
scores, as evident from Tables 5.4 and 5.5.
Table 5.4
Perceived Strategic Uncertainty of Environmental Sectors
Sector Mean
Securities
Rank SD Mean
Printing
Rank SD
Custom er 28 .48 3 8 .4 2 30.33 1 9.13
C om petition 2 5 .52 4 10.37 27.83 3 11.85
T echnological 2 1 .3 4 5 10.64 30 .04 2 12.12
Political/legal 3 3 .76 2 10 .56 15.42 5 10.08
Econom ic 3 7 .76 1 9 .2 4 2 6 .54 4 12.26
Socio-cultural 18.24 6 10.53 13.46 6 8 .57
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Securities CEOs perceived the economic and political/legal 
sectors to have the highest strategic uncertainty. This provided 
strong support for the first half of the first hypothesis. It 
also implied that the transfer of sovereignty was a key strategic 
issue for the securities industry.
Table 5.5
Multiple Comparison Testing of the PSU Scores 
in Different Environmental Sectors
Securities (S ) Printing (P ) Industry
S e c to r 1 2  3 4  5 6 1 2  3 4  5 6 Difference
1. C u s to m e r n s  >  <  <  > n s  n s  >  >  > n s
2 . C o m p e tit iv e >  <  <  > n s  >  n s  > n s
3 . T e c h n o lo g ic a l <  <  n s >  n s  > S < P
4  P o lit ic a l/le g a l n s  > <  n s S > P
5. E c o n o m ic > > S > P
6 . S o c io -c u ltu ra l n s
ns indicates no significant difference using SchefTe's multiple comparison procedure at p< 05  
> indicates that the row sector has a significantly higher PSU value than the column sector
< indicates that the column sector has a significantly lower PSU value than the column sector
In contrast, the customer and technological sectors had the 
highest PSU scores for printing CEOs. However, because the PSU 
score for the political/legal sector was almost as low as that 
for the socio-cultural sector, the hypothesis for the printing 
industry was weakly supported. Remarkably, the political 
transition did not appear to be a major source of environmental 
uncertainty for the CEOs of Hong Kong-based printing firms.
As indicated in Table 5.5, the PSU scores for three of the six 
environmental sectors were significantly different in the two 
industries. The economic and political/legal sectors had 
significantly higher PSU scores in the securities industry, while
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the technological sector had a significantly higher PSU score in 
the printing industry.
The second hypothesis predicted that as the PSU scores increased, 
the CEOs would scan more. Table 5.6 shows the amount of scanning 
conducted by the chief executives by combining the interest and 
frequency methods (whereby the highest and lowest possible scores 
are 10 and 2, respectively) . In the securities industry, the 
order of the sectors mirrored that for PSU, with the economic, 
legal/political and customer sectors being scanned the most. 
Meanwhile, printing CEOs indicated that most of their scanning 
was related to customer, competition and technological sectors.
Table 5.6
Amount of Scanning
Sector
Securities Printing
Mean Rank SD Mean Rank SD
Custom er 7.31 3 1.09 7.38 1 1 .18
Com petition 6 .7 9 4 1.22 6 .42 2 1 .2 8
T echnological 6 .2 4 5 1.24 6 .08 3 1.23
Political/legal 7 .6 9 2 1.03 4 .5 2 6 1.35
Econom ic 8 .8 2 1 0 .9 2 5 .87 4 1.43
Socio-cultural 6 .1 7 6 1.31 4.63 5 1 18 1
As shown in Table 5.7, all of the correlation coefficients 
between PSU and the amount of scanning were positive, with the 
single exception of the economic sector in the printing industry. 
However, only half of these coefficients were statistically 
significant at the p<.05 level.
The results provide weak support for the hypothesis that Hong 
Kong Chinese CEOs scan more as their PSUs increase. They also 
imply that strategic intelligence activities will remain
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important and intense in the infancy of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region.
Table 5.7
Correlations between PSU and the Amount of Scanning
Sector Securities Printing
Customer 0.23* 0.11
Competition 0.07 0.36**
Technological 0.38** 0.21*
Political/legal 0.14 0.16
Economic 0.21* -0.05 1
Socio-cultural 0.32* 0.29*
*p< 05; ** p< 01
5.3 Information Source Use
The third hypothesis predicted that the use of both personal and 
impersonal sources would be positively related to the overall 
environmental uncertainty (OEU). Meanwhile, the fourth 
hypothesis predicted that information quality rather than either 
information accessibility or OEU would be the strongest predictor 
for the frequency of information source use (FISU).
Table 5.8 depicts the mean FISU (on a scale of 1 to 5) for the 
eleven information sources. Based upon the earlier 
classification, the securities CEOs used both internal and 
external sources extensively and relied slightly more upon 
impersonal than personal sources to scan the environment. In 
contrast, the printing CEOs have a significantly lower overall 
reliance on information sources and they ranked three external 
and personal sources, namely customers, business associates and 
superiors/mentors, as the ones that they used most frequently. 
It was also quite surprising to find that family and friends, the
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traditional backbone of Chinese communication (Bond & Hwang, 
1986; Redding, 1990) were among the least frequently used 
information sources in both industries.
Table 5.8
Frequency of Information Source Use
Information Source
Securities Printing '
Mean Rank SD Mean Rank SD
Customers 4.24 3 0.95 4.00 1 0.93
Competitors 3.11 10 1.02 2.96 6 1.04
Business associates 3.86 7 1.30 3.96 2 1.12
Family and friends 2.94 11 1.30 2.71 9 1.27
Public media 4.93 1 1.26 3.29 6 1.16
Government publications 3.90 6 1.23 2.58 11 1.28
Trade associations 3.26 9 1.30 2.79 8 0.93
Superiors/mentors 4 .18 4 1.44 3.79 3 1.18
Subordinates/employees 3 .66 8 1.16 3.57 4 1.24
Internal documents 4.03 5 1.38 3.42 5 1.64
Electronic services 4.72 2 1.58 2.63 10 1.53
The perceived accessibility and the perceived quality of the 
different information sources are shown in Tables 5.9 and 5.10, 
respectively. The maximum and minimum possible values in both 
tables are 10 and 2, because each construct represents a sum of 
two scales. As mentioned in Chapter 2, perceived accessibility 
is a combination of the time and effort to contact or locate the 
source and the ease of getting the desired information from the 
source. Meanwhile, perceived quality combines two scales that 
measure information relevance and reliability, respectively.
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Table 5.9
Perceived Accessibility of Information Sources
In fo rm a tio n  S o u rc e
Securities Printine
M e a n R a n k S D M e a n R a n k SD
Customers 5.21 10 1.01 6.46 9 1.25
Competitors 5.14 11 1.25 5.54 11 1.32
Business associates 6.22 9 1.08 6.25 10 1.46
Family and friends 7.17 3 1.47 7.29 1 1.10
Public media 6.90 5 1.14 7.08 2 1.37
Government publications 6.86 7 1.30 6.83 6 1.27
Trade associations 6.59 8 1.05 6.67 8 1.43
S upenors/mentors 6.86 6 1.35 6.95 5 1.14
Subordinates/emplovees 7.07 4 1.13 6.79 7 1.02
Internal documents 7.66 2 1.59 7.00 3 1.10
Electronic services 7.93 1 1.41 6.96 4 1.23
Table 5.10
Perceived Quality of Information Sources
Information Source
Securities Printing
Mean Rank SD Mean Rank SD
Customers 7.00 5 1.07 8.00 1 1.62
Competitors 6.52 9 1 02 6.42 4 1.59
Business associates 7.00 6 1.58 6.50 3 1.79
Family and friends 5 69 11 1.39 5.88 9 1.51
Public media 6.97 7 1.61 5.96 8 1.33
Government publications 7.17 2 1.42 5.67 10 1.61
Trade associations 6.69 8 1.61 6.33 6 us
Superiors/mentors 7.07 4 1.56 6.89 2 1.10
Subordinates 6.41 10 1.56 6.38 5 1.31
Internal documents 7.10 3 2.13 6.33 7 1.01
Electronic services 7.69 1 2.07 4.96 11 1.83
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Chief executives from both industries ranked the following as 
among the most accessible information sources: electronic 
services, the public media, internal documents, family and 
friends, and subordinates. The rankings indicate little overall 
difference between personal and impersonal sources or between 
internal and external sources in terms of perceived 
accessibility.
The CEOs from securities firms also gave their highest ratings 
on the perceived quality dimension to impersonal sources, such 
as electronic services and publications. Meanwhile, their 
printing counterparts perceived that personal sources, including 
customers and business associates, provided the highest quality 
information. Most remarkably, electronic services were ranked 
first by the securities CEOs and last by the printing CEOs. 
These rankings demonstrate the variability of perceived 
information source quality from one industry to another.
The use of information sources in both industries was found to 
be highly correlated with quality perceptions but not with 
perceived accessibility. The lack of significant relationships 
(at p<. 05) between the overall environmental uncertainty and the 
frequency with which information sources were used led to a 
rejection of the third hypothesis. Regression models were also 
computed to analyse the relationship of source quality, source 
accessibility and OEU with the use of each source.
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 
5.11. The adjusted R-squared values indicate that the variance 
in FISU is related primarily to a combination of OEU, source 
accessibility and source quality. Meanwhile, for nearly every 
information source, the perceived quality of the source was the 
most important influence in terms of determining how frequently 
the information source was used by the CEOs. These findings are 
remarkably consistent between the two industries, and thereby 
suggest the likelihood of an industry-independent relationship.
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The use of multiple regression equations as part of the data 
analysis created a concern about the likelihood of mistakenly 
finding significant results among the multiple comparisons. In 
order to account for this, a much more conservative significance 
level was adopted by applying the Bonferroni inequality 
procedure. The Bonferroni procedure has recently emerged as an 
approach in social science research (see Rediker et al., 1993) 
to adjust the significance level to account for the possibility 
of obtaining significant results based on chance alone, due to 
the large number of comparisons that were being made.
Based upon the 121 comparisons (11 variables x 11 variables), and 
a basic significance level of .05, the corrected significance 
level for this estimate is p < .0004. At this level, the quality 
of 10 of the 11 sources in the securities industry and 9 of 11 
sources in the printing industry remained significantly related 
to FISU.
5.4 Education Level and Information Source Use
The fifth hypothesis predicted that a higher educational 
background will be positively correlated with the use of both 
personal and impersonal information sources. As shown in Table 
5.12, only four information sources in the securities industry 
and two in the printing industry were significantly related to 
the level of education.
Three of the six sources with significant correlations to 
educational level can be classified as personal while the other 
three were impersonal ones. The results provided little support 
for the fifth hypothesis.
The weakness of the evidence may be attributed partly to the 
relatively small sample sizes as well as the central tendencies 
in educational levels in both industries. As shown in Table 5.1, 
a majority of the securities CEOs had a post-secondary diploma 
or degree while more than half of those in the printing industry 
had a secondary level education.
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Table 5.12
Correlations between Education Level and Information Sources
Securities Printinq
Customers 0.02 0.10
Competitors 0.51" -0.23
Business associates 0.28 0.46'
Family and friends 0.20 -0.20
Public media 0.32’ 0.18
Government publications 0.29 0.11
Trade associations 0.31' 0.25
Superiors/mentors 0.03 0.23
Subordinates 0.14 0.20
Internal documents -0.16 0.17
Electronic services 0.37' 0.52"
'p< 05, "p< 01, p<001
5-5 Decision Making Roles
The sixth hypothesis predicted that strategic decision makers 
will use more environmental information in the entrepreneur role 
than in any of the other three roles (disturbance handler, 
resource allocator, negotiator) as conceptualised by Mintzberg 
(1973). This hypothesis was tested by ranking the mean score of 
each decision making role, as shown in Table 5.13.
Table 5.13
External Information Use in Different Decision Making Roles
Sector Mean
Securities
Rank SD Mean
Printing
Rank SD
Entrepreneur 4.47 1 0.86 3.41 2 0.93
Resource allocator 4.00 2 0.76 3.55 1 0.85
Decision handler 3 86 3 0.78 2.98 4 0.72
Negotiator 3.76 4 0.95 3.17 3 0.92
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The most frequent use of strategic intelligence in the securities 
industry was related to the entrepreneur role, but the 
entrepreneur role ranked second to the resource allocator role 
in the printing industry. Thus, the data from the securities 
industry strongly support the sixth hypothesis while the data 
from the printing industry data is more equivocal. Remarkably, 
even the lowest level of information use for a decisional role 
in the securities industry exceeded the highest level in the 
printing industry.
The seventh and final hypothesis was that personal sources would 
be used more frequently than impersonal ones in decision making.
Table 5.14
Frequency of Information Source Use in Decision Making
Information Source
Securities Printing
Mean Rank SD Mean Rank SD
Customers 3.26 7 0.95 3.76 2 0.91
Competitors 3.41 5 0.78 3.04 4 0.86
Business associates 3.66 1 0.93 3.88 1 0.84
Family and friends 2.73 11 0.76 2.54 8 1.06
Public media 3.55 3 0.95 2.71 7 0.85
Government publications 3.24 8 0.83 2.33 10 1.01
Trade associations 2.93 10 0.88 2.50 9 0.88
Superiors/mentors 3.10 9 1.25 3.62 3 0.98
Subordinates 3.38 6 0.73 3.04 4 0.91
Internal documents 3.55 3 1.09 2.96 6 1.04
Electronic services 3.62 2 0.90 2.32 11 1.09
As shown in Table 5.14, business associates were ranked as the 
most frequently used information sources by CEOs in both the
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securities and printing industries. Remarkably though, the next 
two highest ranking sources were impersonal ones (electronic 
services and internal documents) in the securities industry but 
personal ones (customers and superiors/mentors) in the printing 
industry. From the perspective of IT application, it is 
noteworthy that electronic services were ranked as the second 
most frequently used source by the securities CEOs, but as the 
least used one by the printing CEOs.
The aggregate means for personal sources and impersonal sources 
are 20.5 and 16.9, respectively, in securities, and 18.6 and 
11.1, respectively, in printing. The application of t-tests 
found that the seventh hypothesis was strongly supported by the 
printing industry data, but only weakly supported by that from 
the securities industry.
Remarkably, all four of the most frequently used sources of 
information for strategic decision making in the printing 
industry were personal, and three of the four were external to 
To the organisation. In contrast, three of the top five ranked 
information sources in the securities industry were impersonal.
5.5 The Results in a Comparative Context
The survey results are discussed more fully in Chapter 7, but at 
this point, it is worthwhile to provide a comparative context. 
Remarkably, many industry-specific differences were found. These 
included the relative rankings of the environmental sectors in 
terms of perceived environmental uncertainty and the relative use 
of different information sources. Political and economic issues 
(presumably related to the handover) were a greater concern to 
the CEOs from the securities industry and they also relied more 
on impersonal sources for external information.
At the same time, there were remarkable similarities between the 
two industries. These included a strong positive relationship 
between environmental uncertainty and the amount of CEO scanning 
as well as the perceived quality of an information source being
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The results from Hong Kong can also be compared with those from 
previous studies conducted in the United States, Canada and 
Nigeria. They were similar in terms of the positive relationship 
between environmental uncertainty and the amount of CEO scanning, 
but the correlation coefficients for both Hong Kong industries 
were significantly lower than in any of the studies conducted 
elsewhere. Moreover, each Hong Kong industry had a distinctive 
profile in terms of both sector rankings on perceived 
environmental uncertainty and the frequency with which different 
information sources were used.
The findings strongly suggest that both the nature of the 
business environment and the CEO scanning behaviours in pre­
handover Hong Kong differed significantly from those found in all 
the locations that have been the focus of previous environmental 
scanning studies. Furthermore, each Hong Kong industry had its 
own distinctive environmental characteristics and CEO scanning 
behaviours.
As noted earlier, Chapter 7 discusses the survey results in 
greater detail while Chapter 8 draws specific conclusions. 
However, before that, Chapter 6 is used to present the results 
from eight case studies that aimed to complement the survey, 
while the survey results enable a cross-sectional profile of both 
CEO perceptions and behaviours, the cases permitted a close look 
at how information was acquired and used during the process of 
addressing specific strategic issues.
the primary factor influencing its frequency of use.
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CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDY RESULTS
Chapter 5 reported on the survey of ethnic Chinese chief 
executives in two Hong Kong industries - printing and securities. 
Consistent with many other studies conducted in Western settings, 
the objective was to discover the nature of strategic 
intelligence in the pre-handover Hong Kong environment. The aim 
was to observe and describe how business leaders in the two 
industries perceived this environment, and the information 
sourcing that they undertook.
Many aspects of the environmental perceptions and scanning 
behaviours of Hong Kong Chinese CEOs were similar to those found 
previously in the U.S., Canada and Nigeria. However, as reported 
in Chapter 5, there were some specific and significant 
differences not only between Hong Kong and other countries, but 
also between the two industries that were surveyed. The most 
prominent differences included the rankings of environmental 
sectors in terms of uncertainty and the relative frequency of 
information source use. Additional investigation, in the form 
of case studies, was undertaken in an attempt to better 
understand and explain how Hong Kong Chinese CEOs in securities 
firms, printing firms, newspaper firms, and universities acquired 
and used information about the external environment.
This chapter reports on the case studies. The first section 
profiles the eight chief executives and their organizations. A 
second section outlines the 19 strategic issues that these CEOs 
identified. The strategic issues recalled by the CEOs from each 
industry are then detailed in a separate section. Relationships 
between the environmental sectors, the decision roles, and the 
sources of information about the external environment are then 
considered. Subsequently, the chief executive's rankings of 
information sources in terms of frequency of use, perceived 
accessibility, and perceived quality are presented. Finally, the 
key results from the case study analysis are summarised.
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6■ 1__Profile of the case studies
Two chief executives in each of the printing, securities, Chinese 
language newspaper, and higher education (university) industries 
in Hong Kong were the subjects of case study. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the printing and securities industries in Hong Kong 
are profiled in the first part of Appendix A while the newspaper 
and higher education industries are profiled in the second part 
of the same appendix. Profiles of the organisations and their 
CEOs appear in Tables 6 .1  and 6 . 2 ,  respectively.
Table 6.1
Profiles of the Organisations
Industry
Organisation Business
Number of 
Employees
Chief
Executive
Printing
Leading Printer
e s ta b lis h e d  in 19 79
Periodicals and packaging 
materials printing
nearly 400 Mr. Li
Chow Printing
e s ta b lis h e d  in 1 9 7 7
Job printing recent growth 
from 70 to 200
Mr. Chow
Securities
South China Securities
e s ta b lis h e d  in 1 9 60s
Institutional and retail 
securities trading
about 200 Mr. Mak
HL Securities
e s ta b lis h e d  in 19 8 8
Retail securities trading and 
financial planning
15 Mr. Chan
Newspapers
Leading Paper
e s ta b lis h e d  in 1 9 70s
Daily newspaper 500 Mr. Leung
Apple Daily
e s ta b lis h e d  in 19 94
Daily newspaper 300-400 Mr. Ho
Universities
Univ. of Hong Kong
e s ta b lis h e d  in 1911
Higher education about 1500 Prof. Cheng
New University Higher education about 1500 Prof. Tang
Note: Pseudonyms are used to protect the anonymity of some CEOs and their organisations
169
T ab le  6.2
Profile o f the Chief Executives
Name Age
Tenure with 
Organisation
Tenure 
as CEO
Highest
Education
Time outside 
Chinese 
society
Printing
Mr. Li 55-64 10-20 years, 
(son of the 
founder)
2-5 years Higher
diploma
No
Mr. Chow 45-54 -20  years -20 years 
(founder)
Form 5 
(O level)
< 1 year
Securities
Mr. Mak 45-54 10-20 years 5-10 years Bachelor's
degree
3 years 
(university)
Mr. Chan 45-54 10-20 years 5-10 years Higher
diploma
No
Newspapers 
Mr. Leung 55-64 5-10 years 
(> 25 yrs. in 
industry)
5-10 years Form 7 
(A level)
No
Mr. Ho 45-54 < 2 years 
(> 20 yrs. in 
industry)
< 2 years Bachelor's
degree
No
Universities 
Prof. Cheng 45-54 < 2 years 
(over 20 yrs. 
in academia)
< 2 years Ph.D. in 
Engineering
13 years
Prof. Tang 45-54 < 2 years 
(over 20 yrs. 
in academia)
< 2 years Ph.D. in 
Engineer^
17 years
Note: Pseudonyms are used to protect the anonymity of some CEOs and their organisations
The case studied organisations ranged in size from 15 to about 
1500 employees. Remarkably, none of them had a formal scanning 
system. Even their business planning tended to be relatively 
unsophisticated. In terms of the continuum proposed by Rhyne 
(1985) , only the New University was about to introduce strategic 
planning. Formal business plans had also been developed at the 
University of Hong Kong and South China Securities.
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6.2 Strategic issues
The chief executives identified a total of 19 strategic issues. 
The list that appears in Table 6.3 attempts to preserve their 
own framing of these issues.
Table 6.3
The Strategic Issues as Framed by the Inform ants
Inform ant Summary o f the Strategic Issue
Mr. Li 1 Responding to skilled (and semi-skilled) labour shortage
Leading Printer 2 Reviewing and revising the product focus
3 Assuring quality standards by pursuing ISO 9000 certification
Mr. Chow 4 Finding (and grooming) a successor to the current CEO
Chow Printing 5 Maintaining competitiveness despite rising input costs
Mr. Mak 6 Responding to the emergence of Internet trading
South China Securities 7 Ensuring a high degree of professionalism in the industry
Mr. Chan 8 Responding to intensified and internationalised competition
HL Securities 9 Considering the computerisation of business processes
Mr. Leung
Leading Paper
10 Responding to a potential ban on tobacco advertising
11 Responding to a retail price war initiated by a newcomer
Mr. Ho 12 Preserving freedom of the press in Hong Kong
Apple Daily 13 Achieving technology leadership within the local industry
Prof. Cheng
Univ. of Hong Kong
14 Maintaining and enhancing reputation and linkages
15 'Riding the wave' of information technology
16 Recruiting and retaining staff
Prof. Tang
New University
17 Managing transition from teaching to research focus
18 Implementing a strategic planning process
19 Improving business processes and management systems
The next four sections detail the issues that were identified in 
the four different industries. Each of the written accounts that 
follow was reviewed by the relevant informant in order to help 
ensure its reliability and validity. A brief description of each
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organisation and its CEO begins each sub-section.
Each strategic issue is classified in terms of three different 
dimensions: 1) the environmental sector(s) relevant to the issue,
2) the decisional role(s) in which the informant was acting, and
3) the information source(s) through which the informant became 
aware of the issue and/or improved his understanding of the 
issue. This classification or mapping enables a subsequent 
analysis of the case study data that complements the quantitative 
analysis of the survey data reported in Chapter 5. The findings 
from the case studies are discussed, together with the survey 
results, in Chapter 7.
6.3 Printing industry
6.3.1 Leading Printer
Leading Printer (LP) was started in 1979 with two employees and 
one printing press. The founding family moved to Hong Kong 
decades earlier and, like many others, made the transition from 
sojourners to settlers (see Chan & Chiang, 1994 or Wong, 1988 for 
a detailed discussions of this transition). The establishment 
of their enterprise coincided with the implementation of the Open 
Door Policy by the PRC. The resumption of China trade created 
new opportunities for printing and packaging in Hong Kong.
The company's offices were initially located in an Industrial 
Estate in the New Territories, but in 1995 they were moved to a 
commercial building in Kowloon. Leading Printer employed nearly 
400 people had annual revenues of more than HK$ 500 million 
(about £ 40 million) at the time the case study was conducted.
Despite its business growth, LP remained very much a family-owned 
and family-run operation. Mr. Li, the current CEO, was the son 
of the company founder. He went to work in the family business 
immediately after completing his higher diploma at a local 
college. Although his father had relinquished the top management 
position several years ago, he retained the ultimate decision­
making authority in his role as the family patriarch.
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The family had always relied heavily on its own members to 
maintain management control. For example, the CEO's wife was 
responsible for financial control and accounting while his 
brother, sister and two first cousins each had specific 
management roles. Even the current production manager joined the 
business after marrying the chief executive's cousin and, 
according to the informant, was now treated "like a brother".
The mother of the current chief executive had handled many of the 
administrative duties in the early years. However, one full-time 
administrative officer was added in 1983, and a second in 1987. 
Meanwhile, a full-time accountant had been on staff since 1991, 
although the CEO's wife was “ultimately responsible for what went 
on in this area". LP printed a wide range of periodicals as well 
as different types of books. A progressively larger share of its 
revenues came from the printing (and sometimes the manufacturing) 
of packaging materials. Growing numbers of items such as toy 
packages and video cassette sleeves were being sold to the 
manufacturing firms throughout the region.
Mr. Li indicated that his strategy was based on four pillars: 1) 
speed and flexibility in responding to customer needs, 2) 
cultivating long-term relationships to sustain cashflow even 
during downturns in the economic cycle, 3) avoiding heavy long­
term commitments to labour, and 4) avoiding a lock-in to any 
single production technology by heavy capital investment. He had 
accumulated a deep personal understanding of the periodicals 
segment of the printing industry, and claimed to know people 
whose combined information about this segment that “was not 
available to anybody else".
Mr. Li noted that due to the customer-driven nature of the 
business, many key design and marketing decisions were removed 
from the firm. This enabled him to focus on improving 
production. Mr. Li believed that "the way to keep everyone happy 
is to deliver a good product while cutting or avoiding costs 
wherever we can".
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Planning was done incrementally and Mr. Li continually assessed 
the business environment for changes and problems. He had 
solicited suggestions about several recent issues from his 
family, business friends, his accountant, and key clients. He 
also claimed that ideas from his staff could be helpful. They 
reported regularly to him and many of them mentioned that they 
had provided inputs on product quality. However, most felt that 
the "big boss" made all the big decisions by himself, and their 
ideas and information were not really taken into account.
The key performance measure for the firm had always been sales. 
Both the current CEO and his father firmly believed that success 
on this dimension would naturally result in good profits and a 
strong competitive position in the industry. Although LP did not 
have an explicit corporate strategy, two industry observers told 
me that it has effectively pursued a cost leadership strategy 
within its chosen product range.
New technologies had been periodically introduced into the core 
production processes, including typesetting, page composition and 
layout. Most of these innovations appeared to be well-received 
by the core group of long-term staff, who took pride in the 
steady productivity improvements that had been achieved over the 
years. The firm maintained detailed financial and accounting 
records; Mr. Li said that "we have comprehensive client records 
and a good follow-up system with loyal customers. We have also 
made up policy and procedure manuals in some areas as a result 
of our recent decision to go for ISO 9000 certification".
In contrast, the documentation related to both operational 
performance and external business environment was limited. There 
was a prevailing reliance on verbal communication and centralized 
decision-making. This type of decision-making and a dependence 
on hierarchical authority, both of which are characteristic of 
mechanistic organisational structures, had been merged with a 
high degree of flexibility and low formalization that typified 
an organic structure (see Bums & Stalker, 1961) . Nevertheless,
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LP had a fairly simple organisational structure with a 
centralized control system, just like many other firms in its 
industry and across the Hong Kong economy (see Redding, 1990).
Issue 1 - Shortage of skilled (and semi-skilled) labour
Leading Printer had steadily upgraded its production technology 
by making selective investments in new hardware, software, and 
methods. Significantly, the returns on such investments depended 
largely on the skills of the workers using them. Mr. Li
indicated that the supply of semi-skilled and skilled employees 
had become a key problem. He stated that "we can't improve 
efficiency unless our people have a really good understanding of 
the technology".
Trainees graduating from secondary schools or technical colleges 
increasingly preferred to work in the service sector. Service 
industries offered better prospects for rapid promotion and good 
salaries. The turnover rate among the staff who had worked at 
LP for less than two years had risen rapidly from 1991 to 1995. 
In recent times, there had been serious difficulties in both 
recruiting and retaining staff.
Mr. Li could not remember exactly how he first became aware of 
the labour shortage that would come to affect his firm. He did 
remember reading about the growing emigration from Hong Kong to 
places like Australia and Canada - the so-called brain drain 
problem, well before the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. 
After the massacre, even his own family members considered 
leaving the territory because of their concerns about what could 
happen after 1997. Many talented young people emigrated in the 
early 1990s, and this brightened job prospects for those who 
stayed. Those with reasonable skill sets could seemingly command 
better wages and benefits than Leading Printer was willing to 
offer.
A series of talks with his production manager in 1992 confirmed 
that rising staff turnover rates coupled with recruitment
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difficulties were a strategic issue for the firm. A review of 
the personnel records indicated that nearly 20 percent of LP's 
staff had resigned in the period from December 1990 to December 
1991. Meanwhile, those applying for positions advertised by the 
company seldom had even a secondary school diploma, and few of 
them demonstrated either a genuine interest or more than cursory 
knowledge of printing work.
Subsequent meetings with others working in the industry confirmed 
that many other printing firms were facing the same problem. Mr. 
Li said that "All of us are in the same boat ... a lot of people 
are jumping off, but we can't get anyone to climb on board". 
Employees appeared to be exiting the industry in significant 
numbers rather than job-hopping within it. Mr. Li and his 
industry associates discussed both the problem and some potential 
solutions, but none of them proved to be particularly useful.
Leading Printer had partially resolved this problem by moving 
most of its operations to mainland China This action was taken 
after soliciting information from customers, suppliers and, most 
importantly, those who already had operations in the PRC. Mr. 
Li noted that "everybody who had moved to Guangdong was happy 
they had done so ... I knew we had to follow them . . . and 
quickly". At the time of this case study, nearly two-thirds of 
LP's employees worked at its new plant in Dongguan, mainland 
China. This had alleviated the labour problem, reduced costs, 
and brought the company closer to an emerging market segment.
This issue involved primarily the economic sector and secondarily 
the socio-cultural sector of the environment. Changes in 
economic conditions and the overall mix of the local economy had 
spawned this issue, but it was exacerbated by recent trends in 
socio-cultural attitudes. The informant recalled that he had 
acquired information from four different types of sources - the 
mass media, subordinates, internal documents, and business 
associates - while acting in the role of disturbance handler.
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Issue 2 - Reviewing and revising the product focus
As more and more foreign firms (Western and Japanese) relocated 
their factories to mainland China, they created a growing demand 
for packaging materials. This was the fastest growing segment 
of LP's business. Consequently, Mr. Li had decided to shift the 
bulk of the production in the Dongguan plant from printing books 
to printing packaged materials. This refocus constituted a 
second strategic issue.
Leading Printer had traditionally derived most of its revenues 
from printing assorted periodicals for major publishing houses. 
However, many of these former customers had adopted new 
technologies and transferred much of their printing in-house. 
Advances in information technology, and particularly in desktop 
publishing capabilities offered by Apple computer systems, were 
responsible for this trend.
Mr. Li remembered seeing some pioneering versions of these IT 
products being demonstrated at trade shows in the early 1980s. 
However, he admitted that he did not really become aware of the 
implications for his business until much later. Some of his 
industry associates, to whom he sometimes contracted work, 
periodically mentioned their worries about competition from do- 
it-yourselfers. Eventually, Mr. Li decided that he had to 
explore this potential threat in more detail.
He conducted a series of discussions with his key business 
partners and also met several times with two of his own 
executives - his cousin, the marketing manager, and his "new 
brother", the production manager. At these get-togethers, a 
potential change in the company's business focus was considered. 
Eventually, Mr. Li decided to leverage the firm's existing size 
(which was fairly large by industry standards) and its good 
reputation. "We had worked hard to build up a good name . . . now 
it was time to enter the new market". Business would come from 
the foreign firms that were setting up production in southern 
China and would need printed packaging for their outputs.
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With this refocus. Leading Printer had to develop a number of new 
capabilities. For example, customers who were selling their 
goods to Russia and parts of Eastern Europe needed printing with 
the Cyrillic alphabet. Others demanded very high quality, 
fluorescent print on their packaging materials. Recently, Mr. 
Li had spent much of his own time with industry associates and 
technology vendors in order to build up these capabilities.
This issue involved primarily the competitive sector and 
secondarily the customer sector of the environment. The 
informant acted in the role of resource allocator while 
diagnosing this issue, and used three specific information 
sources - a trade show, business associates, and the mass media.
Issue 3 - Quality assurance (ISO 9000 certification)
The recent decision to pursue ISO 9000 certification resulted 
from a combination of customer demands and LP' s desire to 
differentiate itself in the local printing industry. The 
printing industry had been a notable laggard in both adopting the 
principles of Total Quality Management (TQM) and seeking out ISO 
9000 certification.
There appeared to be common view among senior printing executives 
that the time and effort associated with such initiatives simply 
were not justifiable in terms of foreseeable benefits. However, 
some of Mr. Li's overseas customers were concerned about the 
standard of future outputs as his firm shifted its operations to 
mainland China. He mentioned that "several big buyers told me 
that they worried about getting a quality product from China".
The ISO 9000 certificate had become popular in many of the 
Western countries where Mr. Li was now courting packaging-related 
business. He believed that potential customers would be more 
willing to establish long-term relationships with suppliers that 
demonstrated a commitment to quality assurance. Discussions with 
the top managers of these potential clients confirmed his belief.
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Mr. Li's next step was to determine the time, effort, and expense 
involved with the certification process. Here, he turned to 
several professional associates, including the author (who had 
done a study on ISO 9000 outcomes in Hong Kong) and someone who 
worked as a quality assurance consultant. The consultant was 
eventually contracted to help Leading Printer document its core 
business processes and prepare for the audits that precede ISO 
9000 certification. This consultant started to work for LP a few 
weeks before this case study was conducted.
This issue involved only the customer sector of the environment. 
The informant was acting in the role of entrepreneur while he 
acquired information from three different sources - customers, 
business associates, and consultants. Significantly, all three 
of these sources were personal and external to the organisation.
6.3.2__Chow Printing
Mr. Chow's printing firm had been in business for nearly 20 
years. In many respects, Mr. Chow was the firm. He is from a 
rather modest Shanghainese family, but set up his own business 
when he was in his early 30s. Ever since he was six years old, 
Mr. Chow had earned his own money, variously working as a tutor, 
a football (soccer) trainer, and a sidewalk hawker before 
completing his Form 5 (Grade 11) education.
Mr. Chow launched a magazine specializing in fashion when he was 
21, using his savings to pay the first instalment on a printing 
machine. After the failure of his magazine, he took a job as a 
copy editor for one of the smaller weekly newsmagazine in Hong 
Kong. However, he had a compulsion to go back into business 
"before he became too old" . When he sat down to look at the kind 
of business that he could run successfully, he came up with two 
key criteria:
1. the business had to be in a growing industry so that he 
could tap into the overall growth of the market. Otherwise, 
he would have to take customers away from potential 
competitors in a mature industry, which would be much more
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difficult.
2. the industry had to be relatively familiar to him. He 
wanted to hit the ground running rather than spend his time 
learning the ropes.
Many of the other start-ups in the late 1970s jumped into the 
printing industry and appeared to simply hope for a profitable 
piece of a growing pie. In contrast, Mr. Chow claimed to have 
thought long and hard about how to position his firm, not for 
short-term profits, but for long-term sustainability. He said 
that he examined the existing industry and observed that it was 
dominated by two types of firms:
1. bigger players, often foreign-owned, that offered 
sophisticated products,- and
2. small firms, typically one or two person operations.
The first type had plenty of marketing clout, but were 
disadvantaged by the hierarchical nature of their operations. 
They tended to be rather impersonal in their dealings with target 
customers. Many of their potential clients were large companies 
interested in making big orders. Front-line staff working in the 
bigger printing firms were unable to provide good customer 
service; clients experienced difficulties contacting someone in 
the printing firm who could help them by making a big decision.
The second type handled small retail orders or were basically 
sub-contractors for higher-end work. They tended to rely on 
lower prices and promotional gimmicks for their sales and offered 
little in the way of after-sales service. There were few 
barriers to entry or exit, and so these types of firms would come 
and go quite frequently.
Mr. Chow believed that there was a vacuum to be filled in the 
middle-range segment of the printing industry. His firm, Chow 
Printing, grew by serving this market segment better than either 
the large or small companies. Financial service and trading 
firms had been among its major customers. They needed fast
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turnaround times and demanded reasonably good customer service.
Chow Printing emphasized technical expertise, good qualifications 
and strong interpersonal skills. In contrast to most of its 
rivals, staff were encouraged to attend developmental courses and 
seminars. Although customers paid a small premium, they received 
prompt attention to their needs, and good quality products along 
with above-average service.
Mr. Chow viewed both his customers and long-term employees as 
friends. He was keen to develop good relationships as evident 
from his extensive customer records. They included individual 
profiles of preferences, usage patterns and peculiarities as well 
as notes about problems and complaints. The records enabled 
targeted marketing, and promoted a high rate of repeat business. 
Loyal customers had liberal and near-instant access to the 
service staff at Chow Printing through dedicated telephone lines 
and a recently-introduced electronic mail system. The latter 
also enabled cost-effective and flexible direct marketing.
Over the years, Mr. Chow's firm has grown slowly but steadily. 
"My company has given me tremendous psychological pressure. 
Whenever there were changes in the situation, I feel worried and 
cannot function effectively. Maybe it is best to work for 
someone else, and let them make all the difficult decisions."
Mr. Chow admitted that he had traditionally been a very 
conservative manager and that his firm probably possessed too 
much cash. It rarely incurred any debt, even in the early years, 
except for the property mortgage that was taken out only because 
interest payments on it were tax deductible. That had recently 
changed. Between 1992 and 1995, Mr. Chow had made local media 
headlines by rapidly expanding his maturing business through 
three separate acquisitions on the mainland. This raised 
employee numbers from less than 70 to more than 200.
The firm had tried to tightly control its production costs, but
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it seemed to have little formalization or standardization beyond 
the printing and customer service areas. Mr. Chow stated that 
"surviving in a competitive market is a constant challenge. But 
to be successful, as we have, is even more daunting. I 
constantly re-examine what we are doing and how we can do it 
better, in less time, with less money, or more effectively."
Some industry analysts, contacted by the researcher, indicated 
that this company would benefit from a more professional 
management approach. Despite efforts to promote employee 
involvement, Mr. Chow still ran the show. The responsibilities 
of his employees were to smoothly carry out the everyday 
activities which involve a minimum of discretionary behaviour. 
The CEO believed that they were able to deliver excellent 
customer service because certain policies and guidelines ensured 
a consistently high level of quality throughout the organisation.
Only fairly routine decisions and actions were taken without Mr. 
Chow's involvement. "X have to stay on top of everything my 
company does." One employee described his management as "a one- 
man show". In contrast, several other staff mentioned that Mr. 
Chow did not interfere too much in their day-to-day work and that 
he was quite generous with bonuses before the Chinese New Year.
Issue 4 - Finding (and grooming) a successor
Long-term relationships were very important in the printing 
business. For at least the last five years, Mr. Chow had spent 
a lot of his time thinking about what would happen to his company 
after he retired. He wanted to hand over the reins to someone 
he could trust, but there was no natural successor. His daughter 
and nephews were pursuing professional careers or determined to 
do so in the future. As a result of his own observations, he was 
convinced that too much education had turned his younger 
generation into "rule followers".
In contrast, Mr. Chow felt that the secret to running a company 
successfully was having the experience and acumen to make one's
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own rules. He had spent a great deal of time and effort actively- 
searching for an appropriate protege. He felt that whoever went 
on to lead his business would need at least five years of 
grooming while Mr. Chow remained in charge.
Mr. Chow had sought out a person who could maintain his company's 
tradition while providing the momentum for future growth. 
Initially, the target population for his search was confined to 
second-level managers within the company and its key business 
partners. However, Mr. Chow did not find anyone in this group 
who was both suitable and willing to take the job. The scope of 
the search had thus been widened to include senior managers 
across the printing and publishing industry.
Mr. Chow eventually invited Mr. Wong to become his deputy. Mr. 
Wong came from the same sub-ethnic group, was a life-long Hong 
Kong resident, had worked in the printing industry for more than 
five years, and expressed great enthusiasm in helping to further 
build up the business when he accepted the invitation. Mr. Chow 
had checked with several of Mr. Wong's business associates and 
clients. Their expressions of trust in Mr. Wong reassured Mr. 
Chow that he was making the right choice. He also mentioned a 
recommendation from the patriarch of one of the Wong clans in 
Hong Kong. This had a great influence on his ultimate decision 
to groom Mr. Wong as his successor.
This issue was not mapped onto any of the six environmental 
sectors, but the informant was deemed to be acting in the role 
of entrepreneur. During the diagnosis of this strategic issue, 
he recalled acquiring information from three external and 
personal sources - business associates, friends, and customers.
Issue 5 - Maintaining competitiveness
Offset printing in Hong Kong was more advanced than in many other 
countries within East Asia. However, Mr. Chow was losing many 
orders because he could not compete on price. By reviewing 
internal documents such as sales and expense reports, Mr. Chow
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knew that his profit margin was declining on orders that he did 
get. The big problem was rental costs in Hong Kong. They had 
risen rapidly in recent years and, for an industry that had large 
physical space requirements, now represented an enormous expense.
From his conversations with industry associates, Mr. Chow knew 
that many local printing firms were moving part or all of their 
operations to near-by areas of mainland China. This enabled them 
to take advantage of lower land and labour costs, and increase 
their competitiveness in an industry that was subject to growing 
levels of international rivalry. Mr. Chow followed, not by 
relocating, but by buying additional facilities in China.
During the 1990s, the growth of public relations increased the 
demand for printing services in Hong Kong. Chow Printing had 
shifted its attention from the overseas market to the local one 
in order to capitalize on the market opportunities that Mr. Chow 
had heard about. In the late 1980s, about 70 percent of its 
turnover came from abroad; at the time of the case study, nearly 
70 percent was derived from customers in Hong Kong and China.
The rapid development of the mainland China market for printing 
has offset falling demand from overseas markets. This had 
reduced the high costs of transporting both semi-finished and 
finished outputs, and improved the firm's competitive position. 
Between 1992 and 1995, Mr. Chow had spent nearly HK$ 100 million 
to take over several existing plants in China and purchased new 
equipment for them. This investment for the long-term had 
constrained the company's cashflow and would hurt its 
profitability in the near future.
Mr. Chow admitted that the costs of running a couple of the 
plants were higher than he had expected. His expectations had 
been based on information supplied by friends and associates in 
related industries. Nevertheless, he continued to believe that 
the new locations, employees and machines would enable the 
company to operate on much larger scale.
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As a result of some informal benchmarking that Mr. Chow had 
undertaken, he suggested that his company was now well-positioned 
to enhance operational efficiency and to take advantage of the 
growing China market. However, he admitted that the transition 
"had been more difficult than I thought it would be, and our 
financial results for the next while will reflect this."
This issue involved primarily the competitive sector, and 
secondarily the technological sectors of the environment. The 
CEO acquired information from the mass media and business 
associates while acting in the role of disturbance handler.
6.4 Securities industry
6.4.1 South China Securities
South China Securities is one of the largest and most successful 
locally-owned securities trading firms in Hong Kong. It was 
established in the 1960s and subsequently rode the growth wave 
of the Hong Kong financial services industry. By the end of 
1996, it directly employed nearly 200 people, including 40 
traders and brokers, and had established a solid network of 
retail agencies. It had inspired above-average loyalty from both 
its employees and agents by providing generous profit-sharing 
payouts and developmental opportunities.
South China Securities had acted as the sole or lead agent for 
nearly two dozen placements between 1993 and 1995, and was an 
underwriter for many other new issues. It had received several 
awards, from both issuers and investors, in recognition of its 
accomplishments with placements and underwriting. The firm 
further solidified its strong competitive position in the local 
securities market.
Mr. Mak, the chief executive, came from a well-to-do family. It 
had started up a garment business in the 1950s and done quite 
well in this industry. He was sent to Britain for his university 
education and spent a few years in the family business before
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switching to securities. Although he headed one of the most 
respected firms in the business, his comments were not what was 
expected from a distinguished industry laureate. He was not 
afraid to speak openly and even cynically about the industry, and 
particularly its problems with integrity lapses and opportunism.
Mr. Mak was clear about one thing, "the essence of my job is 
making decisions." When asked about the basis for his decisions, 
he replied that he gathered as much information as he felt he 
needed, thought about all the aspects of the situation, and then 
decided what to do. It seemed that for him, information is 
converted into intelligence, and then used to make choices in a 
highly sequential and rational process.
Issue 6 - Internet trading
The emergence of securities trading on the Internet in places 
like the United States had created a major business issue for 
Southern China Securities. Their reputation allowed them to 
generate a large volume of securities trading without deviating 
from a standard set of commission rates. However, the 
convenience and lower prices offered by Charles Schwab and others 
reaching out from the U.S. could hurt the profitability of local 
securities firms, such as South China Securities.
Mr. Mak remembered becoming aware of securities trading on the 
Internet through a U.S.-based industry magazine. It had a story 
about how one of the small brokerage houses was setting up the 
necessary infrastructure to take the buy and sell orders of 
retail clients via the Internet. In order to learn more about 
this emerging IT application and its potential effect on existing 
practices and commission rates, he bought some other publications 
and contacted an industry associate in the United States. That 
associate spent about 10 minutes on the phone talking about the 
current status and expected growth of this practice, and 
subsequently faxed him several newspaper clippings and one or two 
articles. Mr. Mak read these items and believed that they gave 
him a better understanding of Internet trading in general as well
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as potential impact on the securities industry. However, he did 
not fully appreciate this new "channel" until he logged onto the 
Internet and tried out one of these services for himself.
Mr. Mak mentioned that securities firms in Hong Kong typically 
introduced practices that had been proven to be successful in the 
United States. He had some difficulty citing an example on the 
spur of the moment, but finally mentioned the Central Clearing 
and Settlement System, which is a book-entry system that 
automates the settlement of securities trades.
However, local people have somewhat different investment 
attitudes and behaviours that their American counterparts. For 
example, decisions tend to be made by families rather than 
individuals. As a result, some practices from the U.S. may be 
transferred directly into the Hong Kong market, but others must 
be adapted to the local market and a few rejected entirely.
In order to assess the prospects for Internet-based trading in 
Hong Kong, Mr. Mak commissioned a small-scale survey of local 
retail investors. Based on the results, he told his senior IT 
people to look into setting up an Internet trading capability. 
At the time this case study was conducted. Mr. Mak was awaiting 
the results of their investigation so that he could develop an 
appropriate action plan.
This issue involved primarily the technological sector and 
secondarily the competitive sector of the environment. The CEO 
acted primarily in the role of disturbance handler and 
secondarily in the role of entrepreneur. During the diagnosis 
of this strategic issue, he acquired information from various 
sources, including trade publications, electronic services, 
business associates, customers, and subordinates in the IT area.
Interestingly, Mr. Mak commented that "when it came to making big 
decisions involving new technologies, I tend to spend a lot of 
my own time learning about the issue. I also stay informed about
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new regulations in the pipeline and their significance to our 
business. However, before deciding on regulatory or legal 
issues, I make a point of getting a lot of advice from our 
lawyers. I also often talk to my cousin, who is a solicitor. 
On the other hand, for decisions about the market, I do not get 
as directly involved, because I feel that my people know more 
about our customers and competitors than I do."
Issue 7 - Professionalism
The recent growth of the securities industry in Hong Kong had 
created a shortage of experienced brokers and traders. The 
cyclical nature of share trading volumes in Hong Kong meant that 
traders could make an enormous amount of money by joining the 
industry when the market is hot. For example, many people 
switched to the securities industry during the market boom in 
1992 and 1993 .
This labour inflow made it difficult to assess the competence and 
trustworthiness of new employees. The Securities and Futures 
Commission in Hong Kong had taken some steps to develop a 
detailed framework of securities legislation that brings Hong 
Kong in line with international standards of market regulation 
and practice. In fact, Mr. Mak was part of the committee in the 
early 1990s that developed codes of conduct for members of both 
the stock and futures exchanges.
More recently, he had worked with other leading members of the 
Stock Exchange Hong Kong (SEHK) as well as one of his own 
assistants to explore the issue of professional accreditation for 
securities brokers and traders. These activities had led him to 
review the codes of conduct and accreditation practices in the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Similar to the Internet 
trading issue, the potential benefits of adapting practices that 
had emerged elsewhere encouraged Hong Kong chief executives to 
seek out information from overseas. For this issue, securities 
regulators in the U.K. and the U.S. were key information sources.
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Complaints of unprofessional, unethical and potentially illegal 
practices were commonly reported by the media as the Hong Kong 
market cooled down after 1993. These reports troubled Mr. Mak, 
who worried that a "few bad apples" could again tarnish the 
reputation of the SEHK and the securities industry in Hong Kong. 
As a result, he became more actively involved in hiring each new 
broker and trader at his company. He cited this as an example 
of the strategic decision making that is the essence of his job. 
This sense of moral responsibility is consistent with the 
Confucian perspective on leadership. The evidence suggested that 
Mr. Mak kept in close touch with the external environment not 
only so that he could improve the performance of his own 
business, but also to help preserve the image of his industry.
This particular strategic issue involved the customer sector of 
the environment, and specifically their perceptions of the 
industry's professionalism and ethical standards. In addressing 
this issue, the CEO was acting in the role of entrepreneur and 
relied on information from four different types of sources - 
business associates, regulators, a subordinate, and customers.
S.4.2 HL Securities
HL Securities was started up by Mr. Chan in early 1988. Mr. Chan 
was born and raised in Hong Kong but went to the United States 
to study for his degree in economics. Shortly after university, 
he returned to Hong Kong and worked for a couple of major 
brokerage firms until the financial market crash of October 1987. 
His American employer had then declared him redundant and sent 
him on his way with a healthy severance package. He was 37 years 
old at the time and it proved difficult to find a job with 
another securities firm in the aftermath of the market crash.
However, Mr. Chan remembered being confident that the financial 
crisis would be short lived. He was optimistic that Hong Kong 
investors would soon return to the stock markets. He also 
thought that if he had enough faith to remain in the industry, 
he should have enough faith to benefit as an owner rather than
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just a broker. "I couldn't work any harder than I was already 
doing, so why not do it for myself."
Supported only by his severance payment, he quickly set up his 
own securities firm. He convinced many of his old clients - 
small business owners and professionals - to switch their trading 
accounts to his new firm. He admitted that he found it difficult 
to avoid the pitfalls of an entrepreneur who wanted to do 
everything himself. He had hired a few people over the years, 
but still saw himself as the "business development guy" and the 
"financial control guy". He spent much of his time with current 
and potential clients. "Business relationships are just like 
personal relationships, they must be nurtured all the time."
In addition to the securities trading conducted by his firm, Mr. 
Chan had started to provide some financial planning services to 
his clients. He personally did most of the planning work to 
ensure that his clients' investments fit their needs. Since 
1992, he had hired three professional employees, and they had 
progressively assumed the responsibility for the buy-and-sell 
order taking part of his business.
Mr. Chan admitted that his company's performance had its peaks 
and valleys, just like the trading volumes and index levels on 
the Hong Kong stock market. "I have managed to keep it limping 
along, but I've paid a high price. I rarely see my wife and 
daughter, except on Sundays." Even though many of his relatives 
also run their own companies (in different lines of business), 
he had thought about going back to work for someone else, "but 
I think that would be very difficult now that I have been running 
my own show for many years."
Issue 8 - Intensified and internationalised competition
As the share trading volumes on the Hong Kong market increased 
during the bull market of 1992 and 1993, the major players in the 
global securities industry have been paying more attention to 
Hong Kong. Few of them could ignore the listing of China shares,
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as the mainland government opened up its largest state 
enterprises to foreign investment. Mr. Chan become aware of this 
internationalization process by reading local media reports, 
scanning an electronic new service, and talking to industry 
associates. He recognised that this development would change the 
competitive dynamics of the securities industry in Hong Kong.
As a result, Mr. Chan wondered how much room there would be for 
the "little fish" as Hong Kong became a "very big pond", just 
like London and New York. He had read (in the newspapers) and 
heard (from business colleagues) that there had been quite a few 
mergers and acquisitions among Western securities firms. Mr. 
Chan foresaw a similar type of shakeout taking place in Hong Kong 
as soon as market sentiment became less positive and some of the 
initial hyperbole over China shares had subsided.
He hoped that he will not be among those who have to close up 
their business. To this end, he had reviewed his internal 
documents and taken steps to strengthen his relationships with 
key customers. This included promising a high degree of 
reliability and providing higher value-added services. His most 
tangible action was to help his clients plan their finances as 
well as execute their trades of corporate shares.
This strategic issue involved the competitive sector of the 
environment and had Mr. Chan acting in the role of disturbance 
handler. While diagnosing and addressing this issue, he had 
acquired information from the local mass media, electronic 
services, business associates, and internal documents.
Issue 9 - Considering computerisation
Largely as a result of personal observation, Mr. Chan realized 
that computerisation was becoming more and more important in his 
industry. His previous employer had already installed a lot of 
computing and telecommunications equipment shortly before the 
1987 market crash. Mr. Chan had subsequently monitored 
developments in this area by reading media reports and talking
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to a few industry associates.
Probably as a result of this environmental scanning, Mr. Chan was 
able to remember that an automatic order matching system had been 
introduced about four or five years ago. He was aware that this 
system had greatly reduced the time and effort required to enter 
orders and confirm trades, and that it provided a useful audit 
trail for securities transactions.
Mr. Chan also kept in touch with a friend from school who was now 
in the computer business. Almost every time they talked, this 
friend chided Mr. Chan for not making greater use of IT to 
modernize his business. In response, Mr. Chan often expressed 
his desire to talk directly to both his clients and employees and 
to keep his own mental or hand-written notes. As a result, he 
had little need for electronic communications or highly 
structured databases.
Nevertheless, his company had been using a personal computer to 
keep accounting and customer records almost since it was started. 
Recently, a trading terminal had been installed in the office to 
supplement the one that was available to him on the trading 
floor. However, Mr. Chan was not sure whether his small business 
would benefit from other applications. Anyway, this was a moot 
point at the moment; he indicated that he was unable (or perhaps 
unwilling) to invest any more money into his business.
The computerisation issue involved the technological sector of 
the environment and had the CEO acting in the role of 
entrepreneur. Information was acquired from the mass media, 
business associates, a friend, and trade publications.
More generally, Mr. Chan stressed that he did not have time to 
read any single publication on a regular basis. Instead, he 
tended to skim over one of the local newspapers each day and 
business magazines a few times a month. This approach enabled 
him to develop impressions about trends and maintain a good sense
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of the current environment. Information from an article "rarely 
makes me go out and do something, but it sticks in my mind" . 
When it was time to make a big decision, he already had a good 
mental image of “what was happening, and what could happen as a 
result of my decision." This suggests a common lag between the 
acquisition of information about external developments and its 
use in strategic decision making.
6.5 Newspaper industry
6.5.1 Leading Paper
Leading Paper was the producer of one of the longest-established 
and best-selling daily newspapers in the Hong Kong market. The 
company also published an international Chinese language 
newsmagazine on a weekly basis and different newspaper editions 
for Chinese communities overseas. The largest of these, in terms 
of sales volumes, were the eastern Canada edition (published in 
Toronto), the eastern U.S. edition (published in New York), and 
the western Canada edition (published in Vancouver).
The ownership of Leading Paper was controlled by a single family 
even though its shares had been publicly listed on the local 
stock exchange for many years. One industry analyst told me that 
this equity structure had helped the company to maintain a 
healthy balance between short-term performance and long-term 
viability.
The chief executive at the time of the case study was Mr. Leung. 
He had been with the firm for nearly 10 years, and had nearly 25 
years of experience in the newspaper industry. He had a 
reputation as a talented and fairly progressive business leader. 
Under his leadership, the company had introduced a number of 
content and production ideas to Hong Kong that were subsequently 
adopted by other local newspapers. During the interview, Mr. 
Leung identified two very different strategic concerns - one was 
a lingering regulatory issue while the other was a recent 
development that had shaken up the local marketplace.
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Issue 10 - Potential ban on tobacco advertising in newspapers
Tobacco companies in Hong Kong spent between HK$ 300 and 800 
million per year on advertising and promotion during the last 
decade. After 1991, they were no longer permitted to advertise 
on television. Although they continued to sponsor sporting 
events, such as the Marlboro and Salem tennis tournaments and 
Camel motorcycle races, most of their television advertising 
budgets were shifted to other mass media outlets.
The newspaper industry had been a major beneficiary of this 
shift. Mr. Leung indicated that the value of tobacco 
advertisements in Hong Kong newspapers had grown by HK$40-50 
million from 1990 to 1994. Despite the segmented market, 
newspaper ads were quite cost effective when compared to their 
radio and outdoor counterparts or on-site promotion. However, 
by 1993, consumer advocacy pressure had reached the stage where 
the Hong Kong Government was actively considering additional 
restrictions on tobacco advertising.
The possibility of a ban on print advertisements represented a 
significant threat to the newspaper industry, since somewhere 
between 5 and 10 per cent of all its advertising revenues came 
from placements by tobacco firms. For many newspapers, this ban 
could be a killer blow, given that it could come on the heels of 
a drastic reduction in China property advertisements (a drop of 
more than 60 percent from its peak in early 1993), and intense 
price competition initiated by a bold newcomer, the Apple Daily.
Mr. Leung could not recall exactly when or how he first became 
aware of a possible ban on tobacco advertising in newspapers. 
This had been a critical concern for a long time. When the 
government banned tobacco advertising on television, he became 
worried that it would only be a matter of time before the ban 
would be extended to newspapers.
Several years ago, Mr. Leung had asked his accountants to work 
out the expected impact on Leading Paper's financial position if
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there was no advertising revenue from the tobacco industry. The 
results were more negative than he had imagined. This together 
with his own smoking habit and a strong belief in a free market, 
where the consumer was left to decide what to buy or not buy, 
motivated Mr. Leung to actively lobby any proposal to ban tobacco 
advertising in newspapers.
Mr. Ho had spent quite a bit of time gauging the sentiments of 
other business leaders in the industry. Some seemed indifferent 
to this threat, but many supported Mr. Leung's stance and 
encouraged him to talk to the relevant government officials. He 
initially attempted to persuade the officials to accept his point 
of view, but this effort was unsuccessful. Mr. Leung came to the 
conclusion that some restrictions on tobacco advertising in the 
print media were inevitable.
However, he believed that he could influence the nature of these 
restrictions as well as the timeframe for implementation. In 
this regard, he directed his management lieutenants to initiate 
a polite dialogue with the leaders of the major anti-tobacco 
consumer groups. Meanwhile, he continued to lobby senior civil 
servants and legislators. He argued that restrictions on tobacco 
advertising would hurt newspaper industry profits and force some 
firms to cease operations. Industry consolidation would not only 
raise unemployment, but also hinder the publication of 
alternative viewpoints, and thus impair the freedom of the press.
The CEO also recalled a talk with his brother, who lives in 
Canada. The brother had mentioned that Canada had gone through 
the same step-wise process of shutting down tobacco and alcohol 
advertising. The details of this process proved enlightening to 
the chief executive. They prompted him to reformulate his 
business strategy and were helpful in persuading the Hong Kong 
government to follow a gradual approach in restricting tobacco 
advertising in the print media.
On this issue, which involved the political/legal sector of the
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environment, Mr. Leung had acted primarily as a disturbance 
handler and secondarily as a negotiator. Issue-relevant 
information was acquired from the following sources 
subordinates, government officials, customers, and family 
(brother) .
Issue 11 - Retail price war
Newspaper firms obtain nearly all of their revenue from two 
sources: the sales of newspaper copies (circulation) or
advertising. Most newspapers rely on both sources of income, and 
there is commonly a dynamic tension between them. Reducing the 
selling price of a paper will tend to increase the circulation 
volume but decrease the total amount of revenue from circulation.
Although more copies are sold, this will not normally compensate 
for the loss resulting from the lower profit per copy. Price 
elasticities in the newspaper industry tend to be rather small. 
However, an increase in circulation will tend to raise 
advertising revenue, because a given advertisement will be seen 
by more people if the newspaper is more widely distributed. 
Conversely, an increase in selling price will tend to decrease 
both circulation numbers and advertising revenues, but increase 
the revenue from retail sales of newspapers.
In pre-handover Hong Kong, co-operation was often as important 
as competition within the Chinese language newspaper industry. 
The Newspaper Society of Hong Kong (NSHK) acted as a medium 
whereby representatives from every company met annually to 
discuss pricing policy. As a result, a nearly-uniform pricing 
policy had been maintained for over twenty years. For example, 
the price of all but one of the Chinese language newspapers rose 
from four to five Hong Kong dollars in October 1994 .
This uniformity was rudely disturbed in June 1995. At that time, 
the Apple Daily entered the newspaper industry and widely 
circulated coupons that enabled the purchase of its new product 
at two Hong Kong dollars. This was less than half the price of
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all the existing Chinese language newspapers in Hong Kong. Such 
an entry strategy prompted a newspaper price war.
As an immediate action to counter its aggressive new rival, 
several newspapers announced reader competitions with various 
types of attractive prizes. A few also made product 
modifications so as to more closely resemble the style and 
content of Apple Daily. However, one strong rival to LP moved 
quickly to acquire additional printing facilities and to 
accumulate a huge amount of newsprint. Once its facilities were 
ready, it responded by cutting its price to HK$ 2.
Mr. Leung became aware of this market shock from multiple 
sources. It was publicized by the mass media, including his own 
newspaper. Meanwhile, a steady stream of phone calls from 
industry associates and news reporters both provided information 
and posed questions about a competitive response. The management 
of Leading Paper had to decide whether its price would also be 
reduced to the HK$ 2 range. Alternatively, it could stay out of 
the price war and concentrate on improving content quality.
Mr. Leung had consulted other members of the his management team 
and his peers from other newspapers on this issue. They were 
divided with respect to which course of action should be pursued. 
However, intelligence gathered from industry associates indicated 
that his firm was in a comparatively favourable financial 
position. The chosen strategic response was based largely on an 
assumption that many of the less financially-endowed mass market 
players could not afford to cut their prices. It was also 
influenced by the results of a quick-and-dirty market survey.
By December 1995, the Leading Paper had used a series of 
promotional programs and discount pricing to boost its 
circulation to new record levels. It was again among the market 
leaders, even though its monthly revenue had declined by about 
HK $3 million from November 1995 to January 1996. Most of the 
major existing papers lost readers and/or revenue during the
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first six months after the launch of the Apple Daily. 
Nevertheless, by the spring of 1996, the industry leaders had 
re-established a nearly-uniforra pricing structure, with most of 
the surviving newspapers selling in the four to six dollar range. 
Leading Paper was among them.
On this issue, which involved the competitive sector of the 
environment, Mr. Leung had acted in the role of disturbance 
handler. He had acquired key information about the issue from 
the mass media, business associates, and customers.
Both the potential ban on tobacco advertising and the retail 
price war threatened the business performance of the Leading 
Paper. While Mr. Leung became aware of these issues through 
various sources, his strategic responses were based largely on 
consultations with business associates. As the CEO of an 
industry leader, he not only had privileged access to critical 
data and the informed opinions of key insiders, but also the 
available resources to make an effective response.
6.5.2__Apply Daily
The Apply Daily was launched on 20 June 1995. It was the 
brainchild of Mr. Jimmy Lai, a maverick businessman who made his 
fortune selling casual clothing like t-shirts, socks and jeans. 
Jimmy Lai was born in Guangzhou (Canton) just as the Communists 
took control of mainland China. He fled to Hong Kong in 1961. 
After working in the garment industry and setting up a sweater 
manufacturing firm that was unsuccessful, he established Giordano 
Holdings. This mass market chain of retail clothing stores 
became very successful in Hong Kong and subsequently expanded 
across much of East and Southeast Asia.
In the spring of 1989, Mr. Lai donated the proceeds from the sale 
of t-shirts with pro-democracy slogans to the students who were 
leading the anti-government protests in and around Tiananmen 
Square in Beijing. Shortly after the Tiananmen massacre, he 
started up Next, a weekly newsmagazine with a strong anti-
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Communist editorial policy. In one of its first issues, Lai 
personally insulted the Chinese Premier of the day, Li Peng.
Based upon the success of his Next newsmagazine, Lai invested 
several billion Hong Kong dollars (estimated at US$250-500 
million) of his own money to enter the already-fragmented Chinese 
language newspaper market in Hong Kong. The resulting Apple 
Daily was independent of the Next Media Group that Mr. Lai also 
controls. Closely following the formula used by USA Today, it 
has tried to appeal to a comparatively young and liberal audience 
that has little time to read traditional newspapers.
Apple Daily included many experienced newspaper people, and its 
CEO, Mr. Ho, had spent much of his working life in the mass media 
field before being recruited by this upstart. Mr. Ho claimed 
that the local industry had changed a lot in recent years, 
because “most newspapers (now) try to flatter the Chinese 
government; they do not want problems after 1997". He produced 
three different editorials that characterized Hong Kong's 
handover in remarkably similar terms - of a wayward son returning 
to the bosom of the motherland.
The Apple Daily aimed to create a market niche by providing a 
different point of view with its reporting and analysis of events 
in Hong Kong and China. The success of Next Magazine and some 
market research indicated that there was an opportunity to 
capitalise on the pre-1997 uncertainty among Hong Kong people, 
and their growing eagerness for reliable information.
Apple Daily launched an intensive pre-launch publicity campaign 
in other media outlets in order to create a high degree of 
recognition in the marketplace. An often-aired television 
commercial featured Jimmy Lai surrounded by masked men firing 
arrows at him. Apples and t-shirts with the Apple Daily logo 
were also given away to create consumer awareness and induce 
product trial. This advertising and promotion campaign ensured 
that the Hong Kong public was very familiar with the new
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entrant's slogan "An Apple a day keeps the lies away".
Meanwhile, a discounted price of HK$ 2 (with a coupon) for an
introductory period was offered in order to directly attack the 
well-established industry cartel price of HK$ 5. As indicated 
previously, this tactic sparked a bitter price war in the 
industry.
On its first day of publication, readers snapped up the entire
print run of the Apple Daily -more than 220,000 copies. It
grabbed a 15 per cent share of the Chinese language newspaper 
market in Hong Kong during its first two months of operation and 
its circulation surged past the 300,000 mark within six months 
of its launch. After one year in business, the Apple Daily was 
generating consistent profits. Its daily sales of more than
250,000 copies placed it second among Chinese language newspapers 
in Hong Kong, hot on the heels of the Oriental Daily News (Survey 
Research Hong Kong, 1997).
Issue 12 - Freedom of the press
Both of the key informants in the industry indicated that many 
of the Chinese language newspapers in Hong Kong were not in 
competition for circulation or advertising revenue. The 
researcher also contacted a representative from a third newspaper 
who stated that its mission was the scholarly criticism of 
government. He further asserted that his company had maintained 
this mission for nearly 60 years. Profit making was identified 
as a means toward the end in this case. Several other senior 
managers in the industry also claimed that their newspapers were 
"ethical products" rather than "commercial products".
As a result, the editors in most Chinese language newspaper firms 
had a considerable amount of organisational power. Their scope 
of authority and influence included corporate policy, business 
direction, and information systems strategy. The strategic 
objectives cited by the newspaper chief executives who were 
interviewed mirrored their paper's editorial objectives or 
appeared to be shaped by them. They cited objectives such as "to
200
educate readers", "to criticise the Government" (both the 
colonial British administration in Hong Kong and the national 
government of the PRC in Beijing) and "to express reader 
opinions". It was also acknowledged that several Chinese 
language newspapers in Hong Kong took an editorial stance that 
favoured the national government in Beijing.
Several of these pro-Beijing newspapers were in fact supported 
by the PRC government, with much of their advertising coming from 
mainland Chinese enterprises. This may be considered an indirect 
form of patronage from Beijing. These papers had a secure 
advertising income and, as a result, they were not in competition 
with the other Hong Kong newspapers for advertising revenue. Nor 
were they in competition for circulation. Starting in late 1995, 
most of the Chinese language newspapers in Hong Kong participated 
in a price war. However, the pro-Beijing newspapers did not cut 
their prices and, perhaps surprisingly, their sales were not 
affected significantly by the price war between other newspapers. 
Remarkably, the Hong Kong newspaper market had lacked a strong 
anti-Beijing voice in the early 1990s.
The establishment and rapid success of the Apple Daily filled 
this gap. It also enabled Mr. Jimmy Lai to promote his strong 
anti-Communist stance which had already made him a well-known 
local personality. The early issues of the Apple Daily 
criticised the attitude of the PRC government towards Hong Kong 
on issues such as Chris Patten's political reforms and proposed 
changes in the post-handover sedition laws. However, it also 
offered a sufficient degree of exclusive news and quality 
editorials to tempt hundreds of thousands of readers away from 
other newspapers in Hong Kong.
The Apple Daily had openly accused its competitors of self­
censorship on events and issues that could be considered 
sensitive by the mainland Chinese government. Meanwhile, it had 
vowed to report the truth and stand up for the rights and 
freedoms of Hong Kong people. Given this context, it is not
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surprising that the freedom of the press was the strategic issue
for the Apple Daily--the CEO claimed that "we can't survive
without it".
Mr. Ho admitted that he had developed “a good understanding" of 
this issue by reading reference books about its historical 
development and more recent ebbs and flows. He had been 
monitoring overseas developments related to the freedom of the 
press and talked to other newspaper executives around the world 
since stepping into this top management position. He was also 
obviously proud to mention that the Apple Daily was itself a 
constant source of information about this issue and a benchmark 
for its future status in Hong Kong.
Mr. Ho had acted in the role of disturbance handler on this 
strategic issue that involved the political/legal sector of the 
environment. He had acquired key information about the issue 
from the following types of sources - mass media, internal 
documents, and business associates.
Issue 13 - Technology leadership
Many of the people interviewed said that the newspaper industry- 
in Hong Kong was scholar-led. Editors tended to be very well- 
educated and had a very high social status. They tended to see 
themselves as continuing a Chinese scholarly tradition and 
inheriting the prestige that scholars had in the time of the 
Chinese Empire. Many of their editorial staff also considered 
themselves to be artists following in the great Chinese tradition 
of calligraphy. This resulted in very formal writing styles and 
considerable resistance to the introduction of Chinese word 
processors. Many Hong Kong journalists continued to handwrite 
their articles, which were then entered into the computerised 
system by typists or typesetters.
In contrast, the Apple Daily aimed to be at the forefront of 
newspaper industry technology. The external environment had been 
thoroughly scanned in order to identify leading-edge tools and
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techniques. As a result, Mr. Ho proudly claimed that the Apple 
Daily was the only newspaper in Hong Kong (with the possible 
exception of the English-language South China Morning Post) that 
had applied IT to all four core newspaper processes: production, 
editorial, distribution, and sales.
On-screen layout and computerised colour separation now 
represented the cutting edge for the copy/plate/print production 
process while on-line data bases provided an important new source 
of editorial support. AD had also begun to publish a version of 
its product on the Internet. This form of distribution saved 
time and greatly reduced (or even eliminated) the consumption of 
ink and paper. Finally, tele-ad sales (telephoning in a 
classified advertisement) were being supplemented by the 
electronic submission of artwork for display advertisements. The 
widespread application of IT enabled the newspaper to be created 
quickly and also resulted in a highly-differentiated product.
In sharp contrast to the stodgy pro-Beijing mouthpieces in Hong 
Kong, the Apple Daily featured colourful, lifestyle-oriented 
reporting. The paper provided timely news items that were 
tightly edited and concisely written in colloquial language. Big 
headlines, full colour photos, and innovative graphic designs 
created an unmistakable resemblance to USA Today.
Despite its improvements on the traditional production cycle 
times, the CEO expressed concern about the emerging 
commercialisation of the Internet, and the potential competition 
from new forms of electronic media. He stated that "the Internet 
was no longer just a technological tool used by you academics, 
but it is quickly changing Hong Kong business and society." His 
opinion was based on personal observations, the opinions of 
trusted associates and information from other mass media sources.
Mr. Ho had acted in the role of entrepreneur on this strategic 
issue, which involved primarily the competitive sector and 
secondarily the technological sector of the environment.
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Information about the issue had been acquired from business 
associates, technology vendors, the mass media, and trade 
publications.
As a brash newcomer to the local newspaper industry, it was clear 
that the Apple Daily was determined to distinguish itself in 
terms of two major characteristics - its anti-Beijing editorial 
policy and modern product appearance. The viability of such a 
differentiation strategy had been established by acquiring 
information from an interesting combination of sources. Local 
industry and political insiders had indicated that its proposed 
editorial stance would be tolerated before and after the 
handover. Meanwhile, it had sought out overseas experts, and 
particularly people connected to USA Today, in order to develop 
a technological leadership position in the local market.
6.6 Higher Education
6.6.1 The University of Hong Kong
The University of Hong Kong (HKU) is one of the oldest 
universities in the dependent territories of the British 
Commonwealth, and by far the oldest tertiary education 
institution in Hong Kong. From modest beginnings, it had grown 
to embrace almost all the major teaching and research disciplines 
and could realistically claim to be among the premier 
universities in the Asia-Pacific region.
The university had drawn on the cultural traditions of both China 
and the West, and according to its mission, had always strived 
"to offer the highest standards of teaching, research, and 
scholarship as practised in the wider, international academic 
community". Before the outbreak of the Second World War, which 
temporarily arrested its steady progress, the university had four 
Faculties - Arts, Engineering, Medicine, and Science. Since the 
end of the War, it had expanded its student intake totals, 
teaching staff numbers, and scope of intellectual activity.
By 1996, the University had a student population of about 14,000,
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including nearly 5,000 postgraduates. They were registered in 
nine Faculties - Architecture, Arts, Dentistry, Education, 
Engineering, Law, Medicine, Science, and Social Sciences. Under 
the terms of their contracts, each of the nearly 900 teaching 
staff was expected to contribute to scholarship by undertaking 
research as well as fulfil their student-related duties. More 
than 1,400 research projects with an overall budget of nearly HK 
$400 million were conducted in the University during 1995-1996. 
Academic staff were involved in a further 700 identifiable 
projects that did not receive dedicated funding support.
The University had developed many linkage agreements and 
collaborative projects with leading universities around the 
world, and was a member of Universitas 21, a loosely-coupled 
network that includes many of the world's major research-based 
universities.
The Vice-Chancellor, Professor Cheng was born and raised in Hong 
Kong, but went to North America to receive his university 
education in engineering. He worked overseas for a few years 
before returning to Hong Kong to take up an associate deanship. 
He had served as the President of another university in Hong Kong 
for about five years before taking up his present position.
Issue 14 - International reputation and linkages
Professor Cheng stated that as 1997 approached, a lot of people 
overseas had asked "whether we can keep doing what we are doing." 
They had expressed specific concerns about the ability to 
maintain academic freedom and attractive academic compensation 
levels in post-handover Hong Kong, because professors in mainland 
China faced research restrictions and received much lower 
salaries.
The core issue seemed to be whether HKU would be able to retain 
(let alone enhance) its standing in the international academic 
community. Professor Wang, the previous Vice-Chancellor, had 
sought to assure those concerned that little would change at the
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university. Professor Chang was sustaining this theme and 
highlighting the facts that HKU would continue to teach in 
English, would still seek out the best faculty from all over the 
world, and had plans to enhance both its research activities and 
international linkages. Significantly, it would continue to be 
an active partner in the world-wide Universitas 21 association.
The Vice-Chancellor claimed that at least one major change was 
imperative - far more multi-lingual and multi-cultural graduates 
were essential for Hong Kong's externally-oriented, service-based 
economy. He had personally observed the benefits that these 
graduates provided to Australia and Singapore, and had also read 
studies from those and other countries. The UGC institutions had 
started to provide developmental English courses for their 
students, but he did not feel that the issue of being comfortable 
in both Eastern and Western cultures had been addressed in an 
adequate manner.
Professor Cheng felt that higher education in Hong Kong would 
benefit from taking on a more international focus, and becoming 
a regional centre for higher education. In particular, he hoped 
that the limit on non-Hong Kong undergraduate students could be 
relaxed at his university. As a result, he had initiated several 
discussions on this particular issue, with the UGC, with Hong 
Kong Government policy makers, and even with officials from the 
Ministry of Education in mainland China. He admitted that these 
discussions had not altered his fundamental view nor achieved a 
breakthrough to date, but they had significantly enhanced his 
understanding of this multi-faceted issue.
He knew that recruiting very good students from mainland China 
and other countries would require additional funds, probably from 
the Hong Kong taxpayer, but that it would provide substantial 
benefits. In the short-term, such recruitment would help to 
internationalize Hong Kong students. He further reasoned that 
some students would remain in Hong Kong, and add to the skilled 
labour pool. Meanwhile, those returning to their own countries
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would be likely to maintain links with Hong Kong, thereby 
providing mutual benefits. He had asked his assistants (internal 
staff) to gather evidence about the costs and benefits of foreign 
students in order to help support (or refute) his contentions.
The Vice-Chancellor had acted primarily in the role of 
disturbance handler and secondarily in the role of negotiator on 
this issue. He had acquired information about aspects of the 
issue from published articles, regulators, government officials, 
business associates, and his own subordinates. Although this was 
primarily a competitive issue, it also involved the 
political/legal sector of the environment.
Issue 15 - Riding the wave of information technology
During the past decade, a variety of IT-mediated learning 
environments had emerged, including stand-alone computer-assisted 
instruction applications, networked information resources, 
teleconferencing and videoconferencing, and assorted means of 
distance learning. Internet-based applications, such as e-mail, 
gophers and WWW servers, had been widely adopted by universities 
in Hong Kong. These applications had expanded the range of 
possibilities in communication, collaboration, and information 
delivery. The rapid pace of technological development and the 
emergence of the information age presented opportunities, 
challenges and threats to universities in Hong Kong.
Professor Cheng identified this as a strategic issue, but added 
that the aims of higher education were quite universal and 
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Based on his own 
experimentation with different IT applications, he agreed with 
a recent article that while technology could alter the essence 
of the university as a social institution and quicken its pace 
of discovery and invention, the electronic environment would not 
replace the physical and human elements.
Nevertheless, he also concurred with the dominant view expressed 
in a recent "Future of Universities" forum - that international
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virtual campuses would enable students to have on-line access to 
the best teachers and scholars anywhere in the world. Those 
virtual campuses had already appeared, at least in embryonic 
form. It was widely agreed that their numbers would explode 
during the coming decade. While virtual universities might 
supplement or even replace existing institutions, the full range 
of long-term implications was far from clear.
From his discussions with academic colleagues both in Hong Kong 
and overseas, Professor Cheng was aware that quality assurance 
was a key issue with the part-time programmes and short courses 
offered by non-traditional means. Where these were provided by 
respected and established higher education institutions, there 
can be a good level of assurance for potential students. 
However, some of these programmes in Hong Kong were offered by 
overseas institutions with uncertain or dubious reputations. The 
problems posed by "virtual campuses" established on an 
international scale were likely to be even greater.
Based upon discussions with other university leaders, he believed 
that IT could be both an opportunity and a threat for higher 
education institutions in Hong Kong. The world-class 
telecommunications infrastructure would be helpful as local 
universities developed on-line courses and academic interactions, 
enabling access beyond the boundaries of a physical campus and 
even the borders of Hong Kong. He mentioned that the Hong Kong 
Academic and Research Network (HARNET) was being improved all the 
time while the technological support for libraries and computer 
centres was substantial. This would enable Hong Kong to open up 
its universities for students and institutions across China. 
Despite some concerns about the impact on local students, he 
perceived that there would be positive spin-offs.
By reviewing internal documents and talking informally to 
hundreds of students over the years, Professor Cheng was also 
aware that Hong Kong, like other developed societies, was moving 
away from the traditional model of education. People no longer
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completed their studies before devoting themselves solely to 
work. Initiatives such as IT-enabled distance learning offered 
“a way of meeting the need for more flexibility, by allowing 
people to dip in and out of education and periodically updating 
their knowledge". HKU was moving in this direction, but he felt 
that it should “do much more, and do it much more quickly".
Nevertheless, Professor Cheng expressed his personal concerns 
about another aspect of this issue - whether a university in Hong 
Kong could compete successfully against the richest, best- 
established and most famous educational institutions in the 
world. He believed that it could if it invested its resources 
in selective areas of excellence. The danger was that Hong Kong 
universities could become side-lined as overseas schools 
harnessed the technological advances before they did, and created 
sustainable first-mover advantages. Since several universities 
in the U.S. and Canada were well-advanced in this area, he had 
sought to learn from the North American experience.
There was little doubt in his mind that IT was already changing 
how many academics work. A new generation of faculty were coming 
into academic positions with little or no secretarial assistance. 
They used their own PCs to prepare teaching materials, 
conference presentations, grant proposals, manuscripts, and other 
documents. Meanwhile, the experiences of overseas universities 
indicated that IT could be used to revamp cost structures and 
gain efficiencies, without sacrificing educational quality.
The HKU campus was already routinely using IT in many 
administrative areas. Its Vice-Chancellor stated that leveraging 
expensive faculty time in both teaching and research was the 
natural next step. He hoped that IT applications would improve 
productivity and achieve cost savings. The results of several 
reported studies and some research that he had commissioned were 
inconclusive. However, he thought that many IT applications were 
now starting to benefits the university. "I don't have the hard 
numbers but I think IT is helping to increase productivity and
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reduce operating costs." He cited improvements in areas like 
data management, personnel files, course schedules, library 
catalogues, budgets and accounts receivable, student transcripts, 
and admissions information. We went on to discuss the IT 
productivity paradox at some length.
The electronic storage of, and networked access to, library- 
resources was another area where his university had already "done 
quite a bit", but much more could be achieved. The Internet 
offered the possibility of an alternative to traditional academic 
publishing, through the development of electronic journals and 
mailing lists. Some of these were already available. However, 
given the difficulties of verifying the authenticity and 
originality of such publications, and of finding and citing them, 
he felt that their status remained uncertain.
He realized that the omnipresence of technology would require new 
models for institutional policies and practices. For example, 
staff evaluation and reward systems would have to be changed. 
He knew that some U.S. schools had overhauled their guidelines 
for peer review and evaluation of teaching, scholarship, and 
services that utilise information technology.
Professor Cheng concluded that this was a complex and on-going 
issue, but he was determined that his university would "ride the 
wave of information technology rather than be swept under by it" . 
He mentioned that he would continue to monitor both the popular 
media and scholarly journals while taking advantage of any 
interactions with industry associates to keep learning more about 
its different facets.
This issue involved the competitive and technological sectors of 
the environment. The informant acted primarily in the role of 
entrepreneur and secondarily in the role of disturbance handler. 
Information about the issue had been acquired from no less than 
six different sources - published articles, business associates, 
customers, electronic services, internal documents, and the mass
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media.
Issue 16 - Recruiting and retaining staff
Despite the growing role of IT, talented and motivated people 
remained the key to success in higher education. The Vice- 
Chancellor seemed to acknowledge this when he mentioned how 
important it was to "find and keep the best possible people. 
Experienced people are in short supply". Rapid economic 
development as well as large-scale emigration had put a lot of 
pressure on the supply of human resources in Hong Kong. Despite 
some returnees (former residents coming back to Hong Kong) and 
the increasing numbers of locally-produced graduates, there had 
been a significant net loss of skilled personnel from Hong Kong 
in recent times. This had implications for academic as well as 
for administrative and support staff.
Professor Cheng stated that "since we depend on the best and the 
brightest, we are particularly hurt. Unlike the private sector, 
we have little flexibility to promote people at a faster rate or 
to offer a higher salary." On the academic side, the plan had 
been to recruit world-class researchers. It would be important 
to rejuvenate the faculty by hiring "the best new professors from 
schools in the United States, Australia, Canada and elsewhere". 
This clearly hinged on Hong Kong continuing to be perceived as 
an attractive locale for university teaching and research.
The Vice-Chancellor noted that "seasoned lecturers" had provided 
a distinct advantage by sharing their wealth of experience and 
expertise. Unfortunately, he believed that energetic efforts and 
new initiatives were often dissuaded because many faculty had an 
iron rice bowl (tenured or superannuated terms of employment) . 
As a result, he was eager to institutionalize what he termed a 
Nike approach: “don't wait, just do it."
The recruitment of administrative officers, research assistants 
and part-time lecturers was becoming "a big headache for all of 
us". Professor Cheng had monitored the emergence of this problem
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through the mass media and through the reports of his own 
subordinates. In response, HKU was stepping up its recruitment 
efforts and committing additional resources to training and 
development. Meanwhile, the Vice-Chancellor was continuing to 
maintain dialogues with both the Labour Department and the 
Institute of Human Resource Management in order to examine other 
steps that could be taken. As the time of this case study, the 
staff shortage persisted and the stop-gap measures undertaken by 
local employers, including HKU, seemed to be inadequate.
This strategic issue involved the economic sector of the 
environment and had the Vice-Chancellor acting in the role of 
disturbance handler. He had acquired key information about the 
issue from the mass media and consultants. Moreover, in contrast 
to the printing and securities CEOs, he had relied upon 
information from his subordinates for a second strategic issue.
While the handover was not perceived to be a strategic concern 
for HKU, two of the issues identified by the Vice-Chancellor were 
related to it. He and his management team spent a lot of time 
and effort to understand and address the concerns of overseas 
associates with respect to the impending change of sovereignty. 
They also had to deal with the issue of recruiting and retaining 
staff who were aggravated by concerns of the local work force 
about the post-handover situation.
6.6.2 New University
New University (NewU) was established as a polytechnic, but it 
had rapidly taken on the role and responsibilities of a full- 
fledged university. It had formally received university status 
and title from the Hong Kong Government in 1994 . Its vision is 
to be widely recognised as a leading university in the region.
By 1997, NewU was offering over 70 taught courses ranging from 
diploma to master's degree levels and various research degree 
programmes up to the doctorate level. The student population had 
grown to nearly 17,000 studying in four degree-level faculties
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and a sub-degree college. In addition, a school of professional 
and continuing education organised trade, professional or target- 
specific custom programmes, as well as self-financed University 
award-bearing courses.
NewU had progressively improved its research ethos, with faculty 
members undertaking more and more studies of both a basic and 
applied nature. NewU had established a number of subject- 
specific research centres while encouraging staff to undertake 
both contracted studies and consultancy projects. By 1996, NewU 
had become an academic leader within Hong Kong in areas such as 
business finance, electronic engineering and mathematics. It 
also benefitted from a purpose-built campus that featured modern 
learning and research facilities with generous technology 
support.
Professor Tang, the NewU president and CEO, was born and raised 
in Greater China, but received his graduate degree in the United 
States . He had worked as a professor and dean in the engineering 
and/or science faculties of universities in the Canada, U.S. and 
Hong Kong before accepting his present appointment.
Issue 17 - Transition from a teaching to a research focus
New University had made impressive progress in selected learning 
and research areas both before and after receiving its official 
university status. However, it found it difficult to shed its 
polytechnic heritage. Many staff had been with the organisation 
for five years or more. They were good teachers and had helped 
to administer various programs effectively, from the higher 
diploma to the doctorate degree level. However, few of them had 
formal training or much experience in academic research. 
Moreover, many were unenthusiastic about doing research.
Meanwhile, the University Grants Committee (UGC) in Hong Kong had 
indicated that a growing share of the funding would be based on 
research performance. The president indicated that "this puts 
us at a disadvantage in at least two ways. First of all, we
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don't have the research momentum of a HKU or a CU (Chinese 
University). Secondly, our mission forces us to focus on applied 
topics that some traditional scholars consider less valuable or 
appropriate for a university. Top journals in many disciplines 
simply do not publish applied research. I fear that we will not 
receive full credit for our performance from those judging us."
NewU had to compete for the best researchers from around the 
world and the best students from not just Hong Kong, but 
increasingly from China and the Anglo countries. With the rapid 
expansion of overall university student numbers in Hong Kong, 
there were larger numbers of mediocre applicants being accepted. 
NewU was getting a significant share of these poorer students.
At the same time, it sought to recruit good researchers that 
might not be as good at teaching or as motivated in the classroom 
as its existing staff. Professor Tang stated that "although the 
official university name was long overdue and will help us, we 
do lose some of our basis for differentiation. Our current image 
is a weakness. All in all, it is not an ideal situation, but I 
am excited about the challenge."
The four new universities in Hong Kong, with the possible 
exception of (what he called) "the Rolls Royce in Sai Rung" (the 
well-resourced University of Science and Technology) considered 
themselves to be in similar predicaments. They were fighting an 
uphill battle for a finite amount of resources against the two 
older and more established universities. The President stated 
that he "tried to maintain a regular dialogue with the UGC" and 
also spent a lot of time reading their written reports and 
pronouncements. This was necessary so that he could lobby for 
fairness towards the institution.
He and the leaders of the other less-established universities in 
Hong Kong "certainly talked to each other quite a bit ... often 
get(ting) together for lunch to discuss how we can advance our 
mutual interests." For example, many traditional funding
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agencies were reluctant to fund applied research. They believed 
that such money should come from industry. He also talked 
regularly to a good friend who was a vice-president of the new 
Ryerson University in Toronto. Ryerson was also a polytechnic 
until very recently. He said that "Although the university 
system in Canada is quite different from ours, it is good to 
share information and empathise with each other."
This issue involved primarily the competitive sector and 
secondarily the political/legal sector of the environment. The 
President acquired information from regulators, competitors and 
subordinates while acting in the roles of negotiator and 
disturbance handler.
Issue 18 - Implementing a strategic planning process
In the past, a lot of the decisions and actions in NewU had been 
imposed in a top-down manner. Teaching staff had rarely 
coordinated or integrated their plans. However, the President 
felt that NewU had grown to the point where it had to do things 
more formally and based on a common purpose. "Part of this is 
being accountable and delivering value for money, but another 
part is preparing ourselves to be a successful player in a more 
competitive environment ... we have to acknowledge our strengths 
and weaknesses and then move forward in a coordinated manner".
NewU had recently made a decision to move away from triennial 
planning (based on UGC funding periods) to more strategic 
planning. Professor Tang began to advocate this idea after a 
visit to the United States. He had subsequently convinced others 
that NewU should implement it. The President also mentioned that 
he had read a number of books on strategic planning. He pulled 
Academic Strategy by George Keller from his bookshelf and said 
that it had been particularly useful. Consequently, he knew that 
strategic planning could not be left to a dedicated group of 
planners. As the chief executive, "I can not say you're in 
charge of planning and I'm going to delegate the fate of the 
organisation to you."
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Professor Tang had held lengthy discussions with his management 
team to ensure that there would be a long-term commitment in 
order for NewU to achieve this change. After them, the 
introduction of strategic planning, consistent with the most 
sophisticated business planning approach conceptualized by Rhyne 
(1985), was announced.
The President claimed that strategic planning provided an 
opportunity for involvement by university staff who truly wished 
to show initiative. They could help shape what the organisation 
would do, and how it would respond to its changing environment. 
He believed that by participating, faculty and staff would refine 
their critical thinking and analysis skills, their writing 
skills, and their powers of persuasion. It would become 
important to convince colleagues that a trend or an issue 
requires a specific action.
Such involvement would also help Professor Tang learn more about 
NewU in a non-threatening way. He admitted that he talked more 
often to people at other universities than those at his own. He 
claimed this reflected his interest in "knowing what others are 
doing to improve their competitive positions". He specifically 
expressed a desire "to engage faculty and staff in grappling with 
external trends and issues that could bring threats and 
opportunities to the organisation" . In higher education, people 
had a general tendency to look inside at what was going on in the 
academy and less frequently include significant external 
influences in their thinking. However, such an introverted 
perspective would now be disastrous.
One aspect of this is the intended development of "areas of 
excellence" within the UGC institutions. These were to be formed 
by building upon perceived strengths to produce groups that would 
be recognised internationally as worthy of substantial investment 
in state-of-the-art facilities. It was hoped that many of these 
groups would focus on areas of direct interest to industry and 
commerce in Hong Kong and the region, and that they would play
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a lead role in teaching as well as research. As a result. New 
U would have to recognize its comparative strengths and 
weaknesses and also understand what the local and regional 
business community was interested in.
This created a critical need to absorb and organize information 
about the external environment, classify and review areas of 
change, and then develop intelligent strategic responses. For 
example, IT and the popularity of distance learning meant that 
almost any university in the world could set up shop in Hong 
Kong. There were already more than 100 MBA programs on offer. 
Professor Tang mentioned that “more and more really good 
universities, like Northwestern, MIT and Toronto, are coming into 
Hong Kong and leveraging their strong international reputations". 
He had been browsing both the English and Chinese language 
newspapers and magazines to find out which new competitors were 
entering the local market and what they were offering. However, 
he mentioned his own limitations in judging developments outside 
the science and engineering field.
There was a need to focus the university's efforts and reduce the 
chance of reacting randomly or committing major resources on 
peripheral areas. The biggest difficulty would be extracting 
value from a chaotic flow of information. The president stated 
that he often perceived the university environment to be just 
like 'white noise'. He stated that environmental scanning 
“should become part of the planning process, ... undertaken 
through a concerted effort”. He remembered reading that a 
university in the U.S. state of Georgia was doing a good job in 
this area, and that a high level of organisational discipline 
seemed to be a key success factor.
This issue involved the competitive sector of the environment. 
The President had acquired information from business associates, 
subordinates, internal documents and academic publications while 
acting in the role of entrepreneur.
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Issue 19 - Improving business processes and management systems
The President also stated that "we teach TQM (total quality 
management) and BPR (business process re-engineering) in our 
business programs, but until recently very few organisations in 
Hong Kong have applied these principles". He had read (or at 
least browsed) books and articles on these principles/concepts 
and was convinced that New U's operations could be improved 
substantially. "I am optimistic about using information 
technology and modern management systems, certainly in the 
classroom, but even more so in the administrative end of things."
He noted that universities in Hong Kong were shifting their focus 
from quantity to efficiency and quality. Rapid expansion tended 
to be a rather inefficient process in terms of value for money, 
and New U had become very bureaucratic as a result of the fast 
growth during the last decade. "When I came here, I was amazed 
at the amount of paperwork." In a more stable situation, tighter 
controls and better resource usage could reduce unit costs while 
some expansion-related tasks would no longer have to be done.
Professor Tang was aware that the UGC would be adopting a new 
financial model for grant assessment and distribution. To this 
same end, it would carry out a series of management reviews in 
each institution under its jurisdiction. He was determined that 
NewU would be a step ahead of the game. This would mean 
“adopting a more systematic approach to management so that 
processes could be documented and improved". He admitted “that 
many (faculty) feel that I am trying to curb their traditional 
autonomy. Some probably think that I am simply grabbing more 
power for myself. However, there is a big difference between 
academic freedom and responsible resource management."
This issue involved primarily the competitive sector and 
secondarily the technological sector of the environment. 
Professor Tang had acquired information from books and articles, 
business associates, internal documents, and regulators while 
acting in the role of entrepreneur. Such a reliance on different
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sources was more evident among university CEOs than the others.
6.7 Mapping the Strategic Issues
The preceding sections have profiled descriptive profiles of both 
the strategic issues faced by the CEOs and their acquisition and 
use of information about the external environment in addressing 
these issues. Further analysis of the case study data was 
enabled by mapping these issues using an approach outlined by 
Miles and Huberman (1984/1994).
Each strategic issue was mapped on three different dimensions 
based upon how it was identified, framed and described by the 
eight CEOs. The three dimensions were: 1) the environmental 
sector(s) relevant to the issue, 2) the decisional role(s) of the 
informant with respect to the issue, and 3) the information 
sources that make the informant aware of the issue and/or 
improved his understanding or interpretation of the issue. This 
mapping of the strategic issues is shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4
Mapping the Strategic Issues
CEO Strategic Issue
Environmental
Sector(s)
Decisional
role
Information
source(s)
Mr.
Li
Responding to 
labour shortage
Economic
(Socio-cultural)
Disturbance
handler
Mass media 
Subordinate 
Internal documents 
Business associates
Reviewing and 
revising the 
product focus
Competitive
(Customer)
Resource
Allocator
Trade event 
Business associates 
Mass media
Assuring quality 
standards (ISO 
9000 certification)
Customer Entrepreneur Customers 
Business associates 
Consultants
Mr.
Chow
Finding (and 
grooming) a 
successor
— Entrepreneur Business associates 
Family and friends 
Customers
Maintaining
competitiveness
Competitive
(Technological)
Disturbance
handler
Mass media 
Business associates
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Mr. Mak Responding to 
the emergence of 
Internet trading
Technological
(Competitive)
Disturbance
handler
(Entrepreneur)
Trade publications 
Electronic services 
Business associates 
Customers (survey)
Promoting 
professionalism 
in the industry
Customer Entrepreneur Business associates 
Regulators 
Subordinates 
Customers
Mr.
Chan
Responding to
growing
competition
Competitive Disturbance
handler
Mass media (local) 
Business associates 
Electronic services 
Internal documents
Considering
computerisation
Technological Entrepreneur Mass media ! 
Business associates 
Friend
Trade publications
Mr.
Leung
Responding to a 
potential ban on 
tobacco 
advertising
Political/Legal Disturbance
handler
(Negotiator)
Subordinates 
Government officials 
Customers 
Family (brother)
Responding to a 
retail price war
Competitive Disturbance
handler
Mass media 
Business associates 
Customers
Mr.
Ho
Preserving 
freedom of the 
press
Political/Legal Disturbance
handler
Mass media 
Internal documents 
Business associates
Ensuring
technology
leadership
Competitive
(Technological)
Entrepreneur Business associates 
Technology vendors 
Mass media 
Trade publications
Prof.
Cheng
Maintaining/ 
enhancing 
reputation and 
linkages
Competitive
(Political/legal)
Disturbance
handler
(Negotiator)
Published articles 
Regulators 
Government officials 
Subordinates 
Business associates
Riding the wave 
of information 
technology
Competitive
(Technological)
Entrepreneur
(Disturbance
handler)
Published articles 
Business associates 
Customers 
Electronic services 
Internal documents 
Mass media
Recruiting and 
retaining staff
Economic Disturbance
handler
Subordinates 
Mass media 
Consultants
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Prof.
Tang
Managing the 
transition from a 
teaching to a 
research focus
Competitive
(Political/legal)
Negotiator
(Disturbance
handler)
Regulators
Competitors
Subordinates
Implementing a 
strategic planning 
process
(Competitive) Entrepreneur Business associates 
Subordinates 
Internal documents 
Books and articles
Improving 
business 
processes and 
management 
systems
Competitive
(Technological)
Entrepreneur Books and articles 
Business associates 
Internal documents 
Regulators
The mapping process for the 19 issues involved some difficult 
choices in terms of assigning them to appropriate environmental 
sectors, decisional roles, and information sources. In 
particular, more than one environmental sector or decisional role 
was considered to be relevant for several of the issues. The 
role of IT accounted for many of these difficulties. For 
example, it was often difficult to distinguish between the 
Entrepreneur and Disturbance Handler roles as well as between the 
Competitive and Technological sectors; a firm could react to a 
foreign Technological development and the globalization of 
competition (Disturbance Handler role), but still gain a 
Competitive edge by becoming a local technology leader 
(Entrepreneur role). As each issue was mapped to different 
sectors and/or roles, the most relevant and hence primary sector 
and/or role was decided by an arbitrator (as outlined in Chapter
4) . The other sector or role was classified as secondary 
(denoted by brackets in Table 6.4).
The mapping of issues onto the different information sources was 
less contentious, although two minor difficulties were 
encountered. First, the mentions of consultants and technology 
vendors could not be accommodated by this scheme, and so a 
twelfth category was created. Second, the descriptions provided 
by two CEOs failed to distinguish clearly between competitors and 
business associates. This led to a couple of arbitrated choices.
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6.8 Environmental Sectors and Decision Roles
All but one of the identified strategic issues was mapped 
successfully onto at least one specific environmental sector and 
one specific decisional role. The exception was the "search for 
a successor"; no environmental sectors were found to be directly 
relevant for this issue. An example may be useful to illustrate 
how the general mapping process was employed. One of the issues 
identified by Mr. Leung, the Leading Paper CEO, was the price war 
that had been sparked by the bold entry of the Apple Daily into 
the local newspaper market. Mr. Leung and his firm had to deal 
with an issue in the role of Disturbance handler, responding to 
changing conditions in the Competitive sector of the environment.
6.8.1 Environmental sectors
The issue descriptions provided by the informants also enabled 
a mapping to relevant environment sectors. Table 6.5 shows the 
number of times that each environmental sector was relevant to 
the identified issues. Boldface type in the table represents 
sectors with a primary relevance to the issue while italics 
denote those having a secondary relevance. For example, the 
customer sector was of primary relevance to two strategic issues, 
and of secondary relevance to a third issue.
Eleven of the nineteen issues involved the Competitive sector of 
the environment. This included eight issues where it was the 
primary sector. Remarkably, a large percentage of these issues 
involved the adoption or upgrading of technology in order to 
maintain or enhance competitiveness. The Technological sector 
was the second relevant sector for five of the eleven issues 
involving the Competitive sector.
Given that the case studies took place with the Hong Kong 
handover on the horizon, it was surprising that only four issues 
could be related to the Political/legal (or regulatory) sector 
of the external environment. Moreover, two of these issues, the 
potential ban on tobacco advertising in newspaper and NewU's 
transition from teaching to research, were not related to the 
impending transfer of political sovereignty.
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Table 6.5
Environmental Sectors
Industry
Sector
Printing Securities Newspapers Universities Total
Customer 1 + 1 1 - - 2 +  1
Competitive 2 + 1 1 + 1 2 3 + 1 8 + 3
Technological 1 2 1 2 2 + 4
Political/legal - - 2 1 + 1 3 + 1 !
Economic 1 . - 1 2
Socio-cultural 1 - - - 1
Unclassified 1 - - 1 2  j
Bold numbers represent the number of issues where a sector was of primary relevance
Ita lic  n u m b e rs  re p re s e n t th e  n u m b e r  o f  issues  w h ere  a  s e c to r w a s  o f  s e c o n d a ry  re le v a n c e
Only the freedom of the press in the newspaper industry and the 
international reputation for the University of Hong Kong could 
be considered as "handover" issues. However, it should be noted 
that the two human resource shortage issues (identified by the 
chief executives of Leading Printer and the University of Hong 
Kong) could also be attributed to the "brain draining" emigration 
from Hong Kong that was associated with post-handover concerns.
Although the socio-cultural sector was not of primary relevance 
for any of the identified issue, the growing preference for 
service sector jobs among the Hong Kong labour force was a 
sociological phenomenon that helped to explain the staffing 
shortages experienced in the printing industry.
6.8.2 Decisional roles
The 19 issues were also mapped onto the four decisional roles 
proposed by Mintzberg (1973) and considered in Chapter 1. The 
distribution of roles for these issues is shown in Table 6.6.
2 2 3
Table 6.6 
Decisional Roles
Industry
Role
Printing Securities Newspapers Universities Total
Entrepreneur 2 2+ 1 1 2 7+ 1
Resource
Allocator
1 - - - 1
Disturbance
Handler
2 2 3 2 + 2 9 + 2
Negotiator - - 1 1 + 1 1 + 2
Bold numbers represents the number of issues where a decisional role was primary
N um bers  in ita lics  rep rese n t th e  n u m b e r o f  is s u e s  w here a de c is io n a l ro le w a s  s e c o n d a ry
Nine of the 19 issues were related primarily or exclusively with 
the Disturbance Handler role. Seven of the issues had a similar 
relationship with the Entrepreneur role. In total, eleven and 
eight of the issues, respectively, involved the Disturbance 
Handler and the Entrepreneur roles. These totals were much 
larger than the number of issues with the Negotiator role (3 
instances) and Resource Allocator role (1 instance) . This 
implies that information about the external environment was used 
mostly to decide about how to react to an external disruption 
(Disturbance Handler) or to decide proactively about "improvement 
projects" (Entrepreneur role), such as introducing a new 
technology, formulating a new marketing approach, or finding a 
successor to help ensure the future success of the organisation.
Significantly, each informant sought out some information about 
the external environment while acting in the role of 
Entrepreneur. Such a strong linkage between environmental 
scanning and this decisional role is predicted by Mintzberg 
(1973, p. 78), who stated that "Entrepreneurial work begins with 
scanning activity, where the manager uses information from 
scanning the environment to identify opportunities or problems,
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and Chen to design and select improvement projects." Each CEO 
regularly scanned for new opportunities. Many also followed the 
application of emerging technologies in other countries while the 
printing and securities CEOs also tended to look into the 
adoption of products that had been developed elsewhere.
Figure 6.1
Decisional Role - Environmental Sector Matrix
^ \ R o l e
Sector
E n t r e p r e n e u r
D is tu rb a n c e
H a n d le r N e g o tia to r
R e s o u rc e
A llo c a to r
Customer
P s p
Competitive
s \
V'N uuuy
V
f?  g\ 
u \y uu
p
Technological
>( a > 
v UU/
P s
Political/legal i
Vn n  y N U
Economic
p
u
Socio-cultural
p
Bold letters indicate primary quadrant of a strategic issue, and
Non-bold letters indicate secondary quadrant of a strategic issue for: 
P * Printing CEO S * Securities CEO
N = Newspaper CEO U * University CEO
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In Figure 6.1, each strategic issue is represented by a letter 
(corresponding to an industry) and mapped onto a matrix formed 
from the four decisional roles and six environmental sectors. 
As a result, each letter relates two aspects of each issue: the 
informant's decisional role and the environmental sector about 
which the information was acquired and/or used. Remarkably, 
issues where the decision maker acted in the Entrepreneur role 
typically involved the Competitive and Technological sectors or 
the environment while the Competitive and Political/legal sectors 
were prominent for Disturbance Handling issues.
6.9 Information Sources
As the informants recalled recent strategic issues, they 
mentioned a wide variety of sources from which they had received 
or sought information. A total of 68 sources of information were 
cited for 19 issues. Table 6.7 lists the frequency with which 
different types of information sources were cited. 
Significantly, at least two sources were used for each and every 
issue. Information from at least four different sources was 
received with ten issues. Complementary information sources were 
commonly used to first become aware, and to later develop a 
better understanding of a particular issue.
Personal and external sources of information were the most 
frequently cited by the informants in these case studies. Forty 
one of the 68 information sources (60 percent) were classified 
as personal while fifty two of them (76 percent of the total) 
were classified as external sources. Four of the six most 
frequently cited sources were external to the organisation while 
four out of the six most cited sources were also personal rather 
than impersonal in nature.
Meanwhile, a classification of the information sources used in 
the strategic issues identified by the CEOs from each of the 
four industries are shown in Tables 6.8 through 6.11.
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Table 6.7
Frequency of Information Source Use
Information Number of Citation Percentage
Source Citations (out of 19 issues)
Business associates 16 84
Mass media 10 53
Trade/industry publications 7 37
Subordinates/employees 7 37
Customers 6 32
Govemment/regulatory officials 5 26
Internal documents 5 26
Consultants/vendors 3 16
Family/friends 3 16
Electronic services 3 16
O th e r  s o u rc e s 3 16
Total 68
Table 6.8
Classification of Information Source Use by Printing CEOs
Printing Internal External
Personal 1 9
Impersonal 1 4
Table 6.9
Information Sources Used by Securities CEOs
Securities Internal External
Personal 2 7
Impersonal 3 5
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Table 6.10
Information Sources Used by Newspaper CEOs
Newspapers Internal External |
Personal 1 7
Impersonal 1* 4*
mass media was cited twice, but one of the citations was to 
the CEO's own newspaper
Table 6.11
Information Sources Used by University CEOs
Universities ] Internal External |
Personal 4 10 :
Impersonal 3 6 1
The overall classification of the 68 information sources is 
shown in Table 6.12.
Table 6.12
Overall Classification of Information Source Use
Internal External
Personal 8 33 41 (60%)
Impersonal 8 19 27 (40%)
16 (24%) 52 (76%) 68
Further analysis of the data revealed that impersonal sources 
were most often used in the early stages of strategic issue 
diagnosis, while personal sources rose in importance as the 
diagnosis proceeded. As shown in Table 6.13, the chief
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executives commonly became aware of a strategic issue through an 
impersonal source of information, such as the mass media, or 
through self-realisation. In contrast, they tended to seek out 
information directly from other people during the subsequent 
interpretation stage of the diagnosis. External sources, such 
as business associates, government/regulatory officials and 
consultants/vendors, were commonly used to gain a better 
understanding of a strategic issue.
Table 6.13
Most Commonly Cited Information Sources for ...
Creating Awareness Improving Understanding
Mass media 6 Business associates 9
Self-realisation 4 Govemment/regulatory officials 4
Business associates 3 Subordinates/employees 4
3 3
In Figure 6.2, strategic issues are again represented by a letter 
corresponding to the industry of the case study: P for printing; 
S for securities; N for newspapers; and U for university. This 
figure maps the issues onto a matrix formed by the various 
environmental sectors and information sources. Consequently, the 
positioning of each letter represents two aspects of an issue: 
the relevant environmental sector and the source from which 
information about the issue was acquired or received.
This mapping shows that issues related to the Competitive sector 
of the environment dominated the strategic agendas of the eight 
Hong Kong Chinese CEOs. Meanwhile, business associates (included 
suppliers, distributors and bankers) and the mass media were the 
most popular sources of information, both overall and for 
Competitive sector-related issues. However, Figure 6.2 suggests 
that the CEOs called upon a fairly wide range of information 
sources as part of their strategic diagnosis activities.
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Figure 6. 2
Environmental Sector - Information Source Matrix
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In Figure 6.3, each strategic issue is once more represented by 
a letter (corresponding to its industry) and mapped onto a matrix 
formed from the various decisional roles and information sources.
Figure 6. 3
Decisional Role - Information Source Matrix
N .  Role
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Consequently, each letter in Figure 6.3 relates two aspects of 
the strategic issue: the decisional role in which the CEO acted 
and the source from which information about the issue was 
acquired or received. There are no easily identifiable clusters 
in the matrix, but the figure does reinforce the prominence of 
the entrepreneur and disturbance handler roles with respect to 
the strategic issues identified in the case studies.
6.10 Perceived Characteristics of Information Source
Each of the chief executives was also asked to produce three 
different "top five" lists of information sources. From a list 
of eleven sources, they were requested to list the top five 
sources in terms of the following:
1) perceived frequency of use;
2) perceived accessibility; and
3) perceived quality of information provided.
Remarkably, the frequency of use rankings produced by the chief 
executives were highly consistent with both the details of the 
identified strategic issues and the rankings made by their 
personal secretaries (PSs). Six of the PSs logged a week's worth 
of their bosses' interactions, including scheduled and 
unscheduled meetings; letters from outside the organisation and 
memos from within it; and incoming telephone calls. As a result, 
their rankings of information source use were informed by these 
week-long logs.
An aggregation of the individual rankings of CEOs and PSs enabled 
a composite ranking (have a greater degree of reliability) to be 
constructed for each of the four industries. This composite 
ranking was complied by assigning 5, 4, 3, 2 or 1 points
depending on their ranking by each CEO and PS. These industry 
rankings for the perceived frequency of use, the perceived 
accessibility, and the perceived quality of the information 
sources are shown in Tables 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16, respectively.
2 3 2
Table 6.14P e r c e iv e d  F r e q u e n c y  o f  U s e  o f Inform ation  S o u r c e s
Printing Securities Newspapers Universities
Business associates 
Customers 
Trade publications 
Mass media 
Family/friends
Mass media 
Internal documents 
Business associates 
Electronic services 
Trade publications
Business associates 
Mass media 
Consultants/vendors 
Subordinates 
Internal documents
Subordinates 
Business associates 
Govt/regulators 
Trade publications 
Internal documents
Table 6.15
Perceived Accessibility of Information Sources
Printinq Securities Newspapers Universities
Mass media Mass media Mass media Mass media
Family/friends Subordinates Subordinates Internal documents
Internal documents Internal documents Internal documents Subordinates
Subordinates Electronic services Business associates Trade publications
Business associates Trade publications Family/friends Electronic services
Table 6.16
Perceived Quality of Information Sources
Printinq Securities Newspapers Universities
Business associates 
Customers 
Trade publications 
Subordinates 
Family/friends
Customers 
Business associates 
Internal documents 
Electronic services 
Govt./requlators
Business associates 
Internal documents 
Mass media 
Customers 
Subordinates
Subordinates 
Business associates 
Govt./regulators 
Trade publications 
Customers
The overall rankings for the perceived frequency of use, 
perceived accessibility, and perceived quality of the information 
sources are shown in Table 6.17.
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Table 6.17O v e ra ll R a n k in g  o f  Inform ation  S o u r c e s
Frequency of Use Accessibility Quality
1. Business associates 1. Mass media 1. Business associates
2. Trade publications 2. Internal documents 2. Customers
3. Mass media 3. Subordinates 3. Trade publication
4. Customers 4. Family/friends 4. Government/regulators
5. Subordinates 5. Trade publications 5. Consultants/vendors
The results of the case studies are largely consistent with those 
from the survey in terms of the relative frequency with which 
CEOs from the securities and printing industries employed 
different types of information sources as well as their rankings 
of the sources in terms of both perceived accessibility and 
perceived quality.
The case studies supplement the survey results by portraying how 
CEOs in four industries acquired and used information as they 
diagnosed strategic issues. It was found that the chief 
executives from each industry (and indeed each organisation) 
faced a unique set of strategic issues despite the common 
phenomenon of an impending political discontinuity in their 
external environment. Nevertheless, the CEOs displayed a common 
tendency to acquire information from impersonal sources as they 
became aware of or identified a strategic issue and then rely 
upon more personal (and primarily external) sources as their 
diagnosis proceeded to the understanding or interpretation stage.
The results from the survey and the cases raise a number of 
issues for discussion. The next chapter considers these issues, 
and puts the overall results into the larger context of knowledge 
within the fields of strategic management, information 
management, and cross-cultural management.
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Chapter 7 
DISCUSSION
The survey results presented in Chapter 5 indicate how Chinese 
chief executives in pre-handover Hong Kong perceived their 
external environment and acquired information about it. 
Significant differences from as well as some similarities with 
the studies reviewed in Chapter 2 were found. The case studies 
in Chapter 6 profile the gathering and use of external 
information by the Hong Kong Chinese chief executives as they 
engaged in strategic issue diagnosis. Taken together, these 
cognitive and behavioural data provide a solid basis for not only 
characterising, but also explaining the meaning behind the 
observed pattern of strategic intelligence in Hong Kong.
This chapter will move towards such an explanation by analysing 
and interpreting the quantitative and qualitative data that was 
presented in the previous two chapters. This analysis and 
interpretation takes the form of a discussion that will be 
underpinned by the cultural and institutional factors that were 
introduced in Chapter 3.
The major aim of this chapter is to advance our understanding of 
the strategic intelligence phenomenon in the Hong Kong Chinese 
business context. This is to be achieved by discussing a number 
of issues that arise from the results of this study. These 
issues will be considered under the following headings: perceived 
uncertainty in the pre-handover environment; the use and 
characteristics of information sources; strategic decision making 
in Hong Kong Chinese businesses; and the relationship between 
environmental scanning and decision-making roles.
This discussion will highlight many of the characteristics that, 
taken together, distinguish strategic information management in 
the Hong Kong Chinese business culture. Finally, the limitations 
of the study are mentioned. These add to the limitations of the 
research design that were considered in Chapter 4.
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7.1 Perceived Uncertainty
The survey results indicated that the CEOs from both the printing 
and securities industries perceived a substantial degree of 
uncertainty in the pre-handover Hong Kong environment. The 
customer and competition sectors of the environment were among 
the most important sources of that uncertainty in both 
industries. The standard deviations on the perceived strategic 
uncertainty (PSU) scores for these two sectors were also 
comparatively low, especially in the securities industry. This 
indicates that the chief executives had a high degree of 
agreement on the perceived importance, complexity and rate of 
change of these sectors.
In contrast, there were significant industry differences in terms 
of the uncertainty posed by the economic and political/legal 
sectors of the environment. These two sectors were a significant 
source of uncertainty for the securities CEOs, but not for those 
from the printing industry. This suggests that the impending 
handover was more important for some industries (and 
organisations) than others.
7.1.1 The handover: Threat, opportunity or non-issue 
From the perspective of chaos theory, businesses in Hong Kong 
are likely to have experienced bounded instability as a result 
of the political handover (see Legge, 1990; Stacey, 1993). It 
undoubtedly created uncertainty and trepidation for those 
potentially affected, but this occurred within the broad scope 
of an orderly system. Many aspects of the handover may have been 
puzzling or troubling, but the fundamental event could be 
analysed and understood.
A smooth transfer of political power in Hong Kong was in the 
interests of nearly all the major stakeholders. Moreover, 
progressively growing similarities between the economic and 
social systems in Hong Kong and on the Chinese mainland follow 
naturally from the convergence hypothesis mentioned in Chapter
3. As a result, the modernisation of China (and perhaps also its
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integration with the international community of nations) may be 
seen as inevitable development that is only subject to variation, 
and perhaps volatility, in the short and medium term.
Nevertheless, the type of environmental change that took place 
in Hong Kong during 1997 is expected to have strategic 
implications that may be interpreted as an opportunity by some 
and a threat by others (Dutton & Jackson, 1987) . As noted in 
Chapter 1, the strategic management literature suggests that 
these labels are rich in meaning and significance. A threat 
represents a negative situation over which decision makers have 
little control and few degrees of freedom in resolving the issue. 
Conversely, an opportunity is a more positive situation, with 
decision makers perceiving that they have both the necessary 
amount of control and resources to resolve the issue.
These distinctive labels are important, because they can 
determine how an issue is framed and what type of action is taken 
in response to an issue (Dutton et al., 1983; Dutton & Jackson, 
1987; Schneider & DeMeyer, 1991). For example, Dutton (1993, p. 
340) suggested that "different interpretations of issues engage 
different individual and collective processes for dealing with 
them".
A major finding of this study was that the ethnic Chinese chief 
executives in Hong Kong did not share a uniform or even common 
perception of the upcoming transfer of sovereignty. They had a 
range of perspectives on the 1997 handover and its implications 
for their organisations. Their responses (both realised and 
intended) to the impending handover also varied greatly.
It is suggested that what you saw may have depended on where you 
stood. One group of Hong Kong Chinese CEOs considered the 
handover to be a business threat, a second group perceived it to 
be a business opportunity, while a third considered it to be an 
insignificant issue for their organisations. The findings from 
this study suggest significant industry-based differences.
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The case studies revealed that some CEOs, most notably those 
heading up newspaper and securities firms, perceived the handover 
as a serious threat to their business prospects. Several noted 
that recent confidence crises had already created labour 
shortages and adversely affected input costs. In an extreme 
case, the Apple Daily CEO suggested that the very survival of his 
firm after 1997 would depend on the incoming administration 
keeping its promise to maintain the current social and economic 
systems in Hong Kong for a further 50 years. In essence, he 
viewed continued freedom of the press as a business imperative. 
A distrust of the Chinese Communists and the national government 
in Beijing by both the owner and CEO of the Apple Daily was a 
primary source of perceived environmental uncertainty for their 
organisation. In this case, the nature of business-government 
relations was identified as the key to the newspaper's prospects 
in post-handover Hong Kong.
A second group of CEOs perceived the handover as a business 
opportunity. Some cited the overnight growth of the domestic 
market by more than a billion people. Others mentioned that it 
would become easier to combine local financial resources and 
professional expertise with the natural and human resources that 
were plentiful north of the border. Quite a few believed that 
the government policies of Hong Kong and mainland China would be 
better coordinated after June 1997, and that this would make it 
easier for them to do business.
Improved cross-border relationships in the pre-handover period 
had already provided benefits to many Hong Kong firms. For 
example, printing firms had been able to relocate their 
operations and take advantage of more plentiful resources in 
mainland China, newspaper firms had been able to expand their 
markets beyond Hong Kong, and securities firms were cultivating 
new business from PRC government-backed “red chip" firms and 
other China-related listings. Many of the interviewed CEOs 
echoed the ideas expressed by Sung (1997), which were noted in 
Chapter 3, in that they expected to benefit from even closer
contact with a large population while avoiding the typical 
downside of such a relationship.
Perhaps most surprisingly, many CEOs did not expect any 
significant change in their business environments as a result of 
the handover. For this group, including many CEOs of printing 
firms, the transfer of Hong Kong sovereignty was a non-issue at 
the strategic level, since their businesses were already 
straddling the border between the territory and mainland China. 
Several mentioned that the reforms attempted by Governor Chris 
Patten notwithstanding, the British were 'lame duck1 
administrators in Hong Kong. They perceived that the PRC 
government was already exerting its control, by forcing the hand 
of the British administration in Hong Kong or declaring its 
intention to rollback and/or ignore several measures introduced 
by the pre-handover government.
In contrast to the dire scenarios for post-handover Hong Kong 
that were common in foreign media reports and several major 
books, the CEOs who were surveyed and/or case studied generally 
expressed their guarded optimism about the future of the Special 
Administration Region. None of them foresaw significant changes 
for the economy or society of Hong Kong, or for their own 
business. Many of these informants mentioned that the successful 
implementation of the “one country, two systems" concept was 
critical to the international credibility of the PRC.
They further noted that China was changing rapidly, and that 
major urban centres were becoming more and more like Hong Kong. 
Significantly, the popularity of this perception supports the 
author's belief that the results of the study reported here may 
be generalisable to Chinese business contexts beyond Hong Kong.
7.1.2 Sectors and layers of the external environment 
More generally, the study of strategic intelligence in Hong Kong 
highlights the industry-specific nature of the external 
environment. As noted in Chapter 2, the external environment has
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been classified as consisting of two layers - an inner task layer 
and outer general layer (Andrews, 1971; Dill, 1958) . Following 
from this, recent environmental scanning studies (such as Auster 
& Choo, 1993; Sawyerr, 1993) have employed a typology whereby the 
remote environmental layer consists invariably of four sectors - 
the political, the economic, the socio-cultural, and the 
technological.
This perspective can be traced back to the PEST model of Andrews 
(1960) and is taught in many (if not most) business schools. It 
implies that neither political, economic, socio-cultural or 
technological events or changes will be directly relevant to 
organisational goal setting and goal achievement (see for example 
Dill, 1958; Hunger & Wheelen, 1997); only customers, competitors, 
and resource suppliers will directly affect the organisation.
A dissenting view stems back at least to Bourgeois (1980) . It 
holds that the division of the sectors between the task and 
remote layers of the environment depends on the particular 
business domain. The evidence from Hong Kong suggests that CEOs 
in different industries can have very different interpretations 
and reactions to an external event such as the political 
handover. This contingency is evident when the securities and 
printing industries are compared.
Conventional securities firms earn commission income by executing 
transactions on behalf of investors. More aggressive firms would 
engage in various investments and speculative activities (e.g. 
futures and warrants) in order to increase the expected rates of 
return. However, these activities were greatly influenced by 
economic and political/legal factors in pre-handover Hong Kong.
First of all, the industry is subject to a high degree of 
regulatory control. The enactment and enforcement of regulations 
by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, the Securities and Futures 
Commission, and different branches of the Hong Kong Government 
may be expected to shape the securities industry. The ability
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to influence regulatory changes or even to receive quality 
information about such changes would provide a securities firm 
with a competitive advantage.
Secondly, although many of the post-1997 arrangements for Hong 
Kong had been finalized at the time of this study, as result of 
Sino-British negotiations, several areas of dispute did remain. 
Continuing arguments between the outgoing and incoming sovereigns 
raised the level of economic (and to a lesser extent, social) 
uncertainty in the territory. The large-scale infrastructure 
projects that were in progress or about to begin in Hong Kong 
created additional worries about inflationary pressures.
These concerns about inflation would have a significant effect 
on investment flows in and out of an open economy like Hong Kong. 
Developments associated with the economic and political/legal 
sectors would thus be likely to strongly and rapidly if not 
directly influence the securities industry. Hence, it would 
seem useful for both management practitioners and researchers to 
consider these two sectors as part of the task environment for 
the securities industry and similar economic sectors.
In contrast, the survey data indicated that the CEOs of printing 
firms were more interested in and concerned about customer issues 
and technological developments than economic and political 
events. The political/legal sector ranked only fifth in terms 
of its PSU value and was the least scanned of the six environment 
sectors. Follow-up interviews with some of these executives 
confirmed their own perceptions that political factors had 
neither a strong nor a direct influence on their business 
prospects. Their interests were on the competitive conditions 
in their industry, and so their focus was on competitive 
intelligence (as the term was defined in Chapter 1).
The political handover of Hong Kong would not represent that 
significant a change for the printing industry, largely because 
it had already transferred much of its operations to mainland
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China. This "business-as-usual" perspective can be contrasted 
with the alarm and even hysteria expressed by the overseas media, 
particularly in the United States, and the serious concerns 
indicated by the CEOs of securities firms in Hong Kong.
The printing firm CEOs were found to be comparatively more 
concerned about modernising their production methods and 
maintaining their competitiveness in an industry that was subject 
to increasing levels of international rivalry. At the time of 
the study, the printing industry in Hong Kong was introducing new 
technologies in order to streamline its operations and meet the 
increasing expectations and requirements of their customers, both 
locally and overseas.
With a tight supply of workers and rising wage rates, many of 
those heading up printing firms were looking at the potential of 
substituting labour with technology by automating key processes. 
The high PSU score for the technological sector resulted from a 
combination of high complexity, rapid change and considerable 
strategic importance, as perceived by the printing firm CEOs. 
As a result, it is appropriate to include the technological 
sector in the task environment for printing firms and those in 
similar industries.
The case studies reinforced the industry- and time-dependent 
nature of the external environment. Political events, including 
the actions of governments or public agencies, were perceived to 
have a substantial influence on both newspaper firms and 
universities. As a result, the chief executives of these 
organisations spent comparatively large amounts of time in 
seeking out information about new initiatives and impending 
changes in public policy. Some of them were lobbying actively 
for changes in these policies. Significantly though, the 
impending discontinuity in government was not a major source of 
perceived uncertainty for the CEOs nor did it appear to inhibit 
or alter their political activities.
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- l- 3 Comparison with the results of previous studies 
A key assumption in this study was that the handover represented 
a unique environmental discontinuity that represented an 
attractive research opportunity. As a result, it was expected 
that the profile of environmental uncertainty perceived by the 
CEOs in pre-handover Hong Kong, and particularly that of the 
political/legal sector, would be a distinctive one. 
Nevertheless, as indicated in Table 7.1, the pattern of results 
for each of the surveyed industries in Hong Kong was similar to 
a previous study.
Table 7.1
Environmental Sector Rankings and Scores on 
Perceived Strategic Uncertainty
United States 
(Daft et al., 
1988)
Canada
(Auster & Choo. 
1993)
Nigeria
(Sawyerr. 1993)
Hong Kong
Securities Printing
1. Customer
2. Economic
3. Competition
4. Technological
5. Politicai/legal 
(regulatory)
6 Socio-cultural
1. Customer
2. Technological
3. Competition
4. Regulatory
5. Economic
6. Socio-culturai
1. Economic
2. Political/legal
3. Suppliers*
4. Customer
5. Competition
6. Socio-cultural
7. Technological
1. Economic
2. Political/legal
3. Customer
4. Competition
5. Technological
6. Socio-cultural
1. Customer
2. Technological
3. Competition
4. Economic
5. Political/legal
6. Socio-cultural
•S a w y e r r  C19931 u s e d  th e  t e n t i  " S o u rc e s  o f  R e s o u rc e s "
The findings from the printing industry in Hong Kong resembled 
those reported by Auster & Choo (1993) for Canadian chief 
executives in the publishing and telecommunications industries'. 
Both data sets revealed that the three environmental sectors with 
the highest perceived strategic uncertainty were, in order, the 1
1 The Canadian study did not report the results by industry
customer, the technological, and the competition sectors. These 
results suggest that market-based competition plays a key role 
in these industries. As a result, information about customer 
needs, relevant technological developments and competitive 
initiatives can be highly beneficial to strategic decision makers 
facing this type of business environment.
Meanwhile, the results from the securities industry resembled 
those reported by Sawyerr (1993) for manufacturing CEOs in 
Nigeria. In both cases, the economic and political/legal sectors 
were perceived to have the highest levels of perceived strategic 
uncertainty. This suggests that the securities industry in Hong 
Kong is subject to a comparatively strong institutional influence 
(in the form of government oversight and regulatory bodies) akin 
to that felt by the manufacturing sector (and other parts of the 
economy) in an underdeveloped economy like Nigeria.
Information about regulatory and economic changes can be highly 
beneficial to strategic decision makers in industries where there 
is such a strong institutional influence. Significantly though, 
even in the pre-handover period, the strategic uncertainty of the 
political/legal sector in Hong Kong (as perceived by the CEOs of 
securities firms) remained substantially lower than that 
perceived in Nigeria (by manufacturing chief executives).
The numeric values of the PSÜ measures were not directly 
comparable to those from Nigeria due to the use of different 
measurement scales2. However, the strategic uncertainty levels 
perceived in Hong Kong were significantly higher than those 
reported in studies conducted in Canada and the United States. 
In particular, the perceived rate of environmental change was 
found to be much higher in Hong Kong than in North America. The 
perceived complexity, which is related to the diversity and total 
number of external events, of the environment in Hong Kong was 
actually lower (but insignificantly different) than that found
2 For example, Sawyerr (1993) employed 7-point Likert scales 
while the other studies used 5-point scales
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in Canada and the U.S., and similar to that found in Nigeria.
Further insights can be drawn by considering the rankings of the 
different sectors within each study, based on their PSU scores, 
as well as the ratios of those PSU scores. The customer and 
economic sectors were consistently ranked near the top by the 
CEOs in all these studies. This implies that despite the 
considerable efforts of market researchers and economists/ 
econometricians, strategic decision makers in many different 
contexts continue to lack quality information about their 
customers and the general economy.
Meanwhile, the socio-cultural sector was the sector with the 
least strategic uncertainty in all the recent environmental 
scanning research that employed comparable methods and measures. 
Its slow perceived rate of change has consistently distinguished 
it from the other sectors in these studies. This provides 
empirical support for the argument made by Hofstede (1980) and 
others, that the societal culture is very stable over time.
7.2 TnfnnMUo n  Source Use
The acquisition of information about the external environment is 
often an antecedent to the interpretation of and response to a 
strategic issue. The organisational responses to a particular 
issue will be based largely on how their top managers come to 
understand and interpret the issue (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; 
Schneider & DeMeyer, 1991; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990). The 
understanding and interpretation of an issue will in turn depend 
upon the information sources the managers choose to rely on.
When presented with similar stimuli, chief executives in 
different organisations may form different interpretations of the 
same issue. When presented with different stimuli, even chief 
executives in similar positions may be expected to interpret and 
respond to an issue in different ways. As a result, the selection 
of information sources will have a central role in shaping the 
strategic issue diagnosis effort.
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The chief executives in all four industries used both personal 
and impersonal as well as internal and external sources of 
information. These findings were expected, because Daft and his 
colleagues (1988, p. 136) concluded that "Managers use multiple 
media, and media may complement one another. A weak signal 
detected from a personal source may be supplemented with 
objective data". The high levels of competition and market 
discipline that characterised the pre-handover Hong Kong economy 
(see Chen, 1995; Mushkat, 1990) would be likely to further 
encourage the use of many (rather than few) information sources.
The results from Hong Kong were also consistent with a conclusion 
reached by Henry Mintzberg. After he observed North American 
managers more than two decades ago, Mintzberg (1973) concluded 
that they strongly favour verbal media. Hong Kong Chinese 
managers also espoused an overall preference for personal 
sources. In contrast to impersonal sources, they could provide 
a rich verbal account of a given situation and, if necessary, 
augment it with their own interpretation.
Just like in the West, top managers in Hong Kong gained much of 
their information about the external environment from other 
people. Personal communications are rich in context and enhance 
the CEO's ability to detect weak signals and make sense of subtle 
aspects of important issues (Daft & Lengel, 1986) . The evidence 
from this study, and particularly from the eight cases, indicated 
that Hong Kong Chinese CEOs were inclined to rely on personal 
sources of information, especially during the later part of the 
strategic issue diagnosis process.
Remarkably though, in contrast to the findings of the 
environmental scanning studies conducted in Anglo cultures, the 
CEOs in Hong Kong exhibited a strong preference for external 
sources of information. The chief executives from the printing 
industry, arguably the most traditional of the four industries 
under investigation, had the greatest reliance on personal and 
external sources of information. They had a particularly strong
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tendency to seek out information by interacting personally with 
customers, business associates and subordinates.
The CEOs of more modern sectors of the Hong Kong economy, such 
as securities trading and universities, tended to make 
comparatively more use of impersonal sources. The most
frequently used sources in the securities industry - the public 
media and electronic information services - were not surprising, 
given that the economic and legal/political sectors were rated 
as the most important. Information about economic and regulatory 
changes can be communicated most quickly and efficiently by these 
impersonal sources.
7 2 . 1  Tnfnr-matinn • Cnmpptpnca or commodity?
The results imply that gaining access to strategic information 
in a traditional industry, such as printing, may be largely a 
competence that is cultivated and developed over time. In 
contrast, strategic information in a more modern industry may be 
largely a commodity that can be purchased when it is needed. 
This distinction has implications for managing information in 
different industries. Based upon this line of reasoning, a 
management-oriented IT application, such as a computer-based 
decision support system or an executive information system, would 
be more beneficial to a securities firm than a printing firm. 
The existence and nature of these differences in industries 
beyond those studied here and in places other than Hong Kong 
could be a focus for further useful research.
The emphasis on external rather than internal personal sources 
may be appropriate given the information biases of subordinates. 
Western studies have shown that subordinates have a consistent 
tendency to downplay both the negative aspects and uncertainty 
of a given situation so as to avoid displeasing their boss (see 
Taylor, 1984, pp. 16-17). As suggested in Chapter 3, Chinese 
employees have a comparatively high need to demonstrate their 
loyalty to the organisation and deference to their boss. Chinese 
leaders (unlike their Japanese counterparts) are also unlikely
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co admit their dependence on subordinates (Fukuda, 1984). The 
combination of two factors would increase the tendency to distort 
information as it was passed upwards in the organisation and 
decrease the likelihood of the CEO seeking out such internally- 
available information. External sources, such as customers and 
business associates, may find it easier to talk to the CEO, and 
be less motivated to filter their messages when doing so.
Pre-handover Hong Kong could also have been considered an 
unanalysable business environment. As a result, the information 
searching and interpretation methods used by successful CEOs 
there may have become "more personal, less linear, more ad hoc 
and improvisational" (Daft & Weick, 1984, p. 287) . For example, 
a rationale offered by Boyd & Fulk (1996) implies that the 
impending transfer of political sovereignty will raise the 
perceived levels of both strategic variability and complexity. 
Consistent with media richness theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986), the 
increased environmental complexity faced by the Hong Kong CEOs 
may have led them to rely more on external personal contacts.
However, the strength of this tendency in the pre-handover Hong 
Kong environment together with the differences found between 
industries suggests that this is more than a temporal phenomenon. 
Instead, it is likely to stem from the traditional nature of 
Chinese business. In the Chinese culture, there is comparatively 
little encouragement for independent thinking among subordinates 
(Martinsons & Martinsons, 1996). Educational systems emphasise 
rote learning while the socialisation process instills great 
respect for elders and superiors.
The social tendencies to follow existing guidelines and respect 
leaders combine to inhibit the proactivity of subordinates. More 
relevant to this study, their capability to provide their bosses 
with meaningful information is severely limited. As a result, 
peer-to-peer communications and top-down directives will be more 
common forms of Chinese organisational communications than the 
bottom-up transfer of information or ideas.
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- ? 2 Family and fripnds
Family and friends have been identified as important sources of 
information and advice for both the top executives of Chinese 
businesses (Redding, 1990; Siu & Martin, 1992) and smaller U.S. 
firms (Johnson & Kuehn, 1987; Smeltzer et al, 1988; Specht, 
1987). However, both the survey and the case studies indicated 
that they were not used very often by Hong Kong Chinese CEOs.
This tendency was particularly evident among the chief executives 
of securities firms and universities. Even when family members 
were perceived to be the most accessible sources, their domain 
of knowledge was not considered to be particularly useful by the 
CEOs. It may be that as blood relations and social colleagues 
become more educated, their tendency to migrate (moving to other 
countries or accepting work in unrelated industries) reduces the 
relevancy of their knowledge base.
The educational level of the general population in Hong Kong has 
continued to increase rapidly and consistently in recent decades. 
Over the same time frame, people have been less willing to work 
in a family business, particularly if it is a small industrial 
firm (see Lau & Kuan, 1988). Young people armed with educational 
qualifications have become increasingly intent on employment with 
a large corporation that offers a higher compensation and better 
prospects for career advancement. This applies even if the 
potential employer is in an industry unrelated to the family 
business. As a result, a continued decline in the role of family 
and friends as business information sources may be expected in 
Hong Kong, and perhaps also in other modernising societies.
7.2.3 Business associates
Personal networks based on family, kinship or regional ties have 
served as the key channel for information exchange in the 
traditional Chinese business culture (see Bond, 1986) . Redding 
(1990) even identified the reliance on interpersonal bonding as 
one of the three defining characteristics of Chinese capitalism. 
This is consistent with commentaries such as Boisot (1987) and
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Martinsons (1991), which suggest that in contrast to the 
bureaucracies and markets that prevail in Western economies, 
information fiefdoms are common to Chinese societies.
For example, Boisot and Child (1996) assert that even after 
decades of central planning by the Communist Party in mainland 
China, the codified behaviour and impersonal transactions that 
characterise the diffusion of information within a bureaucratic 
hierarchy remain rare. Instead, Chinese organisations depend to 
a large extent on personal relationships and connections, or 
guanxi. Rules and procedures continue to reflect personal will 
and preference (or perhaps the ideological orientation of the 
Communist elite) rather than being the outcome of a rational or 
deliberate analytical process. Boisot (1987, p. 186) suggested 
that "relationships in Chinese culture are intensely 
hierarchical, but they are not of the impersonal kind that one 
associates, following Weber, with modern bureaucracy".
The growth of the Chinese family business (CFB) has been found 
to follow comparatively simple and well-tested formulae (Redding, 
1990; Warrington, 1982). For example, fast-follower and focus 
strategies have been common in Hong Kong. Not surprisingly, many 
of the informants espoused a strong commitment to a single, 
narrowly-defined industry. This type of specialisation, 
sometimes termed downscoping, may be expected to raise the 
potential value of information obtained from customers, 
suppliers, and business associates. This is also consistent with 
the results of previous studies (e.g. Johnson & Kuehn, 1987; 
Yeung et al., 1995) which indicate that customers, subordinates 
and suppliers are key sources of environmental information for 
small businesses.
Following from this, many of the Hong Kong Chinese CEOs were 
found to have cultivated long-term relationships with these 
parties, thereby creating intra-organisational in-groups. In 
some cases, these in-groups amounted to an extensive yet informal 
business network based upon mutual interests and personal ties.
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7.3 Business networks and boundary spanners
Networks of social interactions in the business context may be 
classified as either inter-organisational or intra- 
organisational. Traditionally, business interactions have been 
conceived as consisting exclusively of links inside the 
organisation (e.g. Fombrun, 1983). However, the role of external 
information sources found in this study highlights the potential 
importance of ties that cross the organisational boundary and 
link to outsiders.
As Dollinger (1984) has pointed out, the flow of information 
through boundary spanning can be critical to the performance of 
an organisation in that it helps it make sense of, and respond 
to environmental changes. This is consistent with Fombrum 
(1983), who found that centrality in the organisation's 
communication network was related to an individual's influence 
after controlling for the effect of their formal position.
The information processing perspective outlined in Chapter 2 
holds that organisational designs follow from information 
processing requirements. Consequently, those who have access to 
or control of key information should be highly influential 
members of the organisation. Ties crossing the organisational 
boundary raise the influence of the individuals who maintain 
them, because of the critical gatekeeping role that boundary- 
spanning personnel take on in receiving and processing 
environmental information.
Outside interactions may be not only an important channel for 
obtaining key information about the external environment, but 
also a means to enhance and sustain personal status in a society 
where being respected and maintaining one's good reputation are 
paramount concerns. As a result, information gatekeepers are 
likely to exert significant influence within the organisation and 
perhaps also significant control over critical resources.
Mintzberg (1973) has noted that CEOs spend a large share of time
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in the externally-oriented functions of figurehead, spokesperson, 
and monitor. Therefore, top management would be expected to 
maintain a large number of external ties. As part of a social 
elite, chief executives may be expected to prefer interactions 
with others who are part of the same lofty social strata.
The findings not only indicate a strong external orientation 
among the Hong Kong Chinese chief executives, but also suggest 
that many of their intra-organisational ties are quite stable and 
long-lasting. These CEOs could be seen as important boundary 
spanners, interacting with their peers and outsiders so that 
their organisation can maintain a deep engagement with the 
external business environment.
This implies that the traditional conceptualisation of a network 
internal to an organisation should be extended to include intra- 
organisational ties. Building upon the term "boundary spanning", 
this new conceptualization of the organisational network 
literally spans its boundaries, extending to all those people 
outside who are important to the activities of the organisation. 
These outsiders may even be connected among themselves, although 
the evidence from the case studies only suggested significant 
connections between the information source outsiders in the 
higher education industry.
Nevertheless, with the increasing acknowledgement of strategic 
linkages between firms and sets of organisations rather than 
individual companies, it is important to view the flow of 
business information from a broad perspective. The locus of 
organisational communications is no longer circumscribed by its 
traditional boundaries, but rather spans them to include 
outsiders. To be influential and effective, managers must extend 
their networking beyond their own organisation, and stretch these 
efforts across its boundaries. Top managers all around the world 
will need to identify an appropriate mix of personal connections 
and establish information sourcing arrangements within and across 
organisational boundaries.
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For example, in pre-handover Hong Kong and especially within the 
service sectors of the economy, these personal business networks 
were augmented by reliable impersonal channels. The results 
support the notion of an equilibrium being maintained between 
personal trust (trusting only those people that you know well) 
and systemic trust (trusting the political, economic and social 
systems in general). Wong (1991) related these two contrasting 
forms of trust to the rule by man and the rule of law discussed 
in Chapter 3. He further suggested that in Hong Kong, they stem 
from a Chinese cultural tradition and the more than 150 years of 
British administration, respectively.
Increased competitive pressures, market disciplines and 
technological progress are also likely to have encouraged 
diversification in terms of the information sources used by 
CEOs. The effect of a new political administtration in Hong Kong 
on this equilibrium is subject to speculation and a potential 
area for future investigation.
7.4 Strategic decision making in Hong Kong
It has been theorised and widely accepted that an increase in the 
perceived level of environmental uncertainty will lead to a 
greater amount of environmental scanning and a more frequent use 
of information sources (see Weick & Daft, 1983 for a detailed 
rationale) . The evidence from recent studies provided strong 
support for the existence of these relationships among the CEOs 
in Canada, Nigeria, and the United States (see Daft et al., 1988; 
Auster and Choo, 1993; Sawyerr, 1993).
Daft et al. (1988) reported correlation coefficients ranging from 
0.37 and 0.65 between the perceived strategic uncertainty (PSU) 
levels in different environmental sectors and the frequency with 
which different types of information sources were used (FISU). 
The overall correlation coefficient in that U.S.-based study was 
0.58. Auster and Choo (1993) found comparable correlation 
coefficients, ranging between 0.30 and 0.46, with an average of 
0.37. They also collected data on the CEO's level of interest
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in keeping informed of trends in different sectors. This enabled 
them to calculate correlation coefficients between PSU and the 
interest measure of scanning. These coefficients were found to 
range from 0.36 to 0.58, with an average of 0.44. Sawyerr (1993) 
also found positive correlations between PSU and both the 
frequency and interest measures of scanning. The coefficients 
with the frequency measure ranged from 0.02 to 0.40, while those 
for the interest measure ranged from 0.30 to 0.63.3
The data from Hong Kong offered more equivocal evidence for a 
relationship between the perceived level of strategic uncertainty 
and either the amount of scanning or the frequency with which 
information sources would be used. Most of the correlation 
coefficients between the PSU of different environment sectors and 
the amount of scanning related to those sectors ranged between 
-0.05 and 0.21.
Further data analysis indicated that only the use of three 
information sources in the securities industry 
business/professional associates, family and friends, and 
subordinates - and two sources for printing firms - government 
publications and electronic services - had significant positive 
correlations with the relevant PSU score. This implies that CEOs 
in Hong Kong do not tend to increase nor focus their scanning in 
response to higher levels of environmental uncertainty.
7.4.1 Scanning and information sourcing
The study found that Hong Kong Chinese CEOs do a considerable 
amount of environmental scanning in their roles as strategic 
decision makers. However, their scanning appeared to be less 
formal and less systematic than that undertaken by CEOs in North 
America or Nigeria. Even with the comparatively high levels of 
environmental uncertainty that existed in pre-handover Hong Kong, 
information sources were used selectively to deal with strategic
3 In contrast to both Daft et al. (1988) and Auster & Choo 
(1993), Sawyerr (1993) did not report average scores for the 
correlation coefficients.
254
issues that arose or environmental uncertainties that were 
perceived. The ethnic Chinese CEOs did not intensify their 
scanning efforts in a uniform manner. Moreover, most information 
sources, and particularly impersonal ones, were used less 
frequently by the sampled CEOs in Hong Kong than their 
counterparts in North America.
The absence of formal scanning systems and the rarity of having 
an employee with explicit environmental scanning responsibilities 
(only three of 53 surveyed organisations, all in the securities 
industry) further suggests that the CEOs in Hong Kong relied 
extensively on their personal experience and informed intuition, 
perhaps based largely on their own accumulated intelligence. The 
CEOs appeared to interpret each strategic issue and to develop 
an understanding of it as the need arose.
Consistent with an adaptive or co-evolving orientation, there 
were few attempts to predict or forecast environmental changes, 
let alone their implications for business. As would be expected 
with the strong correlation between the use of an information 
source and its perceived quality, there was little or no evidence 
that the CEOs were pumping easy-to-access information sources. 
Instead, the inputs of a few key in-group members were critical 
for the handling of many strategic issues.
7.4.2 Managerial autocracy
The case studies were helpful to resolve many of the how and why- 
questions of a complex human situation - the acquisition and use 
of information about the external environment during the 
diagnosis of strategic issues. They provided particularly useful 
insights in terms of the relationships between the chief 
executives and their subordinates. For example, the eight CEOs 
were found to have a limited involvement with the operational 
level. Their subordinates would defer to them to make a specific 
decision, but the CEOs would not meddle in the steps leading up 
to the decision making point. Contrary to some of the Chinese 
management literature (e.g. Redding, 1990; Siu & Martin, 1993),
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few of the case studied CEOs could be characterised as "hands-on" 
managers. They did not seem to be overly familiar with the 
operational details of their organisation, and in several cases, 
where hesitant to talk about them.
On the other hand, consistent with the form of corporate 
governance noted by Tricker (1994), strategic issues were handled 
almost exclusively by the CEO of the Hong Kong Chinese 
organisation. Few of the CEOs in the study had decentralised or 
delegated any significant aspects of the strategic decision 
making process. Only one of the 53 firms in the survey had a 
staff member with a dedicated responsibility for environmental 
scanning. Meanwhile, only the heads of the two universities 
among the eight CEOs in the case studies were starting to 
encourage subordinate participation in strategic planning. 
However, even this may be seen as a behavioural change that 
merely mimics a trend that is evident in Anglo societies.
The Hong Kong Chinese CEOs appeared to commonly go through the 
process of strategic issue diagnosis without involving or 
consulting their subordinates and made key business decisions by 
themselves. As a result, the evidence strongly suggested that 
Hong Kong Chinese organisations followed the managerial autocracy 
model (see Shrivastava & Grant, 1985), in that the entire 
decision making process revolved around the preferences and 
actions of the chief executive.
Group decision making can be useful to combine (and perhaps 
synergise) bits of information that are not known by any single 
individual and to coordinate collective resources in order to 
solve or resolve a large issue quickly. However, there does not 
appear to be much gain in terms of decision quality, "even when 
knowledge and competency are adequate in the group as a whole" 
(Carroll & Johnson, 1990, p. 28). Both individuals and groups 
are prone to error, behave inconsistently, and neither has much 
self-cognition of a good or a bad decision.
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Several studies have compared group versus individual performance 
on a common set of problems (see Argote, Seabright & Dreyer, 
1986; Bazerman, Giuliano & Appelman, 1984). These studies have 
found little difference in terms of susceptibility to errors and 
biases. Groups also have their own drawbacks, such as the 
tendencies to reach a premature consensus via the phenomenon of 
groupthink (Janis, 1982) , to become extremely polarized based on 
initial leanings (Lamb & Myers, 1978) , and to consume tremendous 
amounts of time and resources (Argote et al., 1986) . Meanwhile, 
an attempt to build a group consensus within an organisation 
before responding to an external change can be just as futile as 
waiting for all the information to become available. Such 
efforts can also be highly detrimental in dynamic business 
environments (see Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988).
Finally, strong correlations were found between the overall level 
of environmental uncertainty and the reliance of CEOs on certain 
sources of information. This provided some empirical support in 
the Hong Kong Chinese context for the 'single informant' line of 
reasoning offered by Donald Sch6n (1983) that was noted in 
Chapter 2.
1^5__Persisting with Successful Approaches
Explanations for an observed pattern of environmental scanning 
may need to consider not only the characteristics of particular 
issues at hand, but also the habits derived from the past. 
Milliken & Lant (1991) argued that an organisation's recent 
experiences with success and failure activate psychological and 
inertial processes that influence the way top managers interpret 
their environments and respond to strategic issues. Simply 
stated, chief executives of organisations buffeted by recent 
successes will be more predisposed to sustain existing practices, 
will build a form of psychological slack represented by 
overconfidence, will tend to see new issues as opportunities, and 
will find it comparatively more difficult to recognise emerging 
threats (Milliken & Lant, 1991). These CEOs would thus be less 
likely to respond effectively to an emerging threat.
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If the organisation has performed well in the recent past, top 
managers are expected to persist with an approach that they have 
been using to manage strategic issues. A couple of popular 
phrases - "don't mess with success" and "don't fix it if it is 
not broken" reflect this perspective. Conversely, poor 
performance results would be more likely to lead to substantial 
changes in their approach.
The rapid economic development of Hong Kong in recent decades, 
and in particular the success enjoyed by the organisations that 
were part of this study, could have encouraged their CEOs to 
address strategic issues by persisting with previously used 
approaches. As a result, management habits may be hard to change 
unless the performance of an organisation (however it may be 
measured and evaluated) drops off substantially.
Indeed, the seeds of failure for a business are often sown in 
past success. For example, Miller (1990) posits that 
organisations achieve superior performance through a focus on a 
few distinctive competences and winning strategies. They react 
to their success by reinforcing the same competencies and 
strategies, and thus embark on a trajectory that ultimately leads 
to their demise.
New environmental conditions and competitive pressures often 
require managers to unlearn the practices that they have used 
successfully in the past. Any attempt at such unlearning may 
have to begin with understanding what has been done and what has 
happened in the past. From this perspective, this study may 
provide an important reference for Hong Kong Chinese managers as 
they adjust to new conditions in the wake of the Asian financial 
crisis and the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong.
Milliken and Lant (1991) argue that a recent failure will be the 
most likely impetus for introducing a new process or altering an 
existing one. Poor business performance may be expected to 
encourage the top managers of an organisation to seek out new
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information or ideas, and to increase the reach and range of 
their interpersonal connections by involving more people in the 
strategic decision making process.
At the same time, the bounded rationality argument outlined in 
Chapter 2 would suggest that a given manager will continually 
seek to reduce the cognitive effort involved in making a given 
decision by relying upon heuristics (gained from previous 
experience) and standardised procedures (Hogarth, 1983; Lord & 
Maher, 1990) . It can be argued that a chief executive will 
prefer to resolve a strategic issue by relying on established 
guidelines and heuristics rather than working from first 
principles.
The first-principles approach would involve gathering large 
amounts of relevant information about each strategic issue as it 
arises. This would elevate the role of environmental scanning. 
Approaches at the other extreme will ultimately lead to 
mindlessness, whereby a decision maker does not acquire any new 
information to make a decision, but instead closes the mind to 
such stimuli and makes an automatic response.
7.5.1 Managing the knowable and the unknowable
Stacey (1992) has argued that organisations face two 
contradictory tasks: managing the knowable and managing the 
unknowable. He suggested that managing the knowable, which is 
captured in routine issues and decisions, requires tight control. 
Conversely, managing the unknowable, which would seem to be at 
the core of strategic decision making process described in 
Chapter 1, requires flexibility and openness.
It was suggested earlier that Chinese family businesses achieve 
a high degree of organisational flexibility by staying small, 
retaining a narrow product/market focus and making liberal use 
of informal communication channels. The CEO nurtures personal 
trust in order to reduce internal frictions, align individual 
goals with those of the firm, and cultivate extra-organisational
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networks (Ko, 1995; Redding, 1990). This combined with a 
centralisation of management authority enables the top manager 
to make appropriate decisions and rapid responses in dynamic 
environments. Significantly, it also is helpful to ensure that 
other organisational stakeholders, and particularly subordinates, 
will be supportive of these decisions and responses.
By staying small and maintaining a narrow focus, the CEO avoids 
the cognitive strain that would arise if there were too many 
issues to be addressed and decisions to be made. The data 
collected in this study suggests that Hong Kong Chinese CEOs make 
most of their strategic-level decisions on a piecemeal basis. 
They do not seem to waste much time or energy collecting data or 
otherwise processing decisions that may or may not need to be 
made.
The case studies indicated that Hong Kong Chinese CEOs tended to 
move forward incrementally on most strategic issues, and rarely 
considered all the options that might be available. This 
approach seemed to be quite appropriate given the general nature 
of the issues that they confronted. Many of these 19 issues 
identified in the case studies were simple and/or straightforward 
and often similar to ones that had been dealt with in the past.
Nevertheless, there was a low degree of procedural rationality, 
as evidenced by the limited use of structured analytic techniques 
or decision systems to support the process. It was rare for the 
Hong Kong Chinese CEOs to employ a rational-deductive model (see 
Chapter 1) , whereby an issue is identified and understood 
quickly, so that relevant information may be collected in order 
to generate and evaluate options, and then an appropriate 
response can be selected from these options.
The results are consistent with an adaptive rather than a highly 
rational style of strategy making. The case studies revealed 
that the chief executives rarely evaluated solution or resolution 
alternatives, and often they did not even mention generating
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them. Strategy making in Hong Kong Chinese businesses was found 
to be highly incremental and iterative, and hence consistent with 
the subjective-intuitive view of strategy making outlined in 
Chapter 1 and the logical incrementalism reported by Quinn 
(1980) . There was little evidence of the grand strategy or
comprehensive corporate plans that would be expected with the 
traditional Western views of strategic management mentioned in 
the opening chapter of this dissertation.
The Hong Kong Chinese businesses in this study (excluding the 
universities from the public sector) were also found to have 
remarkably few rules or standard operating procedures. However, 
the employees in these firms seldom made their own decisions even 
on routine matters. This was not because they were able to 
follow pre-programmed routines, specified rules or standard 
operating procedures, but rather because they habitually deferred 
to their bosses for guidance on the appropriate course of action.
The private sector firms in Hong Kong thus appeared to have 
entrenched mechanisms for managing both the knowable and the
unknowable   handling both strategic and operational issues.
The informal mechanisms for both types of issues appear to be 
based upon a managerial autocracy model. Such a model may enable 
their CEOs to see more strategic issues as opportunities rather 
than threats, while their relative independence from rules may 
help them to deal effectively with these issues. However, the 
rarity of operating procedures and the reluctance of subordinates 
to make decisions could impair efficiency and delay the pursuit 
of selected courses of action.
7.6 Information Source Accessibility Versus Quality
Similar to a recent Canadian study (Auster & Choo, 1993), the 
perceived accessibility of an information source was not highly 
correlated to the frequency with which it was used by the Hong 
Kong Chinese CEOs. For example, an analysis of the data from the 
securities industry found that only two of the eleven sources - 
competition and public media - had significant correlation
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coefficients. More importantly, the regression modelling 
indicated that quality was a much better predictor of information 
source use than either perceived environmental uncertainty or 
source accessibility.
This consistency among recent studies suggests that information 
source accessibility is not a serious problem for CEOs in 
contemporary business environments. However, the standardised 
regression coefficients for source quality in both Hong Kong 
industries were found to be significantly higher than those 
reported by Auster and Choo (1993). This implies that source 
quality is an even more important factor in predicting 
information source usage in Hong Kong than in North America.
As indicated in Chapter 2, several studies had concluded that 
source accessibility was of paramount importance in determining 
the use of an information source. However, all of these were 
conducted before 1985. At that time, computer-based information 
systems were not well developed and so seeking quality 
information incurred social and economic costs (O'Reilly, 1982). 
Under these conditions, more accessible sources were more likely 
to be used.
However, it appears that there is now an abundance of accessible 
information sources. As a result, it is no longer difficult to 
identify accessible information sources. Instead, the selection 
among various accessible sources and the perceived quality of the 
information provided by selected sources are now the critical 
challenges. In addition, the novelty and unpredictability of 
strategic issues is likely to mean that the ability of a source 
to provide quality information (e.g. that reduces noise) will 
override its accessibility.
Both Western and Hong Kong Chinese managers now seem able to 
select among information sources of differential quality rather 
than worrying about a lack of data. Significantly though, this 
study is among the first to demonstrate the context-specific
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nature of information quality perceptions. The survey results 
illustrated how the industry of the CEO has a significant 
influence on their ranking of information sources in terms of 
perceived quality (and, to a lesser extent, perceived 
accessibility). The case study evidence went further, showing 
how the specific nature of the strategic issue shapes the type(s) 
of information that will be sought at different stages of 
diagnosis, and what information sources will be favoured by the 
chief executive at each stage of that process.
Despite the abundance of raw information, the study indicated 
that, consistent with Redding (1990) and Warrington (1982), 
formal strategic planning in Hong Kong Chinese businesses was 
still impeded by factors such as the tendency towards informal 
and centralised decision-making as well as the prominence of 
business networks and personal relationships. Previous studies 
indicate that formal planning was rare in both small U.S. firms 
(Robinson & Pearce, 1984; Sprecht, 1987) and Chinese family 
businesses (Redding, 1990; Warrington, 1982). Instead, success 
was reputed to result from "gifted readings" of environmental 
clues that led to the identification of business opportunities 
(see Johnson & Kuehn, 1987; Welsh & White, 1981).
This perspective is reinforced by a steady stream of anecdotal 
reports from Hong Kong in recent years as well as the data 
collected in this study. Even amidst the uncertainties of the 
pre-handover business environment, the ethnic Chinese CEOs were 
found to favour selective and informal modes of scanning rather 
than the comprehensive or systematic gathering of information 
about the external environment that could be considered a 
critical part of their business planning efforts.
Although Hong Kong, unlike Singapore, does not have a 
comprehensive government policy for information infrastructure 
development, economic sectors such as financial and 
transportation services have aggressively invested in IT so as 
to remain competitive on a global basis. IT now plays a
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substantial role in communications between suppliers and 
customers. The structural transformation of the Hong Kong 
economy was mentioned in Chapter 3. This shift, from primarily 
manufacturing to almost exclusively services, has also 
contributed to the increased frequency of communications within 
and between organisations.
7.7 Environmental Scanning and Decision-Making
Decision making may be defined as a process whereby choices or 
judgments are made by gathering and evaluating information about 
alternatives, and then selecting from among those alternatives 
(Carroll & Johnson, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The Hong 
Kong Chinese CEOs were commonly found to gather information for 
one of two purposes: 1) to relate a current situation to their 
own previous experience, or 2) to determine the nature and 
effectiveness of responses taken elsewhere (often in Anglo 
cultures) to similar situations.
Very few of the CEOs in the case studies sought out information 
to identify the attributes or properties of specific decision 
alternatives that were under consideration. There was a tendency 
towards a reactive form of strategic issues management rather 
than proactive or forward-looking strategy making. The 
comparatively lengthy experience of these CEOs in their current 
positions, and particularly in their respective industries may 
enable decision-making efficiency.
However, the ingrained habits arising from this extensive 
experience may also explain the surprisingly small number of 
decision alternatives or the limited "consideration set" 
(Bettman, 1979) that attracted their attention. The findings 
indicate that their decisions were commonly based on subjective 
judgments, a kind of comparison or matching (often to favourable 
attributes) rather than choice, which would consist of 
comparisons among alternatives (see Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
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Information about the external environment typically helped them 
to determine how to do something rather than what to do. They 
rarely appeared to make explicit decisions by considering either 
a complete or even a limited set of alternatives (as in Einhorn 
Sc Hogarth, 1981) . A significant amount of non-specific 
information search activity, such as reading newspapers or 
talking to colleagues, was evident. This was undertaken in order 
to prepare for the future rather than as part of a specific 
decision-making process. Such environmental scanning activity 
may be termed "pre-decisional" behaviour (see Payne, Braunstein 
Sc Carroll, 1978) .
The results also challenge an implicit assumption of economics - 
that more information will lead to a better decision (which 
follows from the need to compare the marginal cost of gathering 
information with the marginal benefits it is expected to 
provide). Despite the relatively high levels of strategic 
uncertainty perceived by the Chinese CEOs, the PSU scores were 
not consistently or significantly related to either the amount 
of scanning or the frequency with which information sources were 
used. This finding may follow from a comparatively low need to 
avoid uncertainty among the Chinese (see Hofstede, 1993).
Top managers in Hong Kong may rely on their own expertise (rather 
than other information sources) or work to increase 
organisational flexibility (rather than predict environmental 
changes) to cope with such uncertainty. It is known that they 
have been effective in identifying niche markets and then using 
their personal networks and specialized business skills to 
capitalize on them (see for example Redding, 1990). With the 
growing dynamism of international markets, this area merits 
further exploration in both the Chinese and global business 
contexts.
Both the survey and case study results indicated that 
environmental information was used most frequently in the roles 
of entrepreneur and resource allocator. The salience of the
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entrepreneurial role is consistent with previous findings from 
Anglo-dominated societies (Auster & Choo, 1993; Fann & Smeltzer, 
1989). Meanwhile, the importance of the resource allocator role 
may be associated with the care that Chinese managers exercise 
with their resources, especially financial ones.
7.8 The Limitations of the Study
The limitations of the research design were discussed in Chapter
4. However, it is also appropriate to mention the limitations 
of the study as it was executed. The demographics and nature of 
the business population in Hong Kong precluded the generation of 
a large sample size (at least by the standards of Anglo-American 
social science) or even a modest non-Chinese sample. As a 
result, the focus of this study was on the environmental 
perceptions and scanning activities of Chinese CEOs in pre­
handover Hong Kong. Its findings will have differing levels of 
applicability beyond this context.
The distinctive nature of Chinese capitalism, especially as it 
is manifested in Hong Kong, restricted the sample size. Small, 
family-owned businesses accounted for more than 98 percent of the 
firms and 90 percent of the economic activity in most pre­
handover Hong Kong industries, including the two that were 
selected for this study. As suggested in Chapters 3 and 4, these 
types of firms are notoriously reluctant to disclose information 
to outsiders.
Redding (1990) is among those who have attributed this secrecy 
to a deeply-rooted insecurity that is argued to prevail among 
ethnic Chinese capitalists. A high degree of confidentiality has 
been a necessary defense mechanism for them in hostile and 
uncertain environments. Such information hoarding was likely to 
be amplified in pre-handover Hong Kong, where increasing 
competition for timely and accurate information was forecast in 
advance of the political change (e.g. Martinsons, 1993; Siu & 
Martin. 1992).
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Many Hong Kong Chinese printing plant owner/managers also had 
moved their operations to the PRC in order to take advantage of 
the lower wages and rentals. Their stays in the Hong Kong head 
office were short and unpredictable, making interviews difficult 
to arrange. Many of the informants (like the stereotypical Hong 
Kong resident) also professed to be extremely busy making money. 
Several explicitly mentioned that being interviewed was both time 
consuming and irrelevant to their profit making activities. They 
would prefer to spend their time doing business or relaxing. 
Significantly, Ghoshal (1988, p. 71) was given similar rationales 
by Korean chaebols that declined to participate in his study.
The comparatively small samples from the two surveyed industries 
limited the statistical power of the data analysis. As a result, 
it was a pleasant surprise to find such clear differences between 
the two industries as well as significant differences between the 
Hong Kong data and those from earlier studies conducted 
elsewhere.
Based upon the high levels of confidence for many of the survey 
findings, the analysis indicated that both the perceptions and 
behaviours of those studied were truly distinctive. The case 
studies were helpful not only to make sense of the similarities 
and differences found in the survey, but also to examine how 
external information was used to diagnose specific strategic 
issues.
The results of this study lead to several key conclusions. These 
conclusions have significant implications for both management 
theory and practice, and they also prompt recommendations for 
additional research. The conclusions and implications of this 
study as well as the recommendations for further investigation 
are all presented in a final chapter, which follows.
2 6 7
Chapter 8
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This final chapter recaps the major results of the study in order 
to draw key conclusions. The implications of these conclusions 
for theory, practice and further research are considered.
8.1 .Summary of Hypothesis Testing
The study used a survey of two industries and eight case studies 
to examine the nature of strategic intelligence in pre-handover 
Hong Kong. The variety and richness of the data reported here 
strongly indicates that synergistic value can be achieved by 
combining quantitative and qualitative research methods. This 
represents the first conclusion of this study.
As reported in Chapter 5, the survey enabled seven hypotheses to 
be tested. A summary of these test results appears in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1
Summary of Hypothesis Testing
Securities Printing Overall
Hypothesis 1.
Economic and 
political/legai 
sectors have the highest 
PSUs for service firms.
Supported.
Largely
supported.
Economic, political/legai 
and technological sectors 
have the highest PSUs for 
manufacturing firms.
Weakly
supported.
P o liu c a l/ le g a l s e c to r  
h a s  a  c o m p a ra tiv e ly  
lo w  P S U
Hypothesis 2.
PSU is positively related to 
the amount of scannina.
Supported. Weakly
supported.
Partially
supported.
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Hypothesis 3.
PSU across different 
environmental sectors is 
positively related to the 
frequency of using both 
personal and Impersonal 
sources.
Weakly supported. 
Three personal 
sources have a 
statistically significant 
positive relationship.
Not supported. 
One personal 
source and one 
impersonal 
source have a 
statistically 
significant 
positive 
relationship.
Not supported.
Hypothesis 4.
Perceived quality is a better 
predictor of source usage 
than perceived accessibility 
orPEU.
Strongly supported. Strongly
supported.
Strongly
supported.
Hypothesis 5.
Education level is positively 
correlated with the 
frequency of using both 
personal and impersonal 
information sources.
Strongly supported. Weakly
supported.
Partially
supported.
Hypothesis 6.
Decision makers acquire 
the most information about 
the external environment in 
the entrepreneur role.
Strongly supported. Not supported. Partially
supported.
Hypothesis 7.
Personal sources are used 
more frequently than 
impersonal ones in 
decision making.
Weakly supported. Strongly
supported.
Fairly strongly 
supported.
8.2 E n v i m n n w i m l  p « r r « r H n n a
As hypothesised, the chief executives from the two industries 
were found to differ in how they perceived their business
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environments in pre-handover Hong Kong. The CEOs of securities 
firms perceived the economic and political/legal sectors of the 
environment to have the highest levels of strategic uncertainty. 
Meanwhile, those from the printing industry rated the customer 
and technological sectors as the most strategically uncertain.
The overall levels of strategic uncertainty perceived by the CEOs 
from both Hong Kong industries were similar to those reported in 
Canada, the United States and Nigeria (see Auster & Choo, 1993, 
Daft et al., 1988; Sawyerr, 1993). However, the pre-handover 
Hong Kong environment was generally perceived to have a faster 
rate of environmental change. As a result, it may be appropriate 
to characterise Hong Kong Chinese organisations as a part of a 
comparatively simple but very dynamic socio-economic system.
The case studies revealed that the Hong Kong Chinese CEOs had 
assorted perspectives on the political handover. Some of the 
chief executives perceived the handover as a serious threat to 
their business prospects while others believed that it 
represented a significant business opportunity. Remarkably, many 
of those surveyed and case studied indicated that it was not a 
significant issue in terms of their strategic decision making.
To be more specific, the transfer of political sovereignty and 
its potential impact was the strategic issue for one newspaper 
industry CEO and a significant worry for many top managers in the 
securities industry. In contrast, it was generally a non-issue 
for the CEOs from the printing industry, whose operations already 
tended to straddle the border between Hong Kong and mainland 
China. They were more concerned with their industry-specific 
task environment, because of their direct influence on business.
It is concluded that, despite the alarmist tone set by the 
international media, the impending handover was neither a major 
nor uniform source of environmental uncertainty for Hong Kong 
Chinese chief executives. The case studies further suggest that 
while the transfer of political sovereignty was an important
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consideration for many CEOs, it was not a universally problematic 
issue. More generally, it is concluded that the characteristics 
of the industry, the organisation, and the CEO combined to shape 
the perceptions of, and preparations for this event.
8.3 Strategic issues
While the handover was a strategic issue for only some CEOs in 
some industries, concerns about maintaining or improving 
competitiveness existed in all four industries. More than half 
of the 19 strategic issues recounted by the eight chief 
executives involved the Competitive and/or Technological sectors. 
Two types of issues were particularly common: increasing 
competition (often from overseas) and improving organisational 
performance through the application of information technology. 
These issues are likely to top management agendas all over the 
world rather than being unique to Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Chinese CEOs most commonly addressed strategic 
issues by taking on one of two decision making roles (based upon 
the typology of Mintzberg, 1973): Entrepreneur or Disturbance 
Handler. The Entrepreneur role often involved upgrading
technology in order to improve competitive position while the 
Disturbance Handler role tended to result from regulatory changes 
(involving the Political/legal sector) or emerging competitive 
challenges. Again, this pattern is not expected to be peculiar 
to Hong Kong or Chinese CEOs, although there are few if any 
reported studies from other locations and cultural contexts.
8.4 Differences in eniH r n n a w n H I  a f f » n n l n n
The survey results indicate that the CEOs from the two industries 
in Hong Kong differed in their patterns of environmental 
scanning. The chief executives from the securities industry 
tended to acquire information about external developments using 
a fairly balanced mix of sources - personal and impersonal as 
well those outside and inside the organisation. In contrast, the 
CEOs from the printing industry were found to maintain closer 
contact with their customers and suppliers, including the vendors
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of production and information technologies. More generally, they 
tended to rely extensively on people outside their own 
organisation for information about their external environment.
In response to higher levels of environmental uncertainty, the 
CEOs from both industries were found to sharpen their scanning 
focus and increase their information sourcing from selected 
sources. The survey and the case studies both strongly indicated 
that information sources were chosen largely for their ability 
to provide timely and relevant insights rather than their 
accessibility to the chief executive. Written sources generally 
received the lowest ratings because they lacked both timeliness 
and relationship-building capabilities.
Even so, the specific information source preferences of the CEOs 
were found to depend greatly on not only the industry context, 
but the nature of the strategic issue that they were addressing. 
The survey results presented in Chapter 5 highlight a major 
shortcoming of the existing environmental scanning literature, 
which has tended to downplay the nature of the industry 
environmet. Meanwhile, the case studies show how the particular 
details of a strategic issue will shape the process which is 
applied to its diagnosis.
The correlations between perceived strategic uncertainty (as 
defined by Daft et al., 1988) and various measures of scanning 
activity and information source use were weaker in Hong Kong than 
those found elsewhere. About half of the correlation 
coefficients from the two-industry survey were insignificant at 
the p<.05 level. Moreover, greater levels of environmental 
uncertainty did not invariably raise either the interest in 
scanning or the frequency of information source usage.
These results highlight the limited external validity of 
conclusions from earlier studies while challenging the common 
wisdom that gathering more information will inevitably reduce 
uncertainty. Despite the comparatively high overall level of
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environmental uncertainty in pre-handover Hong Kong, it was not 
significantly or consistently related to the frequency with 
which information sources were used. It is concluded that Hong 
Kong Chinese CEOs responded differently to changes in perceived 
strategic uncertainty than CEOs in North America and Nigeria.
The comparative management literature (see Kiggundu et al., 1983; 
Schneider, 1989) suggests that since environmental uncertainty 
and environmental scanning activities occur at the organisation- 
environment interface, differences across countries and cultures 
should be expected. The results of this study provide strong 
support for this theoretical perspective. However, the richness 
of the data also provided a clear demonstration of how both 
strategic management and information management are embedded in 
context-specific norms (see Boisot, 1987; Martinsons, 1991; 
Schneider, 1989) .
The environmental scanning process in a given locale will thus 
be influenced by institutional factors and the prevailing 
culture. The previous chapter discussed how specific aspects of 
the Hong Kong economy and the traditional Chinese business 
culture help to explain many of the differences in results 
between this study and earlier ones conducted elsewhere. 
However, the findings of this study also establish the salience 
of industry context.
There were significant differences in environmental scanning 
behaviours between the CEOs from the securities industry and 
those from the printing industry. Combined with the conclusion 
drawn in section 8.2, it is clear that the business context is 
not only a fundamental determinant of how the environment is 
perceived, but it also interacts with the nature of a specific 
strategic issue to determine what information about the external 
environment is acquired as well as how it is acquired and used. 
Consequently, both management practitioners and researchers are 
advised to develop an understanding of (and take into account) 
the specific industry environment rather than just the general
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b u s in e s s  e n v iro n m e n t in any given locale, not just Hong Kong.
8.5 Information sourcing during strategic issue diagnosis
The case studies revealed that Hong Kong Chinese CEOs commonly 
became aware of important developments in the external 
environment as a result of information from an impersonal source, 
such as the mass media. At that point, the chief executive 
decided whether the development constituted a strategic issue. 
For a strategic issue, the CEO would go on to gather additional 
information in order to make better sense of the issue, determine 
its strategic implications for the organisation, and to evaluate 
the likely results of alternative responses/actions.
At the sense-making stage of the diagnosis, personal sources, 
such as business associates, were more often than impersonal 
ones. Based on the framework for strategic issue diagnosis 
presented by Jane Dutton and her colleagues (Dutton et al., 1983; 
Dutton & Duncan, 1987), it is concluded that impersonal sources 
are more likely to create awareness and enable the timely 
identification of a strategic issue while personal sources are 
more likely to support the sense-making stage of the process.
The Hong Kong Chinese chief executives were found to serve as the 
primary processors of external information and also the major 
sources of information for other employees within the 
organisation. The results also strongly suggest that Hong Kong 
Chinese CEOs tend to employ adaptive rather than rational styles 
of strategic issues management. This supports the subjective- 
intuitive view of strategy making outlined in Chapter 1.
Strategic courses of action tend to emerge incrementally and 
iteratively rather than in the form of the grand plan that is 
implied by the traditional strategic management literature. 
Consistent with the entrepreneurial strategy making type proposed 
by Mintzberg and Waters (1985) and the managerial autocracy model 
advanced by Shrivastava and Grant (1985), the strategic intent 
of Hong Kong Chinese organisations tended to exist as an
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Perhaps encouraged by a high tolerance for uncertainty (see 
Hofstede, 1980), the CEOs in the study appear to have heeded the 
advice of von Clausewitz (see Collins, 1962) and responded to 
environmental uncertainty by maintaining a high degree of 
organisational flexibility and relying upon experience-based 
judgment in the absence of reliable business forecasts.
Personal experience and regular contact with an informal network 
of associates were found to compensate for an underdeveloped 
institutional framework and to substitute for formally-sourced 
information. Consistent with the cybernetic law of requisite 
variety (see Ashby, 1958), the relative simplicity of the 
external environment has enabled Hong Kong Chinese CEOs to 
achieve business success with an autocratic management style.
The expert model of decision making (from Chapter 1 and Lord & 
Maher, 1990) was commonly employed by the CEOs in the study. 
They relied upon familiar aspects of a given situation and proven 
heuristics to help them process information and address strategic 
issues. Most of the chief executives, and particularly those 
from the printing industry, relied greatly on uncodified 
knowledge gained through a lifetime of learning experiences, both 
their own and those of key associates. This knowledge is 
comparatively more contingent and contextual than hard copy or 
digital information, and therefore less of a commodity that can 
be bought and sold as needed.
A large overlap in the experiences of senior executives in 
affiliated organisations was particularly evident in the goods- 
producing industry that was studied. This overlap enabled a 
shared discourse among these top managers, and meant that they 
were in effect an in-group. They kept each other informed about 
relevant developments in their business environment and often 
worked together to resolve strategic issues that were of mutual 
interest. Since this phenomenon was less evident in the more
unarticulated (and hence adaptable) personal vision.
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modern, service-producing industries, it is expected to decline 
over time. This would support the convergence thesis mentioned 
in Chapter 3, whereby management practices around the world 
become more similar over time as technical needs are met 
regardless of culture.
A notable exception to the perspective of information as a 
distinctive competence (rather than a commodity) was found with 
foreign business practices and technologies. Operating in a 
relatively late-developing and open economy, Hong Kong firms 
have been able to transfer and adapt many tools, techniques and 
methods from places like North America and Western Europe. The 
case studies clearly indicated that the Hong Kong Chinese CEOs 
in different industries kept abreast of new developments overseas 
and, where appropriate, they oversaw the assimilation of these 
practices and technologies into their own organisations.
Conversely, remarkably little information about external 
developments was acquired through informal, internal information 
networks or by wandering around the work environment. Most of 
the CEOs tended to communicate directives and ideas to their 
subordinates while remaining detached from the office grapevine 
and similar communication channels within their own 
organisations.
It is concluded that Hong Kong Chinese businesses have thrived 
in a comparatively simple but rapidly changing socio-economic 
system partly because their CEOs have maintained rich connections 
with the external environment. Since the rate of environmental 
change is arguably increasing all around the world while 
underdeveloped institutional frameworks and business environments 
remain common, these propositions merit further exploration in 
not only the Chinese case, but also in other business contexts.
8.6 Information aoureM: Characterlstlea and use
The results from Hong Kong were consistent with those from a 
recent Canadian study (Auster & Choo, 1993) in that the quality
2 7 6
of Che information source, rather than its accessibility or the 
perceived uncertainty of the environment, best explained the 
frequency with which it was used. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
this suggests a recent shift in terms of the key obstacle to the 
acquisition of quality information by managers. Largely due to 
advances in IT, managers are increasingly able to focus on 
selecting the best information from a surplus of available 
sources rather than worrying about how to access information from 
a surfeit of sources. This conclusion reinforms the mainstream 
literature on information management and implies a growing need 
for information evaluation and filtering technologies.
The frequency of use for an information source, especially in the 
securities industry, was found to depend significantly on the 
specific type of decision making activity. For example, much 
more information was sought out for entrepreneurial decisions 
than for those that involved disturbance handling. Industry 
differences were also detected. Information about the external 
environment was used most frequently in the entrepreneurial role 
by CEOs of securities firms and in resource allocator role by the 
chief executives of printing firms. Therefore, it is concluded 
that information sourcing behaviour will be highly contingent on 
the strategic management context.
Future studies could investigate what patterns of environmental 
scanning and information source usage are associated with 
specific generic business strategies or particular strategic 
issues and decisions. The value of an information source may 
depend on the importance, urgency and type of the strategic issue 
being considered as well as organisational and environmental 
characteristics. However, there has been little study of the 
relationships between these variables. This implies that while 
reliable and useful information is a prized asset in a 
competitive and international business centre like Hong Kong, 
the best means to acquire it remain poorly understood.
Since managers undertake scanning activities in order to make
sense of an uncertain external environment, further research 
could examine the detailed processes by which they seek and use 
information. These processes would go beyond specific job- 
related functions, and raise questions such as: How do decision 
makers detect, recognise and frame strategic issues from a fast­
flowing stream of environmental signals and messages? How do 
they determine what information is necessary and sufficient to 
address a particular strategic issue? How do they select among 
different sources (or combinations of sources) that provide 
necessary and sufficient information about the topic of interest?
The use of the phrase “necessary and sufficient" highlights 
another characteristic of information that has methodological 
implications. The building and maintenance of personal 
relationships is a core element of the traditional Chinese 
business culture. An important aspect of long-term relationship 
building is showing respect for the other party. This implies 
that some personal information sources may not be contacted 
because of their expected utility (i.e. the ability to provide 
necessary and sufficient information), but rather to give face 
or show respect to the individual.
While this type of symbolic behaviour may be (nearly) universal, 
it is expected to be more prominent in a high power distance 
society like Hong Kong. Not surprisingly, several strategic 
issues in the case studies featured such information sourcing. 
The CEOs consulted their mentors and peers partly out of a sense 
of duty rather than because of an instrumental expectation.
Previously reported studies have tended to assume that 
environmental scanning is conducted in order to collect 
information that will reduce uncertainty by creating awareness 
or helping sense-making. However, the results from this study 
suggest that it is critical to account for both the instrumental 
and symbolic value of information in research designs. This in 
turn favours more intensive methods, such as case studies, to 
augment or replace extensive methods, such as surveys.
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8.7 Trust, tradition and information technology
The nature of strategic intelligence is also important from an 
information systems perspective. The Hong Kong Government does 
not have a comprehensive or even explicit IT policy, but 
industries such as banking, finance and transportation have made 
substantial IT investments. The findings support a proposition 
that the CEOs of more modern, service-oriented firms undertake 
more environmental scanning and have a greater reliance on 
impersonal information sources than their counterparts in more 
traditional, goods-producing firms. The top managers tend to 
trust their long-time associates and their own instincts rather 
than arms-length data and rational analysis.
The results further suggest that the structural transformation 
of the Hong Kong economy, from manufacturing to services, has 
raised both the role of environmental analysis and the potential 
to formalise these activities. This transformation and the 
growing levels of competition (noted in section 8.3) have 
undoubtedly increased the demand for IT applications even before 
taking account of supply side changes, such as continual 
improvements in the performance-price ratios of hardware and 
software.
Nevertheless, the traditional Chinese focus on particularistic 
or personal trust may be expected to impede the adoption of 
computer-based IS. This study confirmed personal networks as the 
key channel for acquiring and exchanging information in the 
traditional Chinese business culture. The top managers of 
affiliated organisations were found to have built up personal 
relationships for both communications and economic transactions. 
In contrast, it was remarkable that no more than two of the eight 
CEOs in the case studies included electronic services on their 
list of “top five" information sources in terms of either 
perceived quality, perceived accessibility or frequency of use.
The results suggest that in Hong Kong, systemic trust stemming 
from British colonialism and economic modernisation has moderated
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the personal trust which is based on family and regional ties 
among the Chinese. It is concluded that pre-handover Hong Kong 
featured a dynamic equilibrium between the Chinese tradition of 
personal trust and the Western tendency towards systemic trust.
Within this context, the Hong Kong Chinese CEOs acquired key data 
as well as deep insights about the external environment directly 
from other people. These people were sometimes family or 
friends. More commonly though, they were professional colleagues 
and business associates. In Chapter 3 it was noted that business 
in Chinese societies is conducted between individual people 
rather than impersonal firms. The results indicate that business 
information is also communicated largely from principal to 
principal rather than through intermediaries or impersonal media.
Consequently, the growing use of IT by Chinese managers will 
hinge not only on their confidence in the more narrowly-defined 
information system, but also on their trust in the broader 
system, including the impersonal and often anonymous sources that 
provide data inputs to the IS. Based on the discussion in 
Chapter 3, this trust can only be built up patiently and 
gradually.
Meanwhile, the conclusion made in the previous section suggests 
that the marketing of an IS to a Hong Kong Chinese CEO should 
emphasise the quality of the information that it can provide 
rather than its ability to make information accessible. The 
capacity for on-going adjustments and accommodations will also 
be a critical part of any IS solution provided to a Hong Kong 
Chinese manager, since this is an invariable part of a personal 
relationship.
More generally, the management-level use of IT will be an 
important benchmark for determining the extent to which modern 
management approaches have supplanted traditional Chinese 
management practices. It is recognised that IT may be used 
either to modify a traditional business practice or to reinforce
280
it. For example, electronic mail could loosen the social 
hierarchies found among the Chinese by enabling people at any 
level and in any location to communicate directly and agree to 
work together. However, electronic tracking and surveillance 
could help to sustain these same hierarchies by supporting a 
command-and-control management model.
With respect to environmental scanning, IT may be able to absorb 
certain information-intensive tasks, giving a manager more time 
to concentrate on the less-structured aspects of conceptual and 
decision-making activities. However, the potential use of IT by 
Hong Kong Chinese chief executives may be constrained by their 
relatively simple and unstructured style of strategic decision 
making and an emphasis on pre-decisional information acquisition, 
to interpret issues rather than to select among specific choices.
Electronic communication systems can potentially enhance an 
organisation's responsiveness to environmental changes while 
formal information systems can facilitate both control and 
coordination. However, these IT applications are most effective 
when data sets are routine and relatively unambiguous (Daft & 
Lengel, 1986). Tacit, intuitive and subjective information are 
not as well-suited for electronic databases or highly-structured 
telecommunication systems.
Based on a growing body of empirical evidence, it has been 
theorised that Chinese management systems constrain the use of 
formal and integrated MIS (see Martinsons, 1991; Tricker, 1988) . 
In fact, there may be a basic misfit between the computer-based 
management information systems (that prevail in places like the 
United States) and the organisational behaviours of the Chinese 
(see Martinsons & Westwood, 1997) .
Personal communication technologies, such as cellular phones, 
appear to be much more suited to the Chinese business context. 
This issue of fit merits further investigation. Specific studies 
could consider the types of IT applications that could best
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support the scanning activities of Chinese managers and others 
who are confronted by dynamic and uncertain environments.
8.8 An Agenda for Additional Research
In addition to the topics already mentioned in this chapter, 
several other areas related to strategic intelligence are also 
worthy of further study. At present, little is known about how 
specific characteristics of the recipient, rather than those of 
the information source or the external environment, influence 
environmental perceptions and scanning behaviours. This study 
found partial support for a relationship between higher education 
levels and greater use of both impersonal and personal 
information sources. However, the influence of specific 
cognitive characteristics and management styles on scanning 
behaviours is worthy of further investigation.
It is expected that different aspects of strategic issue 
diagnosis and decision making will depend on the cognitive style 
of the manager. Cognitive style is a multi-faceted concept with 
several dimensions that can potentially influence information 
seeking and use (Rouse & Rouse, 1984). Among the most important 
may be ambiguity tolerance and locus of control.
Ambiguity tolerance is the capability to accept or live with 
situations that are perceived or interpreted as being ambiguous, 
while ambiguity intolerance is the tendency to perceive or 
interpret such situations as sources of threat (Budner, 1962). 
However, only one previous study appears to have investigated 
this variable in the context of environmental scanning. Boyd 
(1989) found tentative support in the U.S. for his hypothesis 
that managers with a higher tolerance for ambiguity will engage 
in higher levels of scanning activity. Based on the results of 
this study, Hong Kong or another Chinese-dominated society would 
provide an attractive site for testing the external validity of 
this finding.
Given the traditional Chinese belief in fatalism, it would also
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be useful to study how the locus of control influences 
environmental scanning practices. Locus of control refers to the 
perceptions of people about the factors responsible for what 
happens to them. People with an internal locus of control tend 
to believe that what happens to them is under their own control. 
In contrast, those with an external locus of control tend to view 
what happens to them as determined by circumstances and events 
beyond their influence.
All other factors being equal, those with an external locus of 
control may be less inclined to seek out information about the 
environment because of their self-perceived inability to act upon 
it. This tendency may moderate the amount of scanning and the 
frequency of information source use in Chinese societies. 
Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any empirical study 
of this variable in the context of environmental scanning.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, several studies conducted in the 
United States have investigated the relationship between 
environmental scanning patterns and business performance. Chief 
executive scanning in higher-performing U.S. firms has been found 
to have a broader base, be more frequent, rely more on personal 
sources, and have a more positive correlation with PSU (Daft et 
al, 1988; Dollinger, 1984; Schafer, 1990). This stream of 
research could be extended to consider the performance 
implications of different scanning patterns in places like Hong 
Kong and China. The more general question of causality between 
scanning behaviour and business performance also remains to be 
addressed.
This chapter has identified several promising lines of research. 
However, those who pursue a recommended area of research that 
involves performance variables should be aware of at least two 
key issues that arise from the Chinese business culture:
1. It is comparatively difficult to obtain financial data from 
Chinese organisations in Hong Kong and elsewhere; and
2. Chinese businesses (both family-controlled and larger state-
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owned enterprises on the mainland) do not necessarily aim 
to maximise their performance in the Anglo-American sense 
of shareholder value. The interests of workers and business 
associates may be more important than those of shareholders 
(or other "owners") of the enterprise.
These obstacles, or at least considerations, and the previously 
mentioned limitations of this study imply that research on 
strategic intelligence in places like Hong Kong will be 
challenging and fraught with uncertainty. In these
circumstances, it is critical that investigators not be bound by 
either tradition or preconception. They may find it useful to 
heed the advice of Sun Zi, and be prepared to adapt to an 
infinite variety of circumstances. This advice has certainly 
been taken to heart by many a successful CEO in Hong Kong.
8.9 Looking Back and Looking Ahead
The study reported here involved addressing many challenges, but 
it is hoped that its results and conclusions will benefit 
management researchers, educators and practitioners. While the 
investigation was motivated primarily by a scholarly quest, it 
is expected to be of value to many of those whose own businesses 
are competing against or co-operating with Hong Kong Chinese 
organisations. An understanding of how their CEOs perceive the 
external environment, how they acquire and use information about 
it, and why they favour particular approaches and sources should 
benefit both potential adversaries and collaborators.
The “strategy as practice" perspective advocated by Whittington 
(1988, 1996) involves a shift in focus from organisations and
their strategies to strategists and their strategising. There 
is now a broad consensus in the management literature that 
variations in personal attributes will lead to differences in 
what individuals will pay attention to and how they will perceive 
and act upon certain information.
The autocratic tendencies of Hong Kong organisational leaders
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suggest that those seeking to understand and perhaps even predict 
their strategic moves and directions would be well-advised to 
learn about their values, attitudes, perceptions and behaviours. 
Knowledge about the environmental perceptions and scanning 
patterns of Hong Kong Chinese CEOs would represents a useful 
starting point in such a learning process.
The discussion in Chapter 7, taken together with the conclusions 
and implications identified in this chapter, indicates that this 
study has made a significant contribution to several aspects of 
the literature. From a methodological perspective, it has shown 
not only the value of combining complementary approaches, but 
specifically the benefits of following up a large-scale survey 
with a small number of case studies.
In the American management research tradition, the case study, 
and qualitative research in general, has been relegated to a 
peripheral role. Even when a case study method is used, it is 
typically employed during the early stages of a research project, 
as part of a grounded, interpretive approach that leads to the 
development of a preliminary model. It is then common to 
subsequently test the nature and strength of the relationships 
in that model by gathering quantitative data and subjecting it 
to statistical analysis.
In contrast, the design of this study was based on an assumption 
that strategic intelligence is a multifaceted phenomenon. 
Consequently, a multifaceted approach was deemed to be 
appropriate. A survey yielding general descriptive data 
(suitable for comprehensive statistical analysis) was followed 
by case studies providing a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative data (suitable for explaining and elaborating on the 
survey observations).
It is hoped that the framework of this study may serve as an 
exemplar for future research of multifaceted phenomena in the 
field of organisational and management studies, much as Mintzberg
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et al. (1976) and Daft et al. (1988) shaped the designs of many 
strategic decision making and environmental scanning studies, 
respectively, that were undertaken after their work was 
published.
This study profiled the environmental perceptions and scanning 
behaviours of ethnic Chinese CEOs in pre-handover Hong Kong, 
derived explanations for the observed patterns, and ultimately 
considered the implications of the results and the conclusions 
drawn from them. The perceptions of environmental uncertainty 
and scanning behaviours found in Hong Kong had many similarities 
but also several significant differences compared to those found 
in Canada, Nigeria and the United States. The industry-specific 
nature of environmental uncertainty was also very evident in the 
distinctive rankings of environmental sectors by the CEOs from 
two industries that were surveyed as well as their range of 
perspectives on the impending transfer of political sovereignty.
With the passage of time, more of the answer to the question of 
“What will happen to Hong Kong after 1997?” is revealed and the 
pre-handover uncertainty is relegated to the history books. 
Nevertheless, it is believed that this study will continue to 
interest management scholars in the future because it has 
documented how organisational leaders in Hong Kong perceived the 
impending discontinuity in their external environment and what 
information sources were relied upon to shape those perceptions 
and address strategic issues in the pre-handover period.
Remarkably, the study of how information about the external 
environment was acquired and used by the CEOs in pre-handover 
Hong Kong pointed towards a dynamic tension between traditional 
Chinese business practices and more modem management approaches. 
Many key aspects of overseas Chinese management were confirmed 
or reinforced by the results of this research.
Nevertheless, the results suggest that, consistent with the 
convergence hypothesis, the application of information technology
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and more systematic approaches to environmental scanning may be 
expected as the Hong Kong business community responds to a 
combination of internal and external forces. Although this was 
not a longitudinal study, the surveying of both a relatively 
traditional industry (printing) and a more modern one 
(securities) revealed a contrast that may be reflective of 
general “before” and “after" profiles in a modernising economy.
This research has described and explained the fundamental nature 
of strategic intelligence in Hong Kong. As a pioneering effort, 
the author is confident that represents a beginning rather than 
an end, and that it will provide a strong foundation for 
additional investigation. This chapter has identified many 
topics that merit further study and suggested useful approaches 
for such investigations.
Those with research interests in the fields of strategic 
management and/or information management as well as the energy 
and motivation to take on a formidable challenge are encouraged 
to build upon this study in order to further advance our 
knowledge of both strategic intelligence phenomena and the nature 
of organisational management in different contexts.
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APPENDIX A
HONG KONG INDUSTRY PROFILES
A.l The Securities Industry
The services sector has become a progressively more important 
part of the Hong Kong economy in recent decades. It accounted 
for less than 60 per cent of economic output in 1970, but had 
risen to over 80 per cent by 1996 (Hong Kong Government, 1997) . 
Financial services (including insurance and real estate) has been 
a particularly vibrant sub-sector. It grew at an average annual 
rate of more than 20 percent in the decade from 1986, and 
accounted for more than one-quarter of Hong Kong's total GDP in 
1996 (Government Information Centre, 1997).
Hong Kong became a major international financial centre by 
capitalizing on its modern infrastructure, English and Chinese 
language capabilities, liberal economic policies, and a 
favourable location near the geographic centre of the Asian 
continent. It now has an integrated network of financial 
institutions and markets that provide a wide range of products 
and services to both local and international clients. Meanwhile, 
the corporate cathedrals around Victoria Harbour now attest to 
the role of financial services as the lifeblood of the Hong Kong 
economy.
The Hong Kong Government has been generally lauded for creating 
a favourable environment for the financial services industry, 
with adequate regulation to help ensure systemic confidence and 
sound business practices while avoiding excess impediments of 
either a bureaucratic or fiscal nature. For example, it has 
worked closely with the industry to develop and implement a real­
time interbank payment system in Hong Kong that has raised 
transactions efficiency while reducing settlement risks.
Hong Kong differs from paper centres in the Bahamas and the 
Caymans, which are merely convenient for book-keeping and tax- 
avoidance. Hong Kong is a functional centre that generates
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enormous turnover and employs nearly two hundred and fifty 
thousand people. In contrast to Tokyo and Singapore, it is also 
fully integrated, with no artificial barriers between onshore and 
offshore markets.
Over 400 authorized institutions from nearly 50 different 
countries conducted business under the Banking Ordinance in 1996 
(Howlett, 1997). The absence of currency exchange controls 
coupled with the presence of a leading-edge telecommunications 
infrastructure have helped to make Hong Kong one of the most 
active foreign currency markets, and one of the few with around 
the clock trading.
A focus of this study was on the securities industry within the 
financial services sector. Less than three decades ago, Hong 
Kong had a small and parochial stock market, with trading largely 
confined to the equity shares of British firms and local 
utilities. During the 1970s, massive commercial and esidential 
property developments required equally massive financing. This 
prompted a flurry of initial public offerings by local firms and 
led to a rapid expansion of the financial markets in Hong Kong.
After weaknesses in those markets and their regulation were 
exposed by the global crash of October 1987, the Hong Kong 
Government established the Securities and Futures Commission 
(SFC) as an oversight body in 1989. Within the next two years, 
two new ordinances were also enacted, to address insider trading 
and the disclosure of interest. Taken together, these government 
initiatives have improved the transparency and credibility of the 
financial marketplace in Hong Kong.
Nevertheless, the high volatility of regional and global market 
sentiment as well as periodic regulatory changes remain as major 
concerns for the broadly-defined securities industry, which 
consisted of about 2,900 firms employing 37,000 people (Hong Kong 
Government, 1997) .
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The listing of shares by state enterprises from the People's 
Republic of China represented an exciting new development for the 
securities industry. With mainland China looking to the Hong 
Kong marketplace for capital to power its economic reforms, the 
so-called "H" shares and red-chips created a lot of international 
publicity and contributed to a substantial growth in Hong Kong 
share trading volumes.
The unified Hong Kong Stock Exchange, established in 1981, is now 
instrumental in financing the economic development of the PRC. 
Hong Kong attracts many international investors and foreign 
financial service providers, but only members of the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (SEHK) and the Hong Kong Futures 
Exchange Limited (HKFE) are permitted to trade on the local stock 
and futures exchanges, respectively. At the end of 1996, the 
stock exchange had 563 corporate and individual members while the 
futures exchange had 134 members (Howlett, 1997) . By the end of 
1996, it ranked eighth in the world and second in Asia (behind 
Tokyo), with a total market capitalization of about HK $ 3,500 
billion (or 280 billion British pounds) (see Howlett, 1997).
A Securities Ordinance has been in place since 1974 to regulate 
the securities industry. This ordinance provides for the 
investigation of suspected malpractice in securities transactions 
and the maintenance of a fund to compensate clients of defaulting 
brokers. Under this ordinance, dealers in securities, investment 
advisors, and commodity dealers must register with the Securities 
and Futures Commission (SFC). At the end of 1996, 17,892 persons 
and 715 corporate securities dealers (including 291 from 
overseas) were registered with the SFC (Howlett, 1997). This 
represented a rapid rate of growth from less than 8,495 persons 
and 271 corporate dealers (143 from overseas) in 1991 (Roberts, 
1992) . The case studies reported here focus on the chief 
executives heading two of the 424 local corporate securities 
traders in Hong Kong.
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A.2 The Printing Industry
Small family enterprises, with strong imitative capabilities and 
competitive cost structures, have been the norm in the industrial 
sector of the Hong Kong economy (Sit & Wong, 1989; Wong, 1988). 
Even in 1997, less than 1,000 manufacturing establishments in 
Hong Kong had more than 50 employees. Meanwhile, extensive sub­
contracting networks promote production flexibility in response 
to changing marklet demands and serve as incubators for product 
extension and diversification (Redding, 1990; Sit & Wong, 1989). 
Furthermore, the relocation of labour-intensive production to 
mainland China and a move towards higher technology and higher 
value-added activities have been major recent trends among Hong 
Kong manufacturers. These general characteristics also fit the 
printing industry in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong produces different types of printed matter, including 
books, brochures, pamphlets and leaflets, and paper and 
paperboard labels that are used for packaging. Other product 
categories include advertising materials, commercial catalogues, 
calendars, postcards and greeting cards. Hong Kong is also a 
well-known centre for printing newspapers, journals and 
periodicals.
There were about 4,900 printing establishments at the end of 
1996, but only 157 of these establishments employed more than 50 
people, and only about 20 firms had more than 250 workers (Hong 
Kong Census and Statistics, 1997). Total industry employment was 
about 46,000 people (or just under 15 percent of all 
manufacturing workers in Hong Kong), making it the second largest 
employer in the manufacturing sector by early 1997, behind 
clothing, but well ahead of electronics (Howlett, 1997).
Gross output by the printing industry was valued at HK$ 24.4 
billion (or nearly 2 billion British pounds) in 1996, with value- 
added totalling nearly HK$10 billion (or nearly 800 million 
British pounds) . Although the role of manufacturing in the Hong 
Kong has declined significantly since the 1970s, the printing
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industry has experienced healthy growth, at a compound annual 
rate of about 17 percent from 1986 to 1996.
In contrast to many industries in Hong Kong, which exported the 
majority of their products, almost 80 percent of printing 
industry outputs were sold to local customers. The United 
States, China, the United Kingdom, and Japan had been the major 
foreign markets in recent years. Direct overseas buying by 
principals is rare, and direct marketing through the company's 
own channels was relatively insignificant. Most exports were 
attributable to orders received directly from overseas countries. 
About 25% of the export orders came from major publishers with 
Hong Kong operations, such as Oxford University Press, Longman 
and Macmillan. Exports were handled primarily by a few large 
printing firms that have established business relationships with 
overseas customers.
The printing industry could be broadly divided into three 
segments: 1) job printing, 2) periodicals printing, and 3) pre- 
and post-press services. The number of estbalishments and 
employees in each segment are shown in Table A.l.
Table A.l
Establishments and Employment in the Printing Industry
(1997 Hong Kong Government estimates)
Number of Total Employees per
establishments emnlovees establishment
Job printing 3,650 28,000 7.7
Periodicals
printing 50 9,000 180
Pre- and post-
press operations 1,200 9,000 7.5
Total 4,900 46,000 9.4
Job printing is the largest segment of the printing industry,A -  5
accounting for almost 80 per cent of the total number of 
establishments. This sector is dominated by a few large players 
and a large numbers of small manufacturers. The small job 
printers are primarily engaged in the printing of posters, name 
cards, invitation cards, pamphlets, catalogues, and office paper 
stationery for local consumption.
The larger printers are more export-oriented, printing everything 
from books, pamphlets, diaries, periodicals, greeting cards and 
securities products (such as cheques, credit cards and share 
certificates), to packaging/printing materials for other 
manufacturing industries. In contrast, the smaller firms tend 
to rely on orders from individuals and small businesses in Hong 
Kong and southern China. As such, they are highly dependent on 
the general health of the local economy.
Periodicals printing accounts for less than two percent of the 
total number of printing establishments but over 20% of the total 
employment. Hong Kong enjoys a relatively high degree of press 
freedom that has led many international publishing houses 
(especially those involved in publishing news magazines and 
journals) to set up their regional centres here. Several major 
international magazines (e.g. Readers' Digest, The Economist, and 
Newsweek) and regional magazines (e.g. Far East Economic Review, 
Asia Week, and Asian Business) are printed in Hong Kong.
Establishments in publishing services are engaged in typesetting, 
colour separation, plate-making, lamination and book binding. 
Like job printing factories, these factories are generally quite 
small, mainly providing support services to local printers. 
Some, like the reproduction houses, also deal directly with 
overseas publishers and printers. Given Hong Kong's excellent 
telecommunication facilities, publishers are able to access 
information quickly from various parts of the world. This 
advantage is of vital importance to time-sensitive publications.
Increased demand for securities products has also fuelled the
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boom of the printing industry. Industry sources estimated that 
annual growth of the sector averaged 3 0 per cent in the last few 
years. Hong Kong has become the East Asian centre of security 
printing due to its ability to meet high quality requirements.
The printing industry in Hong Kong is renowned for its quality, 
quick delivery, competitive pricing, and ability to cope with 
short-run printing jobs. Local printing firms have combined 
extensive sub-contracting networks with assorted technologies to 
achieve flexible production capbilities and superior service to 
niche markets. The industry has made a steady stream of capital 
investments to upgrade its technology. Its advanced machinery 
and equipment have led to expanded production capacity and 
improved quality standards. Many printing firms use advanced 
models of lasersetters, electronic colour scanners, electronic 
page-composing systems, automatic finishing systems and automatic 
printing machines. Large printers such as Toppan, Dai Nippon, 
Kyodo and Empire reportedly use the best equipment available.
Labour shortages and rising production costs have hampered 
industrial development since the 1980s and forced many firms to 
move their operations out of Hong Kong. Most of these 
relocations have been to Guangdong Province in mainland China, 
where land and especially labour costs are much lower. Both 
large and small printing firms have participated in this 
migration. Their tendency to keep administrative and marketing 
activities in Hong Kong has created the challenge of managing 
remote operations. Some small- and medium-sized firms in the 
industry have been grouping together in order to offer a complete 
range of publishing and printing services, and thereby improve 
their competitiveness.
Internal R&D within the industry remains extremely limited, with 
even modified production processes being imitated from overseas 
rather than innovated. Rivalry is intense and stems mainly from 
the large number of industry participants. The primary bases for 
competition are cost and responsiveness. There is a growing need
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for low-cost labour, because the comparatively simple and 
standardized nature of the production technology means that 
competition can come from anywhere in the region, or anywhere in 
the world.
Detailed data on both potential customers and production 
technologies are available from the Trade Development Council 
(TDC) and the Department of Industry. Private sources, such as 
Trade Media Ltd., also publish an assortment of specialized 
buying guides. Some buying agencies also act as information 
hubs. The openness of Hong Kong to information about externally 
available production machinery, and the ease with which it can 
be imported, makes it difficult to sustain an advantage through 
either cost or the functionality of production technology.
The vast majority of printing firms registered in Hong Kong are 
locally owned, and about 90 per cent are owner-managed. Foreign 
investment in the industry amounted to almost HK$ 2.5 billion (or 
over 200 million British pounds) in 1995. Japan was the primary 
source of that foreign investment (accounting for around 59 per 
cent of the total), followed by the United States, Singapore, and 
the United Kingdom.
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A. 3 Newspapers and Universities
In addition to the two surveyed industries (securities and 
printing), newspaper publishers and universities were considered 
to be fertile settings for studying information seeking by CEOs. 
Information and IT play vital roles in these two industries 
(Picard, 1997; Samaddara, 1994). Cynics might suggest that much 
of the information flowing in and around universities is 
irrelevant to everyday life while that provided by newspapers is 
highly dispensable. However, a general contrast may also be 
drawn between the general characteristics of information in the 
two business environments: sophisticated and objective for 
universities versus sensationalistic and opinionated in 
newspapers.
Universities strive for rigorous data collection and analysis, 
and thereby tend to advance and disseminate accumulated 
knowledge. Meanwhile, newspapers gather data about very recent 
events and provide it to consumers in the form of easy-to-read 
descriptive accounts. However, it can not be denied that both 
universities and newspapers depend critically on information. 
They would not exist with it.
In line with their information-intensive activities, both 
newspaper firms and universities depend critically upon 1) the 
basic freedom of enquiry, whether journalistic and academic, and 
2) the freedom to disseminate the results of those enquiries, 
irrespective of their consistency with the values and ideologies 
of political authorities. As a result, the top managers of both 
newspaper publishers and universities in Hong Kong may have 
reasons for concern about an impending transfer of sovereignty 
to an authoritarian regime that rules over a comparatively closed 
society in mainland China.
A.3.1 The Chinese Language Newspaper Industry
Timely information is a necessity in the newspaper industry. 
Daily newspaper companies need to design, manufacture and 
distribute a new product every 24 hours. There are few other
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industries where this sort of pressure recurs on a daily basis.
At the time of the study, there were 19 daily newspapers in Hong 
Kong. Sixteen of these were published in the Chinese language 
and the remaining three in English. The Chinese language 
newspapers were: Apple Daily (AD), Express News (EN), Hong Kong 
Commercial Daily (HKCD), Hong Kong Daily News (HKDN), Hong Kong 
Economic Journal (HKEJ), Hong Kong Economic Times (HKET), Hong 
Kong People's Daily (HKPD), Mad Dog Daily (MDD), Ming Pao (MP), 
Oriental Daily News (ODN), Sing Pao Daily News (SPDN), Sing Tao 
Daily (STD) , Ta Rung Pao (TKP) , The World Daily News (TWDN) , Tin 
Tin Daily News (TTDN) , and Wen Wei Po (WWP) . The English 
language newspapers were: the Eastern Express (EE), the Hong Kong 
Standard (HKS), and the South China Morning Post (SCMP).
The newspaper industry in Hong Kong had a loose oligopoly 
structure, with substantial product differentiation and 
relatively low barriers to entry, but the market is dominated by 
a few firms. The Chinese language newspapers in Hong Kong may 
be divided into two groups, based on their target market. The 
ODN, AD, SPD, HKDN, and TTDN were among those serving the mass 
market. On the other hand, MP, HKEJ, and HKET were aimed at 
specific market segments. MP was directly aimed at the educated 
middle class while the latter two specialized in local financial 
news and analysis.
Technological change and competition with other media have become 
global issues for the newspaper industry (see Picard, 1997) . 
However, this study came at a time when the impending transfer 
of sovereignty represented an unprecedented challenge for Hong 
Kong newspaper firms. Amidst the political and economic 
uncertainty that were expected to accompany this environmental 
discontinuity, their distinctive concerns could be expected to 
include the prospects for both the editorial freedom of the press 
and the stream of advertising income after the handover.
The total size of the Hong Kong newspaper market had been slowly
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declining since the late 1980s. The interviews with two 
newspaper chief executives suggested that three factors - real 
price increases, reduced product differentiation, and the 
emergence of substitute products - were behind this trend. Each 
is briefly outlined in the paragraphs that follow.
The costs for newspapers may be divided into production and 
distribution. The distribution costs in the industry had been 
quite constant in real times for the past decade. By 1996, they 
totalled about HK$ 2 per copy, with about HK$ 0.50 going to the 
distribution agent and HK$ 1.50 to the newsstand vendor. Despite 
this stability in distribution costs, sharply rising costs of 
material inputs and human resources created tough times for most 
Hong Kong newspaper firms.
Production costs had outpaced inflation throughout the early 
1990s. There was upward pressure on wage rates for editors, 
reporters and semi-skilled production workers. Meanwhile, the 
price of newsprint was rising rapidly. Even worse, it was in 
scarce supply as a result of strong market growth through the 
region. Newspaper publishers in Hong Kong had to pay nearly US 
$1,000 per tonne by late 1995. This was some US $150-200 more 
than the price in Europe and North America, and nearly three-fold 
increase on the price in the Hong Kong market the start of 1992.
At the same time, people in Hong Kong were becoming more 
selective in buying their daily newspapers. One of the CEOs 
estimated that between 15 and 20 percent of the adult population 
in Hong Kong read more than one paper in the mid 1980s, but that 
figure had declined to less than 5 percent. This was attributed 
largely to a faster pace of life and the increasing availability 
of timely and low-cost substitutes. News through the Internet 
and other electronic channels that is free or offered at a 
nominal subscription cost has undoubtedly hurt the newspaper 
industry. However, the CEO also mentioned that journalists from 
different newspapers were increasingly sharing information 
amongst themselves or relying on news wire services. This had
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reduced content differentiation in the newspaper industry.
One of the industry's few opportunities for growth and potential 
differentiation came from the increasing demand for fast, 
accurate and comprehensive financial information and analysis. 
With the rising level of prosperity in Hong Kong, and the 
prospects to make quick money in the stock and property markets, 
such information was attractive to more and more people.
A. 2 .2 Hiahsr Education
The Hong Kong Government identified the improvement of 'soft 
infrastructure' as a major policy aim for the last decade of 
colonial role. Consistent with this aim, the higher education 
system was rapidly transformed from an elitist model to a mass 
model in order to produce the professionals and technologists 
that are required by a rapidly-developing socio-economy. From 
1988 to 1995, the first year, first degree places in Hong Kong 
rose from about 7 per cent of the 18-year old population in Hong 
Kong to over 18 per cent of that population.
A wide variety of public and private institutions now provide 
higher education in Hong Kong. Secondary school graduates may 
obtain initial qualifications from a number of universities and 
colleges funded indirectly by the government through the 
University Grants Committee (UGC) and the Vocational Training 
Council (VTC). These institutions are heavily subsidised by the 
taxpayer. Most offer a wide range of disciplines, but two (the 
Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts and the Hong Kong Institute 
of Education) specialise in limited areas. Three privately- 
operated local colleges also provide full-time degree programmes.
Part-time programmes, typically taken by those already in 
employment, are offered by the Open Learning Institute, the Hong 
Kong Management Association, and many overseas institutions. 
While full-time postgraduate programmes are restricted to the UGC 
institutions, part-time provision is more widespread. A large 
and growing demand for continuing and professional education
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(CPE) is satisfied by UGC and VTC institutions, private colleges 
as well as partly by trade associations and employers in-house.
In 1996-1997, there were about 140,000 full time equivalent (FTE) 
students of higher education in Hong Kong, of which the largest 
components were 70,000 in the UGC institutions and 30,000 taking 
CPE courses. Higher education in Hong Kong has absorbed about 
six percent of recurrent public expenditure in recent years, and 
employed nearly 18,000 workers at the end of 1996, including over 
5,000 teaching and research staff. About one-third of the 
academic staff were "home grown" in that they received their 
higher education in Hong Kong. Little change in these student 
and staff numbers is foreseen over the next few years.
In addition to the expansion of opportunity within the UGC and 
VTC institutions, there had also been a substantial increase in 
private sector provision. Business and computing courses 
provided by overseas institutions, usually in collaboration with 
local partners, had been particularly popular. In essense, the 
universities in Hong Kong have gradually moved towards 
government-supervised, market-based competition.
The recent expansion of higher education in Hong Kong has raised 
concerns about the quality of both processes and outputs. In 
response, the UGC had initiated periodic research assessment 
exercises as well as teaching and learning quality process 
reviews. News structures and systems at the university level and 
audits that are conducted in collaboration with outside parties 
were introduced to helped assure quality.
The average A-level score of entrants to first degree courses 
declined slightly from 1988 to 1996. The UGC institutions also 
remained weak in terms of their limited numbers of overseas 
students, their lack of student residences, and a declining level 
of English language competence among their incoming students (and 
even some worries about Chinese proficiency, e.g. Putonghua).
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In contrast, emerging factors such as increasingly attractive 
compensation packages and a growing research culture enabled 
appointments that upgraded the university faculties in Hong Kong 
to a level "that is comparable to those in the world's leading 
intellectual centres such as Boston, London and Paris" (Eastern 
Express, 1996). The remarkable growth in research activity has 
also been helped by increased funding from both government and 
industry, which amounted to HK$ 700 million (or over 55 million 
British pounds) in 1996, and the creation of a high-powered 
Research Grants Council. Whether the vibrant research culture 
is maintained and world-class scholars remain in Hong Kong after 
the handover may depend laregly on the nature of university 
relations with the new government and other funding sources.
To sum up, the teaching side of the university system may be said 
to have survived the rapid expansion process while the research 
component has undeniably thrived. In advance of the handover, 
there were adequate levels of high-quality faculty and facilities 
to meet the demand for higher education in Hong Kong. A diverse 
and flexible higher education system was addressing the needs for 
both initial qualifications and life-long personal and 
professional development.
Each university in Hong Kong has a governance structure that 
includes an overall governing body (variously called the Court, 
the Council, or the Board of Governors) and a body to regulate 
academic affairs (called the Senate or the Academic Board). The 
governing body, headed by a government-appointed Chancellor or 
Chairman, periodically selects the chief executive for the 
university, who has the title of Vice-Chancellor or President.
As identified in the interviews conducted with two of these chief 
executives, the universities faced a wide range of strategic 
issues. In many ways, these issues were more complex than many 
of the ones mentioned by private sector chief executives because 
of the interplay between market and political forces.
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APPENDIX B - i
ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION QE 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Please c irc le  the number that best indicates your response e.g.
I Section A: Perception of the Environment!
A1 How im p o r ta n t  to your organization are trends and events in each environmental 
sector?
The external environment may be divided into 6 sectors defined below.
Not
Environmental sector important
(1) Customer sector: 1
companies or individual that
use your service/ purchase 
your products
(2) Competition sector: 1
companies that make substitute 
service/ products, which compete
with your own, and their 
competitive tactics.
(3) Technological sector: 1
development of new information 
technologies, production techniques, 
innovation and R&O trends to your 
company.
(4) Legal & political sector: 1
legislation and regulations, 
government policies, and political 
developments.
(5) Economic sector: 1
economic factors such as inflation, 
interest rates, unemployment, and 
economic growth.
(6) Sociocultural sector: 1
demographic trends, social attitudes 
and values in the general population.
Fairly Of some Fairly Very
unimportant importance important important
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 S
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 S
2 3 4 S
2Rate of change is the extent to which agencies, issues, trends, problems, or 
opportunities change over time in your company’s external environment.
A2 What is the rate of change taking place in each environmental sector?
A  lo w  rate o f  change  means things stay about the same from year to year.
A  high ra te  o f  change  means things change quickly and unpredictably from year 
to year.
Environmental sector Low Fairly low Medium Fairly high High
(1) Customer sector 1 2 3 4 5
(2) Competition sector 1 2 3 4 5
(3) Technological sector 1 2 3 4 5
(4) Legal & political sector 1 2 3 4 5
(S) Economic sector 1 2 3 4 5
(6) Sociocultural sector 1 2 3 4 5
A3 W hat is the level of comDlexitv of each environmental sector?
A  complex sector has a large number of diverse factors that need to be taken into 
account in decision making. There are many organizational and individual players 
with complex relationships, so that cause and effect links cannot always be 
established.
Environmental sector Low Fairly low Medium Fairly high High
(1) Customer sector 1 2 3 4 5
(2) Competition sector 1 2 3 4 5
(3) Technological sector 1 2 3 4 5
(4) Legal & political sector 1 2 3 4 5
(S) Economic sector 1 2 3 4 5
(6) Sociocultural sector 1 2 3 4 5
3B1 How frequently do you use each of the following information sources to scan the 
environment?
[Section B: Perception of Information Sources!
Information source Never
Less than 
once a 
year
Few
times a 
year
At least 
once a 
month
At least 
once a 
week
At least 
once a 
day
1. Customers 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Competitors 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Business/ professional 
associates
1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Friends, family 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Public media2 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Government publications 1 2 3 4 5 6
7. Industry, trade associations 1 2 3 4 5 6
a. Superiors 1 2 3 4 5 6
9. Subordinates 1 2 3 4 5 6
10. Internal documents3 1 2 3 4 5 6
11. Electronic information services4 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other sources that you use:
12. 1 2 3 4 5 6
13. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Suppliers, distributors, bankers, lawyers, accountants, consultants, etc. 
Newspapers, periodicals, radio, TV, etc.
Memoranda, circulars, reports, studies, etc.
On-line databases, electronic news bulletin boards, etc.
4
Relevant information is information that is needed and useful with respect to the 
goals and activities of your company.
B2 How relevant is the information from each source about the environment?
Information source
Very
irrelevant
Fairly
irrelevant
Of some 
relevance
Fairly
relevant
Very
relevant
1. Customers 1 2 3 4 5
2. Competitors 1 2 3 4 5
3. Business/ professional 
associates5
1 2 3 4 5
4. Friends, family 1 2 3 4 5
5. Public media5 1 2 3 4 5
6. Government publications 1 2 3 4 5
7. Industry, trade associations 1 2 3 4 5
8. Superiors 1 2 3 4 5
9. Subordinates 1 2 3 4 5
10. Internal documents7 1 2 3 4 5
11. Electronic information services5 1 2 3 4 5
Other sources that you use:
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
Suppliers, distributors, bankers, lawyers, accountants, consultants, etc. 
Newspapers, periodicals, radio, TV, etc.
Memoranda, circulars, reports, studies, etc.
On-line databases, electronic news bulletin boards, etc.
5Information is reliable when it is authoritative and dependable. It is information 
that you personally trust.
B3 How reliable is the information from each source about the environment?
Information source
Very
unreliable
Fairly
unreliable
Reliable 
to some 
extent
Fairly
reliable
Very
reliable
1. Customers 1 2 3 4 5
2. Competitors 1 2 3 4 5
3. Business/ professional 
associates4
1 2 3 4 5
4. Friends, family 1 2 3 4 5
5. Public media10 1 2 3 4 5
6. Government publications 1 2 3 4 5
7. Industry, trade associations 1 2 3 4 5
8. Superiors 1 2 3 4 5
9. Subordinates 1 2 3 4 5
10. Internal documents" 1 2 3 4 5
11. Electronic information services'2 1 2 3 4 5
Other sources that you use:
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
Suppliers, distributors, bankers, lawyers, accountants, etc. 
Newspapers, periodicals, radio, TV, etc.
Memoranda, circulars, reports, studies, etc.
On-line databases, electronic news bulletin boards, etc.
6B4 How much of your tim e  and effort is needed to approach, contact, or locate each 
information source?
Information source
Very
great deal
Great
deal some Little
Very
Little
1. Customers 1 2 3 4 5
2. Competitors 1 2 3 4 5
3. Business/ professional 
associates 3
1 2 3 4 5
4. Friends, family 1 2 3 4 5
5. Public media14 1 2 3 4 5
6. Government publications 1 2 3 4 5
7. Industry, trade associations 1 2 3 4 S
8. Superiors 1 2 3 4 S
9. Subordinates 1 2 3 4 S
10. Internal documents15 1 2 3 4 5
11. Electronic information services'6 1 2 3 4 S
Other sources that you use:
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
Suppliers, distributors, bankers, lawyers, accountants, consultants, etc. 
Newspapers, periodicals, radio, TV, etc.
Memoranda, circulars, reports, studies, etc.
On-line databases, electronic news bulletin boards, etc.
7B5 A fte r  contacting o r locating 
in fo rm a tion  from  tha t source?
the source, h o w e a sv  is it to ge t the desired
Information source
Very
hard
Fairly
hard
Neither 
easy nor hard
Fairly
easy
Very
easy
1. Customers 1 2 3 4 5
2. Competitors 1 2 3 4 5
3. Business/ professional 
associates 7
1 2 3 4 5
4. Friends, family 1 2 3 4 5
5. Public media'8 1 2 3 4 5
6. Government publications 1 2 3 4 5
7. Industry, trade associations 1 2 3 4 5
8. Superiors 1 2 3 4 5
9. Ssubordinates 1 2 3 4 5
10. Internal documents’8 1 2 3 4 5
11. Electronic information services20 1 2 3 4 5
Other sources that you use:
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
Suppliers, distributors, bankers, lawyers, accountants, consultants, etc. 
Newspapers, periodicals, radio, TV, etc.
Memoranda, circulars, reports, studies, etc.
On-line databases, electronic news bulletin boards, etc.
8C1 How frequently  does information about each environmental sector come to your 
a ttention?
I Section C: Amount of Scanning I
Environmental sector
Less than 
once a 
year
Few 
times a 
year
At least 
once a 
month
At least 
once a 
week
At least 
once a 
day
(1) Customer sector 1 2 3 4 5
(2) Competition sector 1 2 3 4 5
(3) Technological sector 1 2 3 4 5
(4) Legal & political sector 1 2 3 4 5
(5) Economic sector 1 2 3 4 5
(6) Sociocultural sector 1 2 3 4 S
C2 T n  w h a t ex te n t do vou keen vourse lf inform ed about developments in each
environmental sector?
I generally do not try 
to keep myself 
informed about this 
sector
I try to be informed 
about the details of 
major events and 
trends in this sector
1 try to know 
everything 
about this 
sector
I try to be informed 
about the existence 
of major events and 
trends in this sector
I try to be informed 
about most events 
and trends in this 
sector
(D Customer sector 1 2 3 4 5
(2) Competition sector 1 2 3 4 5
(3) Technological sector 1 2 3 4 S
(4) Legal & political sector 1 2 3 4 5
(5) Economic sector 1 2 3 4 5
(6) Sociocultural sector 1 2 3 4 5
C3 How many hours do you work in a typical day, including working at home?------- hrs
In a typical working day, how many hours do you spend scanning? hrs
9I Section D : Use of Information |
D1 How frequently do you use information about the environment in your decision 
making activities?
How frequently do you use information about the external environment, when 
you...
Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always
1. decide on improvement project 
such as going into new businesses, 
organizational restructuring, 
acquisitions, public relations programs,
computerization projects, etc.? 1 2 3 4 5
2. decide about resource allocation, 
including budget allocation, 
employment of resources, 
setting of targets, distribution of work,
and so forth? 1 2 3 4 5
3. decide how to handle unexpected 
but important events, such as loss 
of a major customer or supplier, 
conflicts with another organization,
cutting off of key resources, etc.? 1 2  3 4
4. decide during negotiations with
external organizations or individuals, 
about your company's position on, for 
example, the commitment of
resources, or agreement on contracts? 1 2 3
10
D2 How frequently do you use information about the environment from each source 
in your decision making?
Information source Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always
1. Customers 1 2 3 4 S
2. Competitors 1 2 3 4 5
3. Business/ professional 
associates'1
1 2 3 4 5
4. Friends, family 1 2 3 4 5
5. Public media* 22 1 2 3 4 5
6. Government publications 1 2 3 4 S
7. Industry, trade associations 1 2 3 4 S
8. Superiors 1 2 3 4 5
9. Subordinates 1 2 3 4 S
10. Internal documents23 1 2 3 4 5
11. Electronic information services24 1 2 3 4 5
Other sources that you use:
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
Suppliers, distributors, bankers, lawyers, accountants, consultants, etc.
22 Newspapers, periodicals, radio, TV, etc.
23 Memoranda, circulars, reports, studies, etc.
24 On-line databases, electronic news bulletin boards, etc.
I Section E: Background information |
Please tell us about yourself and your company: (We will preserve the confidentiality of all data)
E1 What is your age? (Please tick one box)
Below 25 □  25 - 34 □  35 - 44 □  45 - 54 □  55 - 64 □  Above 64 □
E2 How many years have you been owner/ manager of this company? ______ years
In total, how many years have you been with this company? ______years
E3 What is your highest level of schooling you have attained? (Please tick one box)
None □  Primary □  Secondary □  Master degree or above □
College □  University degree □  Other □  please specify:_______
E4 In which functional area are you working? (Please tick one box)
Finance □  Marketing □  Production □  Personnel □  Other □  please specify:________
E5 What is the business nature of your company? ____________________
E6 How many employees are there in your company? _________ employees
E7 Is there a unit in your company which specializes in scanning? Yes □  No □
COMMENTS AND FEEDBACK
Is there anything else you would like to tell us about how you scan for and use information about the 
external environment? If so, please use this space for that purpose
1
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR ANSWERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE!
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2 . 1 2 3 4 5
3. m m /  ^ i6 A ± 13 1 2 3 4 5
4. HSÄ. £ A 1 2 3 4 5
s. w s ^ í r 14 1 2 3 4 5
6. 1 2 3 4 5
7. is a a a 1 2 3 4 5
8. ±ä] 1 2 3 4 5
9. T B 1 2 3 4 5
10. ft§B3¡:<*'5 1 2 3 4 5
11. ST'«IKSB«516 1 2 3 4 5
Ä 'E Ä fflW S iR *» :
12 1 2 3 4 5
13 1 2 3 4 5
13 ££{££0 • £r»0 • «fr • »66 • 0 f+S5Ä.WIW •
14 fiiS«« • «TW • * £  * •
15 ÄJSWfJ» ’ »ft • MEÄSWeiift* •
18 fifi±Mll«M • * * O T W W  •
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B4
if f t f iS iS
+ a -
A * * * — ¡fe /J '*
-BJ-
/ J ' i
1. S S ? 1 2 3 4 5
2. S t a i t i 1 2 3 4 5
3. f f l * /  ¥ 3 S I A ± 13 1 2 3 4 5
4. flBÄ. S A 1 2 3 4 5
5. « » . « f l - 14 1 2 3 4 S
6. iRJftfTO 1 2 3 4 5
7. 1 2 3 4 5
8. ± 5 ] 1 2 3 4 5
9. T W 1 2 3 4 S
10. f tS C S i* '5 1 2 3 4 S
11. 1 2 3 4 5
£ 1 E Ä f f lW Ä W * « :
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
u  t i s œ œ f f l  - # îh w  • « f r  • » e s  • w iib b & ihwiw  • 
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?£J?r
1. S I S 1 2 3 4 5
2. 1 2 3 4 5
3. S S /  3 S A ± ' 7 1 2 3 4 5
4. S H Â .f îA 1 2 3 4 5
5. ■SSiSEJÍ'18 1 2 3 4 5
6. ¡BO ftfM 1 2 3 4 5
7. I S B 5 S 1 2 3 4 5
8. ± 3 ] 1 2 3 4 S
9. T » 1 2 3 4 5
10. f t f f iX f * 19 1 2 3 4 5
h . t t u m m ™ 1 2 3 4 5
Â E ff if f lW S ÎK ^ ïS :
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
17 tiísetw.ffl • • «fí ■ »es • #itesa«r=i^  •
i» u s « «  • WfJ • « ë  • « M #  •
19 ftswsi* • a £  ■ m e ä w w b ä *  •
29 te«±¡mra» • «í»rB0)fi^ •
nas: rn m so k
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X
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£ « « «
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(2) 1 2 3 4 5
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«Ê& ÍS T WBf a # « «
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6. a j f r f j» 1 2 3 4 5
7. r a s a 1 2 3 4 5
S. ± s ] 1 2 3 4 5
9. T * 1 2 3 4 5
10. ftgßsii*23 1 2 3 4 S
11. S^SIrJääi.?24 1 2 3 4 5
12. 1 2 3 4 S
13. 1 2 3 4 5
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